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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is about non-party and non-governmental organisations campaigning for 
and against European integration in Britain between 1945 and 1986. These groups have so far 
been largely overlooked by studies on Britain’s relationship with Europe. The thesis will 
examine how these groups operated between the spheres of public activism and institutional 
politics. They targeted the general public directly with the aim of becoming popular mass 
movements, and focused on emotive and populist themes and adopted a moralistic tone as 
part of a broad non-party or cross-party appeal. Old-fashioned methods of activism, including 
pamphleteering and mass meetings, were used to cultivate a groundswell of support. 
However, these groups were not able to wrest control of the EEC membership issue away 
from Westminster. In the case of anti-EEC groups, attempts to acquire political influence and 
attract more parliamentarians to the campaign were at odds with the “anti-establishment” or 
“anti-political” tone adopted by sections of their support. Divisions over whether to adopt a 
more “insider” strategy of lobbying and adopting the model of a research-based think-tank or 
whether to continue seeking mass support stifled the campaign. Disagreement over strategy, 
and the confused position between public protest and Westminster politics, caused the anti-
EEC campaign’s to fail. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
At the time of writing, the question of Britain’s membership of the European Union is 
once again at the heart of British political debate. The Conservative government’s proposal 
for a referendum on British EU membership by 2017 has ensured that the issue will re-emerge 
and continue to be a subject of dispute both inside and outside of Westminster.
1
 It is a subject 
that has consistently drifted in and out of the British political agenda ever since the first steps 
towards European political and economic integration after the Second World War. British 
governments on the whole have been half-hearted towards involvement in European 
integration since declining to participate in the Schuman Plan in 1950, due to wariness of 
supranational development, the perception of Britain as a global power and a strong 
attachment to the Commonwealth. Successive governments were similarly negative towards 
integration, and favoured a free trade area in spite of the European Economic Community’s 
foundation in 1957. Declining economic performance and the psychological impact of the 
Suez crisis led to a reversal of policy, and two British applications to join the EEC were 
vetoed in the 1960s. After Britain became an EEC member in 1973, it was still seen as an 
intransigent partner, holding a referendum on membership in 1975, and criticising numerous 
aspects of EEC policy, particularly regarding Britain’s budgetary contribution. The 
Conservative Party became increasingly sceptical of European integration in the late 1980s, 
particularly after Margaret Thatcher’s critical Bruges Speech in 1988, and this strand of right-
wing Euroscepticism has remained strong ever since. 
                                                          
1
 Sparrow, A., “David Cameron’s Europe speech – the key points”, 23 January 2013, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/jan/23/david-camerons-europe-speech-points, retrieved 1 April 2013 
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Euroscepticism has gradually emerged into the British political mainstream since the 
early 1990s, and attitudes ranging from antipathy to hostility are prevalent in numerous MPs 
from all major political parties. However, the most prominent advocates of British withdrawal 
from the EU are currently the UK Independence Party (UKIP), whose rise in popularity 
further reflects a resurgence in Euroscepticism amongst the British public. Yet despite the 
recent emergence of UKIP as a political force, its current leader Nigel Farage has consistently 
sought to distance it from the three major political parties. In response to David Cameron’s 
claim that UKIP contained ‘some pretty odd people’, Farage declared that he was both ‘here 
as a campaigner’ and was a ‘conviction politician’.2 The recent departure of UKIP’s chief 
executive, who described the party as ‘a bunch of enthusiastic amateurs’ after his efforts to 
professionalise the party were resisted, raises further questions as to UKIP’s position on the 
political landscape.
3
 This tension between public campaigning and gaining political support 
and influence within Westminster has both placed the anti-EU movement in a unique position 
between the realms of institutional politics and mass movements, and historically has stifled 
the development of a successful anti-EU campaign. 
This thesis will look at the development of non-party and non-governmental 
organisations for and against European integration in post-war Britain which operated 
between the spheres of public protest and Westminster politics. Its particular focus is on those 
organisations which sought to engage with and influence the public directly. On the far-
reaching, complex, high political and elitist subject of British involvement in a supranational 
European community, these were groups and campaigns which members of the public could 
                                                          
2
 “I am odd (for a politician), Nigel Farage says”, 7 January 2013, http://bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20931123, 
retrieved 6 March 2013 
3
 “Nigel Farage wants Ukip to remain a ‘bunch of amateurs’”, Daily Telegraph, 20 August 2013, retrieved 20 
August 2013 
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join, engage in campaigning for, and invest their support or trust to represent their views on 
European integration and Britain’s international position and national identity. This thesis 
therefore focuses on these groups who had public membership, sought to mobilise public 
opinion and, in the words of Uwe Kitzinger, included a ‘straight undifferentiated appeal to the 
public’ in their activities.4 
In concentrating on groups with open membership and an active public campaigning 
role, the emphasis of the thesis will therefore fall more heavily on the anti-Market side, and 
focus predominantly on anti-Market groups formed from 1961 onwards. The difference 
between pro- and anti-Market groups after this period is elucidated well in Lord 
Windlesham’s study into political communication, where he contrasts the small pro-Market 
campaign formed in 1961 targeting informed opinion with anti-Market movements 
‘communicating with the public direct, and influencing the Government through the medium 
of popular opinion’.5 Groups who sought to mobilise public opinion in favour of European 
integration in the immediate post-war period, however, will be analysed as they attempted to 
bridge the gap between pressure group and emotive mass campaigns before declining in the 
mid-1950s. These groups share similarities with the anti-Market organisations of 1961 
onwards in operating on the political fringes, being comprised of an assortment of politicians, 
dedicated campaigners and public members, targeting both public and parliament for support, 
and using emotive, resonant and cross-party issues – often relating to issues of national or 
European identity – to target a broad base of support. The pro-integration organisations that 
usurped them by no means cease to be significant; on the contrary, their professional and 
                                                          
4
 Kitzinger, U., Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common Market (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1973), p.238 
5
 Windlesham, Lord, Communication and Political Power (London: Cape, 1966), p.164 
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efficient operations, their wealth of financial and political resources, and their continuing 
campaigning efforts make them worthy of detailed investigation. However, the sheer breadth 
of their archival material, in combination with this study’s concentration on campaigns 
engaging in a direct dialogue with the public, means that only the populist pro-Market 
campaigns of the late 1940s and 1950s will be assessed. After 1961, anti-Market 
organisations seeking to mobilise, and speak for, the general public shared the same strategic 
dilemmas and the same political space as their pro-integration predecessors. 
By utilising the archival material of these groups, it will look at how they perceived 
the issues, how they mobilised and what arguments they used in an attempt to acquire mass 
support. On the one hand they would often appeal on emotive issues and adopt a moralistic 
tone in order to gain popular momentum, yet they would also adapt their campaigning to 
current issues, and appeal to the public on non-party or cross-party issues. In the case of the 
anti-Market movement, different groups were brought together by this broad non-party 
appeal. Disillusionment with government policy and party machinery, and an “anti-
establishment” or “anti-political” tone was a common factor amongst anti-EEC groups, 
although this led them to be in the paradoxical position of criticising and campaigning outside 
of Westminster politics while at the same time fighting to protect the loss of parliamentary 
sovereignty resulting from EEC membership. 
This clash between the popular and the political was a primary reason for the failure of 
anti-EEC campaigns. Whilst campaigning along populist lines on the issues of national 
identity, sovereignty and democracy, figures within the campaign were aware that the issue 
remained rooted in the political sphere and thus sought the support of parliamentarians in 
order to maximise political support and appear respectable and prestigious. This was 
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particularly troublesome in the 1970s and 1980s where the ‘political’ members on the 
committees of anti-EEC groups wanted to professionalise and focus on research that would 
influence politicians, while other elements within the groups wished to re-launch mass 
movement campaigning. This clash between idealists and realists meant that these 
organisations often had a confused strategy and definition, and lacked the dynamic leadership 
that could combine appeals to parliament and public or develop an organisation in a particular 
direction. Campaigning on an issue so deeply rooted in institutional politics, they were unable 
to transcend their campaigns into the national mass movements they wished for. Looking at 
the internal development of these hitherto overlooked organisations, along with their rhetoric 
and their activities, will determine why they struggled to make an impact, whilst also 
demonstrating that campaigning on the issue of Britain and European integration was not 
solely confined to Westminster. 
This introduction will firstly consider the wider historiography on British involvement 
with the European integration process, along with the emerging political and historical 
analyses of British Euroscepticism. As will be shown, this thesis will signal a move away 
from the Westminster-centric approach on the subject that, with some exceptions, has focused 
predominantly on the formulation of government and party policies. In providing a detailed 
analysis of the opinions and strategies of organisations on European integration, it will bridge 
the divide between historical cultural and institutionalist approaches towards British 
Euroscepticism. The introduction will then outline the longitudinal approach taken by this 
thesis, and the source material used. Finally, it will give an outline of the thesis, and 
summarise the arguments of each chapter. 
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Britain and European integration – a historiographical overview 
This thesis seeks to broaden the study of British responses to European integration by 
analysing the composition, ideology and actions of pressure groups and movements that 
existed and operated outside of, or on the periphery of, government and political parties. In 
this respect, this thesis exists alongside a historiography which has remained Westminster-
oriented over several decades. The use of government records stored at the National Archives 
[formerly Public Record Office until 2003], combined with the continual lure of material 
annually declassified under the “Thirty Year Rule” of the Public Records Act, have 
maintained this government-centric approach, as political historians seek to explain British 
policy within an ongoing narrative of reluctant engagement with the European community. 
Whilst the recent trend toward “new political history” has seen an incorporation of a cultural 
dimension within the study of institutional politics – or in the words of James Vernon, ‘we are 
all cultural historians now… invoking the holy trinity of the categories of class, race and 
gender’ – works on Britain and European integration have remained largely immune to these 
methodological developments.
6
 Yet the dearth of studies that seek to analyse opinions on 
European integration from beyond the Cabinet or Foreign Office or party machinery is of 
more concern, despite more recent moves in the right direction. This introduction will now 
outline the development of the historiography of Britain and European integration, and in 
doing so will justify the approach taken by the thesis itself. 
The majority of works on Britain and European integration can be summed up by one 
of two short phrases, “missed opportunities” or “awkward partner”. The former implies that 
the decisions of British governments were to blame for its delayed and reluctant membership 
                                                          
6
 Vernon, J., “What is a cultural history of politics?”, History Workshop Journal, 52 (2001), p.261 
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of the EEC, that they continually “miss the bus” with regard to European integration and their 
obstinacy causes them to lag behind community developments. While this theory has been 
questioned as the historiography has developed, the notion of Britain as an “awkward 
partner”, out of step with the European community, has remained inherent. Stephen George’s 
An Awkward Partner has arguably become the definitive work on British policy towards the 
European community, outlining the clashes of successive British governments with the 
community and their overall reluctance to engage wholeheartedly with European integration.
7
 
Placing each government’s European policy within its domestic and international context, 
George seeks to explicate ‘the basis for that [awkward partner] reputation’ that ‘has remained 
through to the time of writing’.8 The continuity of British “awkwardness” lies at the heart of 
the narrative of this body of work, with parallels drawn between British policy before EEC 
membership, first neglecting to join a supranational community and then launching half-
hearted applications, and as an obstinate EEC member after 1973. 
One of the reasons for the perpetuation of the “missed opportunities”/“awkward 
partner” school relates to the background and political stance of the authors of its most 
prominent works. Three of these authors watched British-European developments from close 
proximity in either an official or journalistic capacity. Miriam Camps, who worked in the U.S. 
State Department on European co-operation and integration in close contact with British 
government officials, produced a number of studies in the 1960s during the period of failed 
British applications.
9
 Her study of British relations with the nascent European community, 
written shortly after French President Charles de Gaulle’s vetoing of the British application, 
                                                          
7
 George, S., An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 
8
 Ibid., p.1 
9
 For more details on Camps’s background and career, see Daddow, O., Britain and Europe since 1945: 
Historiographical Perspectives on Integration (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp.91-94 
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lamented Britain’s refusal to join the European Economic Community in the mid-1950s.10 
Camps revisited this subject several decades later with a chapter stating that ‘missing the 
boat’ at the Messina Conference in 1955 was the first in a series of mistakes made by British 
governments.
11
 Hugo Young’s This Blessed Plot, another landmark in the “awkward partner” 
school, expands on George’s work through the use of governmental records at the National 
Archives, along with the author’s personal connections with British parliamentarians and civil 
servants through his position as political editor for the Sunday Times and a political columnist 
for the Guardian.
12
 A ‘notorious pro-European’, Young’s work portrays membership of the 
European community as an inevitability, and therefore British reluctance is seen as ‘[h]igh 
political misjudgement’ where ‘much opportunity was, by sheer lapse of time, wasted’, as 
‘Britain struggled to reconcile the past she could not forget with the future she could not 
avoid.’13 Roy Denman, a governmental official involved in the negotiation of Britain’s 
accession to the EEC, adopts a similar approach to Hugo Young. His overview of British 
relations with Europe, Missed Chances, incorporates pre-war British policy towards Europe 
and similarly uses official documentation from the National Archives to analyse the perceived 
mistakes and ‘the reasons for the consistent failure of the British political class to understand 
continental Europe’ either side of accession.14 However, his more personal views on 
                                                          
10
 Camps, M., Britain and the European Community 1955-63 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964) 
11
 Camps, M., “Missing the Boat at Messina and Other Times?” in Brivati, B. and Jones, H. (eds), From 
Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and Europe since 1945 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993) 
12
 Young, H., This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998) 
13
 Trauffler, C., “Book Review: This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair”, 12 April 2013 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2013/04/12/book-review-this-blessed-plot-britain-and-europe-from-
churchill-to-blair, retrieved 12 April 2013 
14
 Denman, R., Missed Chances: Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century (London: Cassell, 1996), p.4 
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European integration, and confirmation of his pro-European stance, are confined to his 
autobiography.
15
 
Devotion to the European cause, what Anthony Seldon described as history written by 
‘self-styled Europeans’, has therefore been a key defining factor upon the lines along which 
the “awkward partner” literature was shaped. 16 Oliver Daddow has also noted this trend of 
writing historical criticism of post-war foreign policy in the hope of influencing future policy. 
Daddow divides this along the lines of orthodox and revisionist schools, where orthodox 
writers, those ‘first to the field’ writing shortly after events in question, ‘set the agenda’ for 
future research.
17
 The ‘orthodox “missed opportunities” interpretation’ written by the likes of 
Camps was therefore directed at those pro-Europeans aiming ‘to change the course of British 
policy’.18 The use of archival material and governmental documentation, what Daddow calls 
the ‘disciplinisation’ of the subject of Britain and European integration, has led to the creation 
of a revisionist school based around the use of ‘newly released primary sources’.19 The release 
of government records, along with new literature in the fields of international and diplomatic 
history that reinforced the theme of Britain’s post-war decline, led the first revisionist studies 
to interpret British policy from a different angle.
20
 One of the most prominent revisionist 
analyses from a diplomatic approach, by John Young, uses Public Record Office material to 
                                                          
15
 Denman, R., The Mandarin’s Tale (London: Politico’s, 2002) 
16
 Seldon, A., “The Churchill Administration 1951-55” in Hennessy, P. and Seldon, A. (eds), Ruling 
Performance: British Governments from Attlee to Thatcher (Oxford: Blackwells, 1987), pp.63-97 
17
 Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945, p.58 
18
 Ibid., p.59 
19
 Ibid., p.115 
20
 For examples of works of international and diplomatic history influential upon the study of Britain and 
European integration, see David Reynolds and Paul Kennedy: Kennedy, P., The Rise and Fall of the Great 
Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000 (London: Unwin, 1989); Kennedy, P., The 
Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980 (London: Fontana, 
1981);  Reynolds, D., Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century (London: 
Longman, 1991). For an example of the new “revisionist” approach, see Melissen, J. and Zeeman, B., “Britain 
and Western Europe, 1945-51: Opportunities Lost?”, International Affairs, 63:1 (1987), pp.81-95 
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assess British governmental policy as ‘a reaction to decline’, and finds that ‘after 1945 Britain 
had a more sophisticated European policy than is often realised’.21 As had previously 
occurred with the historiography of Britain’s appeasement policy leading up to the Second 
World War, governmental policy was assessed more sympathetically with regards to political 
and economic constraints and geopolitical strategy, and with reference to archival material. 
This development, however, has led to a preoccupation with the use of material at the 
National Archives for analysis of Britain and European integration. Historians on the subject 
have attributed its academic interest to ‘the availability of documents’, ‘[t]he Thirty Year 
Rule’, and the area ‘just opening up in the archives’.22 Daddow notes than in parallel with the 
rise of revisionist historiography in the field and its ‘disciplinisation’, the Public Record 
Office became both the ‘first port of call’ for contemporary historians, and home to the most 
reliable and respectable source material.
23
  One of the consequences of the continual use of 
governmental source material, however, has been a glut of works on the policies of British 
governments towards the European community. What was once a ‘reinvigorated’ debate has 
now been dominated by what one author has dubbed the Public Record Office ‘mafia’.24 The 
aforementioned references to studies of the ‘British political class’ by Denman and of ‘[h]igh 
political misjudgement’ by Hugo Young – compounded by Young’s description of his work 
as a ‘study of leadership’, separated into thematic chapters on key political leaders and 
officials – demonstrate the elitist focus of the majority of the historiography on Britain and 
                                                          
21
 Young, J.W., Britain and European Unity, 1945-1999 (Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2000), p.185, p.189 
22
 Anne Deighton and John Young in correspondence with Daddow: Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945, 
pp.144-45 
23
 Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945, p.145. For more on the Public Record Office’s hold over the subject, 
see pp.144-154  
24
 Bulpitt, J., “The European Questions: Rules, national modernisation and the ambiguities of primat der 
innerpolitik” in Marquand, D. and Seldon, A. (eds), The Ideas that Shaped Post-War Britain (London: Fontana, 
1996), p.229; Crowson, N.J., The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945: At the heart of 
Europe? (New York: Routledge, 2006), p.8 
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European integration.
25
 Given the remoteness of the European Union felt by the majority of 
the British population, and the high political manoeuvring of British politicians on the subject 
of European integration, the self-imposed boundaries of the historiography reinforces the 
Westminster-centric nature of the subject. 
Furthermore, use of source material at the National Archives has made detailed 
historical studies of British policy in more recent periods, for which government records are 
yet to be declassified and released, tentative and brief. For example, Denman’s study of 
Britain’s record as an EEC member up to the time of writing takes up a solitary chapter, with 
scarce primary source material to supplement newspaper articles and personal recollections.
26
 
However, the aforementioned high esteem that governmental records are held in has led to 
scepticism of those parts of studies that fall within the Thirty Year Rule, such as Stephen 
George’s review of John Young’s Britain and European Unity which claimed ‘Young’s foray 
into more contemporary scholarship does not enhance his reputation as a scholar’.27 Anthony 
Forster has noted this theoretical divide within political history formed by the Thirty Year 
Rule, asking whether the period for which archival material is available should be ‘the 
province of contemporary historians, and [the period] after the territory of political 
scientists?’. However, the ‘pre-eminence of primary sources’ within contemporary political 
history that Forster mentions can instead be read as a pre-occupation with The National 
Archives, and no reference is made to archival material for recent decades deposited 
elsewhere.
28
 The development of the historiography has thus continued to predominantly 
                                                          
25
 Denman, Missed Chances, p.4; Young, H., This Blessed Plot, p.3 
26
 Denman, Missed Chances, ch.13 
27
 George, S., “Britain and European Unity: 1945-1992 by John W. Young” review, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 33:2 (1995), p.307, cited in Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945, p.149 
28
 Forster, A., “No Entry: Britain and the EEC in the 1960s”, Contemporary British History, 12:2 (1998), p.139 
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study the actions of political elites over different periods determined by the availability of 
new material at the National Archives, from Britain’s non-participation in European 
integration in the late 1940s and 1950s
29
, to the first application in 1961 (and its failure in 
1963)
30, to new works on Britain’s second application under Harold Wilson.31  The continual 
focus on governmental policy and the use of archival material dictated by the Public Records 
Act thus appear to be mutually reinforcing. 
There have been some steps outside these boundaries, eschewing the study of 
governmental policy within the timeframe dictated by source material within the National 
Archives and broadening the scope of the historiography. In the field of diplomatic history, 
multilateral and transnational approaches utilising the records of foreign governments and the 
EEC itself have portrayed a more complex dimension to the British-EEC relationship. Piers 
Ludlow’s detailed analysis of the Brussels negotiations from 1961-63 looks at the 
developments from the point of view of the EEC and its member states, with Public Record 
Office documents used as ‘an important complement’.32 The edited collection by George 
                                                          
29
 Dell, E., The Schuman Plan and the British Abdication of Leadership in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995); Ellison, J., Threatening Europe: Britain and the Creation of the European Community 1955-58 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); Kaiser, W., Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European 
Integration 1945-63 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); Tratt, J., The Macmillan Government and Europe: A Study 
in the Process of Policy Development (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); Young, J.W., “Churchill's 'No' to Europe: 
The 'Rejection' of European Union by Churchill's Post-War Government, 1951-1952”, Historical Journal, 28:4 
(1985), pp.923-937 
30
 Aldous, R. and Lee, S. (eds), Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); 
Kaiser, W., Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans; Bell, L., The Throw That Failed: Britain’s 1961 Application 
to Join the Common Market (London: New European, 1995); Wilkes, G. (ed), Britain’s Failure to Enter the 
European Community 1961-63: The Enlargement Negotiations and Crises in European, Atlantic and 
Commonwealth Relations (London: Frank Cass, 1997) 
31
 Parr, H., Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain’s World Role, 1964-
1967 (London: Routledge, 2006); Toomey, J., Harold Wilson’s EEC Application: Inside the Foreign Office 
1964-67 (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2007); Daddow, O. (ed), Harold Wilson and European 
Integration: Britain’s Second Application to Join the EEC (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Parr, H., “A Question of 
Leadership: July 1966 and Harold Wilson's European Decision”, Contemporary British History, 19:4 (2005), 
pp.437-458 
32
 Ludlow, N.P., Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), p.10 
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Wilkes on the first British application similarly utilises multi-national archival material to add 
a new perspective on events.
33
 Moving away from high politics and diplomacy, party political 
studies by the likes of N.J. Crowson and Roger Broad have developed the scope of the field 
by assessing the responses of the Labour and Conservative parties to the evolving issue of 
European integration.
34
 Rather than analysing the importance of domestic constraints and 
pressures on governmental policy, these works trace the development of party policy and the 
relationship between party machinery and supporters in order to better the external factors on 
policy formulation. Assessing the European issue through the framework of political parties 
makes the role of public opinion and electoral advantage more prominent factors in these 
studies, with the views of party committees to constituency associations evaluated as 
constraints on party (or, when in power, government) policy. Anthony Forster describes this 
development as a shift from a ‘behaviouralist’ school focused on ‘the importance of 
leadership behaviour’ to a ‘party’ school which focuses on the intra-party responses to 
European integration and an ‘institutionalist’ school which accounts for the adversarial two-
party system in the formulation of European policy.
35
 
However, while the step beyond the National Archives has been a welcome 
development, there remains an absence of studies taking into account the mobilisation of 
public opinion outside of a party political support base. The difficulty in finding reliable 
source material to support the study of public responses to European integration has been a 
primary reason for this. Recent works by Mathias Haeussler and Robert Dewey have assessed 
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the formulation of public opinion and the role of the British media in shaping the debate on 
Europe, studying what Dewey has labelled the ‘low politics’ of media opinion, pressure 
groups and activists.
36
 However, both of these works are restricted to the first application for 
EEC membership in 1961-63. Contemporary studies from the 1960s and 1970s also shed light 
on public opinion towards European integration, but the overall picture remains incomplete, 
and weighted towards the period incorporating unsuccessful applications and accession.
37
 
Studies of pressure groups on the European issue, both contemporary and academic, have so 
far also been limited. For the early pro-Market organisations, the failed efforts of the United 
Europe Movement appear to have been forgotten in the historiography, while the work of 
Richard Mayne and John Pinder on Federal Union has a somewhat hagiographical feel to it.
38
 
Lord Windlesham’s short analysis of the relationship between the influence of pressure 
groups and public opinion on the EEC issue serves as a useful starting point into research into 
the early years of the Anti-Common Market League.
39
 Crowson’s article on the League’s 
influence on the 1962 South Dorset by-election also sheds light on the group’s activities, but 
its emphasis is predominantly on the by-election’s impact on the Conservative Party.40 Both 
Robert Lieber and Jeremy Moon have attempted more broad analyses of the EEC issue 
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encompassing the responses of governments, parties and pressure groups and tracing the 
trends of public opinion.
41
 However, their studies of promotional pressure groups 
campaigning for or against membership are brief, and outweighed by their attention to 
sectional pressure groups and trade unions. Similarly, Uwe Kitzinger’s study of pro- and anti-
Market campaigns is useful but also brief and dated, with access to only promotional material 
and financial records.
42
  While the influence of sectional pressure groups continues to be 
examined, studies of groups and movements directing their efforts towards the public, 
particularly those using the internal records of the groups in question, remains limited.
43
 This 
thesis assesses the aims, opinions, composition and strategies of these organisations that 
operated between spheres – on the fringes of politics and seeking to mobilise public opinion. 
In terms of analysing the anti-Market organisation, this thesis also heeds Dewey’s call 
to trace ‘[t]he lines of descent from the anti-Marketeers to the Eurosceptics’.44 The growth in 
the study of Euroscepticism, both within British politics and as a more widespread 
phenomenon, is another way in which the academic debate on Britain and European 
integration has moved beyond the analysis of governmental policy. Two different approaches 
to the subject of Euroscepticism can be observed, a historical cultural approach and a 
structural institutionalist approach, which would appear to fall along the aforementioned 
blurred lines of contemporary history and political science respectively.
 45
 The former, in line 
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with many of the governmental analyses, attributes British reluctance towards European 
integration to historical notions of exceptionalism, while the institutionalist approach studies 
the production of Eurosceptic groupings as a result of the British electoral system and 
political party management. Chris Gifford, from the cultural perspective, has argued that 
rather than being ‘the politics of opposition’ found on the extremities of the political 
spectrum, ‘Euroscepticism is intermeshed with the politics of the mainstream’.46 The populist 
themes of exceptional national identity and political culture, Gifford claims, transcended the 
party system in a context of post-imperial decline and uncertainty, and Eurosceptic discourse 
has thus capitalised on these emotive cultural myths of ‘British “otherness” from Europe’.47 In 
addition, Menno Spiering, using the example of opposition to metrication in the late twentieth 
century, has demonstrated how perceptions of national history and culture, and Eric 
Hobsbawm’s notion of the ‘invention of tradition’, have underlined British opposition to 
European integration.
48
 Richard Weight, in his analysis of British post-war national identity, 
has similarly attributed British reluctance to engage with European integration to enduring 
historical and cultural attributes within a paradoxically fading notion of “Britishness”.49 
However, in spite of the centrality of emotiveness and populism to this approach, popular 
campaigns and non-party organisations that appealed broadly but directly to the public have 
been overlooked in favour of a more generalised study of the Eurosceptic mentalité. 
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The institutionalist approach deals more directly with the organisational forms which 
such Eurosceptic opinion has assumed. Simon Usherwood has argued that this approach has 
been overlooked and that ‘there has been comparatively little research into the mechanisms 
and processes behind the mobilisation of [the] movement’ of Eurosceptic forces.50 The 
institutionalist school has developed from Paul Taggart’s comparative analysis of 
Euroscepticism in Western Europe, which claimed that single-issue political parties 
strategically used Euroscepticism as a ‘touchstone of dissent’ to distance themselves from 
established centrist parties. Although the Conservative Party’s subsequent drift towards a 
more Eurosceptic position has demonstrated that such opinion within established parties can 
become more than merely factional, the article’s assertion that ‘the institutional context is 
vital for understanding Euroscepticism’ has remained influential.51 Mark Aspinwall has 
developed this approach by demonstrating how Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system 
and the necessity of party management leads to governing parties being forced to 
accommodate Eurosceptic backbenchers, rather than the more centrist powersharing produced 
under systems of proportional representation. In British politics, therefore, parties and 
governments adopt more cautious and reluctant policies as Euroscepticism is channelled in a 
more ‘anti-centrist’ way.52 Usherwood’s approach differs from Aspinwall’s model in that 
while Aspinwall focuses on the accommodation of Eurosceptic MPs through the formulation 
of European policies intended to preserve party unity, Usherwood looks at the externalisation 
of Eurosceptic opinion. Usherwood argues that as British political parties produce 
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compromise policies so as to maintain party unity and avoid alienating an indifferent public, 
Eurosceptic (and, arguably, pro-European) elements work with non-party groups and 
organisations more in line with their opinions.
53
 Usherwood claims that it is often a 
constitutional or policy event within the European community, to which the established 
parties cannot respond effectively, that acts as the catalyst for the formation of such 
organisations.
54
 
While it is true that the 1961 announcement of application for British EEC 
membership was the catalyst for the foundation of a number of anti-Market organisations, 
they were formed by concerned people on the political fringes and from middle class 
professions rather than by MPs. This represents a problem with analyses of externalisation, in 
that they remain Westminster-centric in focusing on party management rather than the 
analysing the non-party organisations themselves, or attributing them with a proportional 
amount of agency. These organisations often approached MPs and politicians, in the hope of 
attaining political influence or ensuring political balance at their helm. This thesis will 
therefore seek a middle ground between historical cultural and institutional approaches, in 
both assessing the use of emotive and populist issues within the anti-Market argument, and 
their fluctuating position toward and away from institutional politics.  
Despite being an issue which has polarised public opinion over the past few decades, 
popular movements campaigning for or against membership of the EEC and EU – along with 
their aims, activities, rhetoric and their engagement with the public – have not been subject to 
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in-depth historical analysis. Top-down approaches to the subject of Britain and European 
integration, and to Euroscepticism, have led to what Dewey calls ‘an incomplete appraisal of 
attitudes and indirect influences’.55 Usherwood’s analysis of these organisations works as a 
useful starting point. In looking at the process leading to the formation of groups ‘outside the 
set of formal institutions’ at Westminster, Usherwood stakes a claim for the importance of 
these non-party groups by highlighting their ideological freedom and their public-oriented 
strategies.
56
 Far from being an issue interpreted and discussed in elitist circles, much of the 
debating and manoeuvring on the European issue has taken place on the fringes of the 
Westminster machinery, from political party factions to public campaigns and membership 
organisations to think-tanks and research bodies. The composition of these non-party or cross-
party organisations that ‘bring together elements of political parties and the general public’ 
corresponds with their position in the middle-ground between parliamentary politics and 
public activism.
57
 The increasing influence of non-party anti-EU organisations after the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 led Usherwood to conclude that ‘we must look beyond pure party 
politics, to the wider field of civil society and the role of non-party groups’ for a complete 
picture of the EU membership debate.
58
 However, while concentrating on the conditions 
which engender the creation of such organisations, Usherwood’s analysis of the organisations 
themselves is necessarily a ‘brief overview’.59 The aforementioned divide between 
contemporary history and political science is again a factor in this, as the focus on structural 
and institutional factors prevails over archival evidence. 
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A lengthier analysis of Eurosceptic mobilisation by Anthony Forster seeks to bridge 
this divide by looking more closely at the history of these fringe organisations through the 
framework of political science, by looking at their activities during ‘the key events in British 
policy towards the European integration project’, which acted as structural-institutional ‘set-
piece opportunities’ to mobilise.60 Similarly to Usherwood, Forster bemoans the lack of study 
of British Eurosceptic groups within the historiography of Britain and European integration, 
although he criticises the ‘institutionalist’ approach along with governmental and party 
analyses as being insufficient. Eurosceptic groups are ‘often treated as of tangential interest’, 
he argues, and the evolving nature of Euroscepticism and the activities and impact of the 
organisations have been neglected.
61
 However, Forster’s work is of a similarly introductory 
nature, and its main purpose appears to be as a corrective to works within the field of political 
science which perceive Euroscepticism to be a modern phenomenon predominantly affecting 
the Conservative Party from the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty onwards. Furthermore, 
despite detailing the development of non-party groupings within which politicians 
campaigned against EEC membership, the emphasis as suggested by the book’s title is on the 
mobilisation of sceptics from the perspective of Westminster and political parties. In this 
assessment, parliamentary activity provided the opportunity for mobilisation and in some 
cases the only effective arena for action, meaning that the campaigning activities of non-party 
organisations, who sought public support as well as political influence, are often ignored. 
The lack of archival source material in both of these works therefore leads to an 
incomplete picture of these organisations. While it is true that organisations seeking popular 
support for or against European integration were necessarily reactive to events in Westminster 
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and within the EEC institutions, it is important to assess how they sought to shape the issue, 
how they attempted to maintain campaigning when the EEC issue was off the political 
agenda, and how their development and their actions were connected with their failure to 
attain political or popular support. Given the recent growth in the study of non-governmental 
organisations [NGOs], it is surprising that these campaigns on the boundary between politics 
and protest have not been looked into. Given that McKay and Hilton state that for ‘any 
significant issue of the last sixty years, NGOs will have been involved’, these organisations 
campaigning on an often extremely salient political issue have so far largely eluded empirical 
study.
62
 It has also often been an emotionally resonant issue with the public. Changing notions 
of national identity in post-war Britain were amplified by the prospect of British membership 
of the Community, and becoming a part of Europe was perceived by a large proportion of the 
public to be an alteration of Britain’s historic course. British membership was therefore 
perceived by anti-Marketeers and Eurosceptics to be a threat to British sovereignty and a 
historic, fixed notion of national identity and “Britishness”. However, there has been a public 
disinterest or lack of knowledge of much of the inner workings of the EEC and EU, and the 
constitutional details and intricate consequences of membership. Anti-EEC groups therefore 
not only reinforced the image of the EEC as a product of complex bureaucratic artifice 
compared with the historic and trusted political systems of Westminster and the 
Commonwealth, but they were also some of the primary conveyors of information about EEC 
policies and workings. In doing this they filled the aforementioned void left by political 
parties who played down the EEC issue to avoid internal rifts and the loss of votes.
63
 In acting 
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as mediators between the EEC and the public, and adopting the role of ‘watchdogs’, these 
organisations thus occupy a fascinating position in the wider spectrum of NGO activity. 
Usherwood believes the current think-tanks and organisations concerned with European 
integration are now ‘much more alert’ than the public and politicians and possess ‘an 
autonomous capacity to accumulate, evaluate and disseminate information’.64 
Organisations from the late 1940s to the mid-1980s attempted to fulfil this role, but by 
seeking the support of the public as much as the support of opinion-formers, their directions 
and tactics were confused. In their failure to attain political influence they were ‘outsider’ 
groups, despite often holding the same opinion as substantial numbers of MPs. By pursuing 
political and mass movement strategies, they utilised both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ tactics.65 
However, in spite of the steps towards professionalization made by anti-EEC groups in the 
1980s, they never truly sought ‘insider’ status. The boundaries of parliamentary and protest 
activity are therefore blurred. While some NGOs, such as the Child Poverty Action Group, 
were able to balance parliamentary lobbying with high-profile media campaigns and a strong 
public presence, organisations on European integration often lacked the dynamic leadership 
and the financial backing to successfully campaign in both spheres. The impact of the 
Referendum Party in the 1990s, led by the highly visible and extremely wealthy Sir James 
Goldsmith, reinforces this point. 
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Sources 
This thesis is an organisational study of the initial pro-Market and anti-Market 
movements, treating these organisations as valuable and worthwhile areas of historical inquiry 
in their own right rather than as the product of externalisation or other political forces. Its 
approach therefore moves away from institutional analyses based around political opportunity 
structures, which assess the ‘set of constraints and opportunities that encourage or discourage’ 
mobilisation.
66
 In assessing the agency and actions of these organisations, within the context 
of political developments, it tends towards more of a resource mobilisation approach, 
exploring how they mobilised support and their forms of organisation, their aims and their 
internal unity. Such an approach therefore looks at more than just a political position but also 
assesses in detail the strategic tasks of ‘mobilising supporters, neutralising and/or 
transforming mass and elite publics into sympathisers, and achieving change in targets’, and 
the potential clashes between these tactics.
67
 In terms of anti-Market organisations, it seeks to 
both elaborate on the study by Dewey and broaden the timeframe of analysis significantly. It 
also adopts the same form of detailed organisational analysis adopted by studies of other 
NGOs, such as the work by Christopher Moores on the National Council for Civil Liberties, 
by Paul Byrne and Jodi Burkett on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and by Tom 
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Buchanan on Amnesty International and other human rights organisations.
68
 Analysis of the 
internal machinations of these organisations reveals divisions between political and public 
approaches, which shaped their aims, strategies and composition. These developments framed 
the public message presented by the pro- and anti-Market campaigns, as well as the manner in 
which they were presented. The thesis therefore seeks to examine the developments 
internally, with regards to the often turbulent relationship between committee and rank-and-
file and between politicians and activists, and externally in terms of the shifts between insider 
and outsider strategy and the fluctuating distance between these organisations and institutional 
politics. 
This thesis therefore seeks to be a more empirical and detailed analysis than Forster’s 
introductory assessment of mobilisation in key events.
69
 The organisations in this study are 
assessed in the context of changing external circumstances, and how they reacted to the 
political context that is thoroughly covered in the historiography by governmental and party 
analyses. It is concerned with how they reacted to changes in access to institutional politics, 
and how they sought to create and harness public opposition when access to the political 
sphere was denied to them. Their reactions to when European integration was a recessed issue 
in Britain – in the 1950s for public pro-Market campaigns, and after the failed applications in 
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the 1960s and after the 1975 referendum for anti-Marketeers – revealed fundamental 
differences in aims and strategy. 
As well as undertaking a more detailed study, this thesis is a more long-term analysis 
than those that take a similar approach, such as Dewey and Haeussler.
70
 By employing this 
longitudinal approach that assesses the shifting positions, aims and dynamics of the public 
campaigning organisations, recurrent trends become apparent. When faced with unfavourable 
circumstances and diminishing resources, organisations were divided as to whether to revive 
mass campaigning or seek more direct political influence, revealing a consistent divergence 
between committees and grassroots activists. This tension between politicians and 
campaigners pulled the organisations in different directions and kept them in a state of flux. 
Furthermore, this long-term focus on shifting strategies and issues within the development of 
the anti-Market campaign reveals how a number of organisations converged around a 
common position and consensus. The desire to appeal to a broad base of support and the 
promotion of cross-party issues meant that initial party political concerns converged on 
liberalist themes – of the defence of individual democratic rights and promotion of direct 
democracy, of free trade and consumerism, and of liberal democratic development and 
institutions intrinsic to British national identity. Convergence on these liberal themes led to 
portrayal of the issue of EEC membership as an oppositional clash between liberalism and 
individualism against state and supranational control and centralisation of power, meaning 
that liberalism and anti-establishment rhetoric ran through the heart of the anti-Market 
campaign. The long-term approach, attempted briefly by Dewey in his concluding remarks, 
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combined with an organisational analysis reveals these common themes and difficulties 
within popular campaigns on the EEC. 
Before discussing the source material used for this thesis, it would be useful to give a 
brief overview of the organisations that were active on the subject of European integration in 
post-war Britain. The two predominant organisations in support of British involvement in 
European integration before the EEC’s creation were Federal Union and the United Europe 
Movement. Both were founded in the spectre of conflict, the former in 1938 and the latter in 
1947, with aims of uniting Europe along peaceful and political lines. European organisations 
with British sections, such as the European League for Economic Cooperation, also formed in 
the late 1940s. From these European organisations, the umbrella European Movement formed 
with its own United Kingdom Council (UKCEM), including the European League for 
Economic Cooperation and the United European Movement. While the United Europe 
Movement faded in the 1950s, the UKCEM, along with the Britain in Europe organisation 
founded by Federal Union in 1959, became the two most prominent advocates of British 
membership of the EEC. 
As political opinion gravitated towards EEC entry, pressure groups began to form 
against membership in the early 1960s. The three most prominent in this period were the 
Anti-Common Market League, the Keep Britain Out campaign, and the Forward Britain 
Movement.
71
 While the latter was no longer active by the mid-1960s, the Anti-Common 
Market League and Keep Britain Out remained vocal campaigners against EEC membership 
throughout the decade. The umbrella Common Market Safeguards Committee was formed in 
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1969, which had close connections with the Anti-Common Market League in terms of both 
personnel and, after 1973, its premises.
72
 Other smaller organisations, including Women 
Against the Common Market, the National Common Market Petition Committee and the 
Referendum Before Common Market Committee, argued their own particular case against 
membership in this period. The National Referendum Campaign was launched in early 1975 
to co-ordinate the activities of existing groups within the “No” campaign, including the Anti-
Common Market League, Get Britain Out and the Common Market Safeguards Committee.
73
 
After the referendum defeat, the National Referendum Campaign disbanded and Get Britain 
Out ceased activity. However, personnel within the National Referendum Campaign and 
Common Market Safeguards Campaign wished to continue campaigning under an umbrella 
movement opposing EEC policies and the federalist progression of European integration. The 
Safeguard Britain Campaign was therefore formed in early 1976, and remained one of the 
most prominent anti-Market pressure groups along with the continuing Anti-Common Market 
League. The Safeguard Britain Campaign, in attempts to better define its aims and attract 
more supporters, changed its name twice, to the British Anti-Common Market Campaign in 
1982 and then to the Campaign for an Independent Britain in 1989. 
The organisational approach of this thesis is reflected by the predominance of sources 
from the official archival material of these organisations. The majority of the anti-Market 
organisations’ sources are held in the Campaign for an Independent Britain collection at the 
British Library of Political and Economic Science. This houses the records of the Anti-
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Common Market League, the Common Market Safeguards Campaign, and the Safeguard 
Britain Campaign and British Anti-Common Market Campaign. It also holds records for a 
number of smaller organisations such as the National Common Market Petition Council, the 
Referendum Before Common Market Committee, the Anti-Dear Food Campaign and various 
Labour and Conservative groupings. As the more prominent organisations have only been 
analysed briefly, this extensive collection has so far not been investigated, and its importance 
in analysing the development of the anti-Market campaign from the 1960s to 1980s is vital. 
The British Library of Political and Economic Science also holds the private papers of Lady 
Juliet Rhys Williams and Frances Josephy, which together contain records of the wider pro-
Market campaign for the immediate post-war period, including the United Europe Movement 
and Federal Union, along with the European League for Economic Co-operation, the 
European Movement and the Christian Movement for European Unity. 
Of the various minutes of committee meetings, newsletters, correspondence, 
pamphlets and propaganda comprised in the Campaign for an Independent Britain collection, 
some sources have proved more useful than others. Predominantly, correspondence both 
within and between anti-Market organisations has been pivotal to highlighting where on the 
political map these organisations were located and where its members and the committees 
wanted them to be. Internal correspondence between committee members outlines the 
divisions within the organisations over the direction its personnel felt it should be taking. 
Most of the internal frustrations are detailed within this correspondence where members were 
likely to be more candid about their disillusionment or exasperation about the campaign’s 
development than in the minutes of committee meetings. Correspondence from local groups, 
as well as collections of records of some local Anti-Common Market League groups, has 
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therefore been utilised. However, of equal importance of correspondence amongst committee 
members, with more active campaigners advocating a bolder public-oriented strategy and 
more political figures fearing the organisations becoming disreputable, or even being 
infiltrated by extremists. This correspondence reveals a continual rift between those members 
who wanted to mobilise the campaign and those members who wanted to consolidate it. 
Publications of these organisations have also been useful in a number of ways. By 
adopting a longitudinal approach, the production of either simple leaflets and pamphlets or 
more detailed reports and analyses reflected the wider strategy of the campaigns on 
integration, and whether populist or political support was sought. Furthermore, analysis of 
propaganda has shed light on how the organisations framed the issues of EEC membership, 
focusing on cross-party issues to appeal to as broad a support base as possible. However, 
while pamphleteering with large print runs was designed to reach a mass audience, there was 
a sense that some circulars were preaching to the converted and not disseminating the 
message far enough. Nevertheless, circulars and newsletters have been useful beyond their 
prioritisation and presentation of certain issues. In maintaining a connection and a dialogue 
with members and local groups, these missives were pivotal both in the sense of keeping the 
issue prominent and the campaign alive, but also in informing and mobilising grassroots 
support. Complaints from local groups about a lack of public campaigning or guidance from 
the centre meant that committees needed to keep members interested, occupied and placated. 
This material therefore would direct them towards political and public forms of activism. 
The lack of local groups’ material for some organisations has been a problem. The 
difficulty of locating records for the Keep Britain Out campaign has been problematic in 
attempting to investigate their working relationship with the Anti-Common Market League 
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and within the Common Market Safeguards Campaign. However, some records have been 
located both in the Campaign for an Independent Britain collection and in the private papers 
of Hugh Gaitskell at the Special Collections of University College London. The reason for the 
lack of comprehensive records for both Keep Britain Out – and for another network of local 
groups, the National Council of Anti-Common Market Organisations – may be down to the 
lack of professional administration of these organisations. Uwe Kitzinger claimed that Keep 
Britain Out ‘did not believe in getting bogged down with card indices of membership and 
correspondence’, was organised in a loosely co-ordinated network of ‘autonomous local 
action groups’, and had no paid employees until late 1971.74 Therefore, it is unlikely that 
detailed records would have been kept, maintained or deposited as archival material. 
An ad hoc method of operation may also be the reason for the absence of committee 
minutes or formal records for the Anti-Common Market League’s initial few years in the 
Campaign for an Independent Britain Collection. However, this gap has been partly filled by 
the private papers of Lord Hinchingbrooke, the League’s first and longstanding president, 
which contain correspondence with a number of politicians and campaigners, including the 
League’s first chairman John Paul. The private papers of Neil Marten – Conservative MP, co-
founder and Vice-Chairman of the Common Market Safeguards Committee and Chairman of 
the National Referendum Campaign – also contains a wealth of correspondence and records 
of the organisations he was involved in, including some Conservative party groups. This is 
complemented by records of the Conservative European Reform Group, a Eurosceptic group 
of Conservative MPs founded in 1980, held within the private papers of Margaret Thatcher at 
Churchill College, Cambridge. In studying the pro-Market campaigns, the private papers of 
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Victor Gollancz at Warwick Special Collections contain a number of files of correspondence 
and records relating to the United Europe Movement, of which Gollancz was a joint vice-
chairman. Furthermore, gaps within the material on both pro- and anti-Market organisations 
are filled by the Britain in Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, which comprises all the 
available published material, including pamphlets, reports, and newsletters, of almost all the 
organisations in this thesis and numerous other pressure groups concerned with Britain and 
European integration. 
Thesis outline 
This thesis will plug a gap in the historiography on Britain’s relationship with the 
European Economic Community by assessing the failed campaigns to inspire passionate 
support for, and then popular support against, British membership of a European community. 
Its first chapter looks at the often-overlooked United Europe Movement and the more 
prominent Federal Union in the late 1940s and early 1950s. While the initial steps towards 
European integration, and the opposition of British governments under Clement Attlee and 
Winston Churchill, has been the subject of considerable historical analysis, popular opinion 
on the issue has been overlooked. Both the United Europe Movement and Federal Union 
utilised the rhetoric of pacifism and humanitarianism, and the post-war fervour in some 
circles for reconciliation, to present the case for European integration to the public. Large-
scale events and meetings, such as the packed Albert Hall meeting at which the United 
Europe Movement was officially founded, showed the resonance that this message carried. 
However, both organisations began to fade into obscurity in the 1950s, unable to 
influence the decision-making either in Westminster and the Foreign Office, or in the 
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meetings at Strasbourg at which the supranational development of the European Economic 
Community began to take shape. The United Europe Movement’s preoccupation with a 
European community based on cultural bonds and a common European identity – defined in 
contrast to the totalitarianism and atheism on the other side of the Iron Curtain – and its 
opposition to rigid constitutional integration put it at odds with developments on the 
continent. Furthermore, it reflected the British preference for ‘loose association’ and 
intergovernmental basis for integration which came to dominate the attitude of British 
politicians to European integration for decades, and which is still prevalent today.
75
 The 
chapter demonstrates how both the United Europe Movement and Federal Union attempted to 
inspire a groundswell of popular support for European integration, and how ‘federalism’ took 
on the characteristics of a ‘movement’ distanced from the more formal lobbying of 
government and civil service. Ultimately, however, this distance may have contributed to the 
decline of both organisations, and caused them to be usurped by more professional and 
technocratic pressure groups concerned with gaining support from government and industry 
rather than the public. The economic case carried more weight than the emotional case, and 
the subsequent technocratic and elitist nature of pro-EEC groups has failed to truly inspire 
popular support for British membership ever since. 
Chapter two looks at the formation and activity of groups opposed to British entry into 
the EEC between Harold Macmillan’s announcement to the House of Commons in 1961 of 
the intention to apply for EEC membership, and the eventual commencement of Britain’s 
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membership in 1973. The organisations which formed in 1961-62 following Macmillan’s 
speech – the Anti-Common Market League, the Forward Britain Movement, and the Keep 
Britain Out campaign – each had a separate ideological stance. However, despite targeting 
different bases of support, these groups were united by disillusionment with party policy and 
the failure to take into account the views of grassroots party membership or the general public 
on the issue of EEC membership. Frustration with party machinery, party whips and a lack of 
intra-party democracy went hand-in-hand with the lack of consultation on British involvement 
in European integration. This, combined with the Anti-Common Market League’s jettisoning 
of the explicit approach to Conservative Party membership, formed the grounds for a large 
non-party campaign against EEC membership. The campaign’s ‘anti-party’ or ‘anti-politics’ 
character thus formed a substantial part of the movement’s rhetoric and appeal, and remains a 
key component of the current anti-EU campaign.
76
 Whilst party politics and ideology 
prevented anti-Market MPs from collaborating effectively, key figures in anti-Market 
organisations outside of Westminster began to collaborate more closely, forming more united 
umbrella organisations at the end of the turn of the decade such as the Common Market 
Safeguards Committee, the National Anti-Common Market Demonstration Committee, and 
the National Common Market Petition Committee. 
At the heart of these developments in the anti-Market campaign was the desire to 
appeal directly to the general public and mobilise a large-scale campaign against entry. 
Although often their figures did not reflect it, these organisations were formed with mass 
membership in mind, seeking to take the issue to the public through propaganda and 
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pamphleteering, mass petitions and demonstrations. The evocative, non-party issues on which 
the campaign focused ran parallel with its populist character, and were utilised to appeal to as 
broad a base of support as possible. The issue of sovereignty was portrayed as both a 
diminution of the democratic rights of the individual voter as well as a weakening of the 
powers of Westminster, and allowed anti-Market organisations to present themselves as 
defenders of the public from the developing trend of ‘big government’. Concentration on the 
economic aspects of membership were concerned as much with the price and quality of basic 
foodstuffs and the introduction of Value Added Tax as it was with more weighty issues such 
as balance of payments. Championing the consumer, therefore, allowed the campaign to 
appeal across both class and gender lines. That these issues began to take prominence over 
other more emotionally resonant issues, regarding patriotism, national identity and the 
Commonwealth, shows an increasing complexity within the anti-Market case. In combining 
the aim of mass mobilisation with the desire for political legitimacy, the chapter argues that 
the anti-Market organisations occupied a unique position between protest and politics, a 
middle ground which hampered their ability to work effectively across both spheres of action. 
The 1975 referendum on Britain’s EEC membership saw both pro- and anti-EEC 
groups refine their arguments put forward to the public in an attempt to mobilise support. 
Chapter three assesses the anti-Market movement between the start of Britain’s EEC 
membership in 1973 and its campaign in 1975 under the umbrella movement of the National 
Referendum Campaign. In its attempt to turn the public against membership, the Campaign 
continued to focus on the populist issues of rising prices, decline in choice and quality of 
foodstuffs, protection of the poorest sections of society, and other ways in which the average 
voter, consumer or family would be affected by continued membership. In both rhetoric and 
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organisation, the National Referendum Campaign appeared to be the end product of the anti-
Market movement’s continual progress throughout the 1960s and early 1970s towards a 
unified body, representing the popular case against EEC membership across the political 
spectrum. However, this narrative passes over the internal divisions within the National 
Referendum Campaign, notwithstanding the very public discord between anti-Market MPs 
such as Tony Benn and Enoch Powell which has already been covered at length. The 
composition of the National Referendum Campaign was in fact a fragmented unity between 
the more professionalised and politicised Common Market Safeguards Campaign at the helm 
of the organisation, and the more militant, anti-establishment organisations on the periphery. 
Once again, the anti-Market movement was unable to bridge the political and public 
spheres and found itself operation within a thankless middle ground. The National 
Referendum Campaign committee was preoccupied with seeking the support of 
parliamentarians and exhibiting political legitimacy, in order to obtain positive media 
coverage and to win the support of moderate or undecided voters. The Common Market 
Safeguards Campaign, utilising the political influence and accommodating personalities of 
Douglas Jay and Neil Marten, therefore emerged as the most influential of the constituent 
organisations. By contrast, groups such as Get Britain Out and the National Council of Anti-
Common Market Organisations were viewed as more politically extremist with eccentric, 
demagogue leadership. The “anti-political” character of these groups, who tended to 
concentrate more on local grassroots mobilisation, was seen as being potentially alienating to 
moderate support and embarrassing to the wider campaign. The clash between political and 
public, national and local, and respectability and populism, demonstrates once more the 
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uneasy position which the anti-Market campaign occupied, and the divisions over direction 
which have plagued the campaign throughout its history. 
Chapter four continues to assess the actions of the anti-Market campaign between the 
referendum defeat and the 1986 Single European Act, a period in which for the majority of 
the population the question of EEC membership was something of a lapsed issue. As such, the 
study of anti-EEC organisations beyond the Westminster sphere in this period has thus far 
been largely neglected. Yet the ongoing development of the campaign, largely outside of the 
public eye, reveals the same clashes over the campaign’s aims, composition and rhetoric that 
would trouble it during its more prominent periods. The campaign would again fail to either 
inspire mass mobilisation against EEC membership or to become an influential body in the 
political debate on the issue, predominantly because its personnel could never agree along 
which of these routes it wanted the campaign to proceed. The formation of the Safeguard 
Britain Campaign from the ashes of the National Referendum Campaign represented 
something of a victory for the “political” side of the fractured anti-Market movement, while 
also continuing the aim of a popular movement seeking to influence public opinion over EEC 
membership and attempting to keep the issue alive. However, as the debate over Britain’s 
EEC membership developed in the late 1970s and 1980s, the campaign’s character fluctuated 
in its attempts to adapt and maintain relevance. Whereas the “Safeguard” title had initially 
proven to be a safe, moderate label to attract varying levels of scepticism in the post-
referendum period, hardliners within the organisation campaigned for a title that reflected the 
ultimate goal of EEC withdrawal. The name change to the British Anti-Common Market 
Campaign in 1982, however, alienated the political support which had been central to its 
“Safeguard” predecessor, and appears particularly misguided when party political groups such 
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as the Conservative European Reform Group aimed to work within the framework of 
scepticism at this time. The tensions between the “political” and “mass movement” 
approaches are also evident in the attempts of the campaign’s committee to professionalise 
and develop into a think-tank. The committee sought to gain “insider” status for the campaign 
through focusing on research dissemination and the expertise of a small number of highly 
knowledgeable individuals. This shift away from a mass movement strategy ostracised local 
groups and grassroots supporters, and disappointed figures within the campaign who sought a 
renewed propaganda drive to capitalise upon widespread scepticism and hostility towards the 
EEC. As with the referendum campaign, divisions over the nature of the campaign stifled its 
development and prevented it from gaining mass support. In this case, the political approach 
failed to connect with the general public, and the hardline message of withdrawal alienated 
moderate support, ensuring that the anti-Market movement would remain on the fringes of 
political debate. 
The thesis ends with the signing of the Single European Act in 1986 for a number of 
reasons. Primarily, this event represents a clear demarcation between two distinct periods of 
the anti-Market movement. The Single European Act put the issue of the EEC firmly back on 
the British political agenda, and dissatisfaction with aspects of the treaty and with the 
direction of the EEC’s development culminated in Margaret Thatcher’s “Bruges Speech” of 
1988. This speech represented the adoption of Euroscepticism into the British political 
mainstream, and resulted in the creation of an ‘alphabet soup’ of Eurosceptic and anti-Market 
organisations in the late 1980s and early 1990s, formed both within and on the periphery of 
British politics.
77
 While anti-Market organisations from the timeframe of this thesis – such as 
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the anti-Common Market League and the Campaign for Independent Britain (previously the 
British Anti-Common Market Campaign and Safeguard Britain Campaign) – continued to 
exist, their memberships and operations were increasingly diminished. Just as the public 
campaigns in favour of European integration were outmuscled by more closed-off, 
technocratic organisations in the 1950s, Eurosceptic think-tanks and organisations staffed by 
political figures dominated the anti-Market campaign after the Bruges Speech. This political 
“second wave” of Eurosceptic mobilisation has already been assessed in the work of Simon 
Usherwood, and the decreasing presence of archival material for the late 1980s and 1990s 
justifies a political scientific approach.
78
 As a result, this thesis is intended to fill the historical 
gap and operate alongside these works on post-Bruges organisations. 
The anti-Market movement had political aspirations but lacked the support of political 
heavyweights or MPs with the influence or credibility to transform anti-Market organisations 
from fringe groups into established political movements. Furthermore, attempts to appeal to a 
broader political support base by diluting the anti-Market message and embracing a more 
moderate stance of scepticism were thwarted by the continual presence of hardline anti-
Marketeers who failed to hide their ultimate aim of EEC withdrawal. While rhetoric in 
Westminster seemed to shift from outright hostility to more qualified Euroscepticism, these 
hardliners were not satisfied with piecemeal gains or safeguards, and alienated potential 
political support, particularly from the Conservative Party. They belonged more to the 
‘populist’ camp within the anti-Market movement, believing that the anti-Market message, if 
presented with enough force, would inspire a nationwide revolt against EEC membership. 
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However, just as the ‘political’ camp lacked the support of a political heavyweight to 
spearhead a prominent campaign, the ‘populist’ camp lacked a charismatic figure, either 
drawn from within or outside of the Westminster sphere, to lead the popular national 
groundswell of support it sought. While political realists sought ways to keep the campaign 
alive whilst the issue of EEC membership disappeared and re-appeared from the political 
agenda, mobilisers and figures more closely connected with local grassroots groups felt 
increasingly betrayed by Westminster politicians and sought to maintain a public campaign on 
their own terms – campaigning against British membership, and then towards British 
withdrawal at the earliest possible opportunity. Its inability to effectively unite these two 
different approaches, or to establish an effective organisational framework that connected 
grassroots campaigners with political figures on committees, lay at the heart of the anti-
Market movement’s failure. 
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CHAPTER ONE: ‘KEEPERS OF THE GRAIL’? PRO-EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
PRESSURE GROUPS IN BRITAIN, 1945-1961
1
 
 
Britain’s post-war policy towards European integration and the European community 
is often seen as a high political and elitist concern. This is particularly applicable for the years 
preceding Britain’s first application to join the EEC in 1961. That the Community’s gradual 
formation and its inception in 1957 were serious foreign policy issues for governments, 
statesmen and cabinets to discuss and decide cannot be refuted. As such, the decision of the 
Labour government of Clement Attlee not to join the European Coal and Steel Community in 
1950, and the decisions of the Conservative governments of Winston Churchill and Anthony 
Eden to remain outside of the European integration process, have attracted the interest of high 
political and international relations historians for decades. Interpretation of the issue has thus 
undergone the familiar processes of revisionism and counter-revisionism – from the initial 
political and journalistic rhetoric of ‘missed opportunities’ to more detailed and sympathetic 
assessments of foreign policy decision-making – without ever setting its sights beyond the 
confines of the closed world of Westminster and the Foreign Office.
2
 
Attempts to analyse the impact of British pressure groups and movements on 
European integration have therefore been limited, with historians preferring to analyse the ins 
and outs of the intergovernmental conferences and governmental policy-making that led to the 
                                                          
1
 On the functional dilemma of ‘mass membership versus pressure group’, a Federal Union committee reiterated 
that Federal Union ‘does not exist to carry on purely educational activities, to act as a “Keeper of the Grail” or 
guardian of a kind of Toc-H lamp.’: Report of the Committee on Organisation Set-Up by the 1956 Annual 
General Meeting of Federal Union [n.d., 1956], JOSEPHY J/2/7, British Library of Political and Economic 
Science (BLPES) 
2
 For a historiographical overview of the ‘orthodox’, ‘revisionist’ and ‘counter-revisionist’ schools on Britain 
and European integration, see Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945. For examples of the orthodox approach, 
see Camps, Britain and the European Community, 1955-1963 and Camps, “Missing the Boat at Messina and 
Other Times?” in Brivati and Jones (eds.), From Reconstruction to Integration. For an example of the revisionist 
school, see Melissen and Zeeman “Britain and Western Europe, 1945-51: Opportunities Lost?” 
 41 
 
European Community forming without Britain. As an example of the latter, Peter Hennessy’s 
analysis of British attempts to ‘shift minds and inspire hearts’ toward the idea of a united 
Europe talks down the early efforts of the European Movement and instead centres on 
Attlee’s Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, ‘the man who counted’, and a Foreign Office 
diplomat, Sir Edmund Hall-Patch.
3
 In his quest for inspirational visionaries, Hennessy looks 
for the ‘true direction of British foreign and economic policy… [in] the real world of secret 
meetings and diplomatic exchanges’, yet describes the world of Whitehall as ‘passion-free 
zones’.4 Anthony Forster’s essentially party-based analysis of the ‘ebb and flow’ of 
Euroscepticism in British politics does account for non-governmental pressure groups, but his 
central focus in this period is the mindset of the ‘political establishment’, unwilling to embark 
on the European project. Furthermore, Forster fails to acknowledge that several prominent 
figures of the political elite were either actively involved in or supporters of those movements 
that he is quick to dismiss. He even goes as far as to say that, in this period, 
…what little discussion that took place was confined to the political elite, and 
internalised within the major political parties at Westminster and key Whitehall 
departments, sometimes reaching the floor of the House of Commons, but rarely 
aired in the public domain.
5
 
 
In other cases, European integration movements receive only a passing mention. 
Richard Weight, in his study of changing British and Home Nations’ identities, makes 
reference to both ‘a small European Movement’ and to Federal Union, initially successful but 
dismissed by the Foreign Office as possessing ‘an inebriated optimism’, attempting to instil a 
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sense of Europeanism into the hearts of the British populace.
6
 Other studies have attributed 
more importance to British pressure groups, protest movements and social movements, but 
have been more selective in doing so. Adam Lent’s study of post-war social movements in 
Britain tends to focus on leftist grassroots movements, and gives a particular emphasis to 
those more radical social and political movements of the 1960s and 1970s that ‘effectively 
sidelined’ the more ‘hierarchical, elitist pressure groups’ of the 1940s and 1950s that used 
conventional tactics to facilitate ‘piecemeal legislative change’.7 While it must be 
acknowledged that the pro-European campaign was prone to a stuffy elitism, the aspiration of 
some of the European pressure groups to engage with the public and aim for mass 
mobilisation shows a certain distance from the realm of high politics, or what Lent calls 
‘dining with MPs’.8 
This chapter will therefore look at two movements which, by seeking to engage with 
the public in campaigning for European integration, linked the spheres of politics and socio-
political activism in the late 1940s and 1950s – the United Europe Movement (UEM) and 
Federal Union (FU). By combining mass mobilisation, education and opinion-forming, these 
movements retained a social dimension, and endeavoured to bring the issue of European unity 
into the public sphere. As such, they attempted to act more like political or social movements 
than pressure groups, and therefore can no longer be overlooked or dismissed as mere elitists 
by political historians. Rather, their attempts to inspire the public through a positive message 
of pacifism and religious and cultural unity utilised a humanistic rhetoric, which grassroots 
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supporters could crusade for and build a basis of mass public support. FU’s persistent focus 
on grassroots campaigning, public membership and social dimension, even after much 
internal soul-searching and institutional professionalization, demonstrates that it does not 
easily fit Lent’s pre-1960s model of conservative, institutionally-based organisations. 
This chapter will first analyse the origins, aims and politics of both FU and the UEM. 
FU’s pacifist rhetoric, proposing political federation as the means to prevent war, placed it 
within a network of movements for moral causes and humanitarian issues. However, its 
idealism and its radical agenda led to limited, left-liberal support, and made it too much of an 
“outsider” organisation lacking in political weight. If FU was too distant from the political 
sphere, however, UEM was arguably too close to it. It aimed to promote a sense of cultural 
Europeanism and a common European identity and shared European history, yet defining this 
along religious lines led to accusations of UEM being anti-Soviet, and its image as a 
Conservative organisation prevented it from amassing widespread support. 
The chapter will then analyse the tactics and organisational structures of both 
organisations. Both organisations targeted the general public directly and sought to be mass 
movements rather than closed pressure groups. FU’s focus on grassroots activity and its 
structure of local branches gave the organisation a strong social dimension, and it perceived 
increasing membership to be crucial to its development. However, the radical aims and active 
branch work of FU reinforced its image as a small group of idealistic devotees, rather than the 
“cheap participation” or “mail order” membership of other campaigning organisations.9 
UEM’s propaganda also directly targeted the general public, but it failed to develop its 
                                                          
9
 Jordan, G. and Maloney, W., The Protest Business: Mobilizing campaign groups (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1997) 
 44 
 
membership due to both a lack of a proper constitution or organisational structure, and a sense 
of elitism or snobbery from its more prominent members. 
The final section will show how both campaigns struggled to adapt to the new political 
climate of the 1950s, with FU stagnating and UEM declining into insignificance. A 
combination of dwindling funds, a reinforcement of internationalist tendencies, and public 
suspicion or lack of knowledge of federalism hindered the development of popular support for 
European unity. FU was subject to internal debate over the nature of the organisation and its 
future development, but proposals to transform FU into a study group were dismissed in 
favour of balancing a renewed membership drive with targeting opinion formers. UEM, 
however, disintegrated as its leading members joined the Conservative government or were 
absorbed into other pressure groups.   
These more influential groups of the mid-to-late 1950s – including the European 
League for Economic Co-operation (ELEC), Britain in Europe (BiE), Political and Economic 
Planning (PEP), and the United Kingdom Council of the European Movement (UKCEM) – 
belonged to a very different sphere, however. Concerned more with economics and industry, 
they prided themselves on expertise rather than public support, and concentrated more on 
influencing government and business than launching a popular crusade. The failure of the 
forgotten public campaigns of FU and UEM was thus a turning point in the issue of European 
integration in Britain, as the discourse became technocratic and the public became more 
detached from the issue. While Eurosceptics would later bemoan the lack of a public mandate 
for Britain’s entry into the European Community, the moment in the late 1940s when FU and 
UEM sought to popularise European integration on a simple, cross-party basis represents the 
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nearest to popular enthusiasm from the bottom up for integration that Britain saw in the post-
war period. 
The origins, aims and politics of Federal Union 
Federal Union was founded in September 1938 during the crises that led to the 
Munich agreement, as the League of Nations and traditional political diplomacy were both 
failing to prevent the escalation of conflict in Europe. Seeking ‘to promote supranational 
government as the only method of abolishing war’, it had a particularly strong pacifist 
dimension.
10
 While its ultimate aim was world government, FU saw supranational integration 
of Europe as essential to preventing the sort of discord on the continent that had twice led to 
global conflict in the first half of the twentieth century. Its pacifist ideals and focus on peace 
aims thus made it an attractive organisation to those of a liberal, pacifist disposition. 
However, as this section will demonstrate, FU’s more radical and idealistic aspects and its 
own perception as a moral protest movement, both limited its left-liberal support base and left 
it as too much of an “outsider” organisation, caught between mass support and political 
influence and bereft of both. This section will first analyse its pacifist and religious, 
Nonconformist rhetoric and support that placed FU within a wider network of humanitarian 
and moralistic campaigning organisations, before demonstrating how its development as a 
protest movement with a radical yet lofty agenda limited its support to middle class left-
liberals and left it on the fringes of politics. 
FU’s pacifist nature meant it found its support increased during times of conflict or 
heightened international tension, and that a political atmosphere of ‘peace kites being flown in 
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all directions’ was ‘unfavourable’ to the organisation.11 Its membership rose from two 
thousand in July 1939 and peaked after the outbreak of the Second World War, having risen 
‘at the rate of 200 members a week’ in the early stages to a membership of ten thousand in 
over 200 branches by 1940.
12
 Membership fell back to its pre-war figure of less than two 
thousand in 1946, but began to rise again slightly in the late 1940s, as the issue of integration 
resurfaced and as the Cold War began to descend on Europe.
13
 With FU reporting in 
November 1947 that the number of new members was five times the monthly average intake 
for the past year, and with new branches being established, the combination of peace and an 
uncertain international future clearly presented FU with an opportunity to press for 
integration. 
Attlee’s call for Europe to ‘federate or perish’ took on greater significance after the 
war with the threat of atomic warfare. FU used the development of nuclear weapons to 
increase its call for a stronger political and diplomatic system across Europe. FU claimed that 
while the continent had ‘entered the age of the aircraft, rocket, and atom’ in terms of arms, it 
was, politically, still in ‘the steam age’, while some areas had ‘sunk back into the mail-coach 
age’.14 Thus, European federation was proposed as the solution to international anarchy, and 
to ensure the prevention of diplomatic disputes and nuclear conflict. However, just as FU 
benefited from international tension in proposing a system for lasting peace, it similarly had 
to find the right balance between presenting federalism as ‘an immediate palliative and an 
ultimate remedy’ for the nuclear threat, and portraying a bleak international outlook in which 
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the need for this federalist solution appeared urgent.
15
 The nuclear issue thus formed a central 
part of FU’s message to the public, as the urgency of the issue and the ‘effect of shock tactics’ 
allowed them to argue for international co-operation on a ‘“clean slate” basis’, allowing for 
the ‘easier mobilisation of the forces of idealism in favour of a completely fresh approach.’16 
FU proposed in the initial post-war period that it 
…does not fail to maximise atomic bomb potentialities, so ideal for its 
propaganda purposes, and that it does its utmost to draw public attention to itself 
by justifiably posing as the only organisation with an effective answer to this 
latest weapon…17 
 
Much of FU’s support consequently came from pacifists such as disillusioned former 
members of the League of Nations Union (LNU). The failure of the League of Nations, an 
international system in the inter-war period based on ‘national self-determination’, led to FU 
attracting support from the LNU’s rank-and-file who became more receptive to the federalist 
argument in the late 1930s and early 1940s.
18
 One of the leading figures in FU described her 
conversion from being a passionate LNU supporter as occurring when the League ‘began to 
look somewhat like an Anglo-French alliance, and we all had to start thinking again.’19  FU 
also sought in the months following the end of the Second World War to co-operate with 
pacifist organisations such as the National Peace Council and the International Friendship 
League in order to organise mass meetings and potentially attract support. It also shared 
prominent members and supporters with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), 
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such as MP Victor Gollancz, Canon John Collins and Bertrand Russell. In 1960, FU members 
who were taking part in the Aldermaston March organised by CND distributed FU leaflets to 
fellow ‘Aldermarchers’ who may have been attracted to their pacifist federal message.20 The 
following year, FU member John Bowyer distributed the pamphlet Love Not War to the 
marchers, keen to demonstrate the institutional solution to the threat of nuclear war.
21
 While 
in the past LNU supporters had been unsure over questions of disarmament and political, 
economic or military sanctions, FU advocated a purer form of pacifism based on federal 
rather than intergovernmental institutional solutions. It therefore sought to portray a situation 
where ‘[t]hose who want peace no longer prepare for war – they prepare for federal 
government’.22 
Many of FU’s more prominent supporters and members also came from a religious 
background, as it drew support from the Anglican and Free Churches in the same way that the 
LNU had done before the Second World War.
23
 In 1939, William Temple, the Archbishop of 
York, joined FU, and lauded its ‘staggeringly effective appeal to the British mind’.24 It 
appealed to the minds of Christian leaders because, according to Temple, its rhetoric of 
‘mutual interdependence’ and ‘brotherhood’ was in line with the Christian spirit.25 The 
religious influence behind FU’s pacifistic, humanistic and humanitarian rhetoric can be seen 
from the motion tabled in the House of Commons by Labour MP Gordon Lang, ‘a 
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Nonconformist minister with a reputation as a speaker for being able to move audiences’.26 
The motion’s long-term policy ‘to create a democratic federation of Europe’ called for the 
inclusion of a constitution ‘based on the principles of common citizenship, political freedom, 
and representative government’, with an additional charter for human rights.27 It was in this 
manner that Christian principles and liberal democratic, humanitarian politics combined 
within FU’s rhetoric. FU therefore placed Christianity at the centre of the campaign to unite 
Europe along democratic lines, declaring that 
Religion certainly has a vital part to play in bringing peace to the world. It is true 
that no amount of political machinery alone will solve the problem of war. […] 
Religion and politics must combine if the great evils in the world are to be 
eradicated. Federal Union is one of the ways of putting Christ’s second 
commandment in practice.
28
 
 
FU in fact formed part of a network of moral movements and pressure groups in the 
immediate post-war period, that sought to gain enough popular momentum and public support 
to achieve their humanitarian goals without primarily campaigning through the parliamentary 
political system. FU members and sympathisers such as Gollancz, Sir William Beveridge and 
Conservative MP Robert Boothby also became involved in the humanitarian campaign for 
aid, reconstruction and help with the refugee problem in Europe after World War Two. Of the 
Save Europe Now (SEN) campaign, Matthew Frank writes that ‘[m]oral-idealistic arguments 
for taking action [were] informed by Christian, liberal humanist or socialist notions of a 
brotherhood of man…’29 Much the same, but with more long-term aims, can be said of the 
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federalist campaign, aiming for supranational European unity to lead to a ‘good and just 
society based on co-operative ideals’ and a ‘peaceful and democratic world’.30 By defining 
Europe along general principles of liberty and federalism, FU therefore presented European 
integration as the solution which would give man ‘the chance to develop his personality and 
fulfil his high destiny’, and inspire the ‘highest and most creative energies in man’.31 
It was due to these far-reaching humanistic aims that FU was criticised as being highly 
idealistic by other pressure groups. By 1957, Lady Juliet Rhys-Williams, a founding member 
of the UEM who had by this point become sceptical about the form the European Community 
had taken, was accusing FU of ‘wishful thinking’, and that their moral crusade had ‘taken on 
the character of a religion’ by ‘earnest people, who... have discarded their old faith in favour 
of a humanistic atheism...’.32 While FU’s religious influences above challenge the accusations 
of atheism, its focus on pacifism and humanitarianism would prove problematic. Coupland 
claims that FU’s first official statement of policy, calling for a ‘federation of free peoples’ to 
secure ‘peace, based on economic security and civil rights for all’, was open enough for FU to 
be ‘ideologically heterogeneous’.33 But politically, its concentration on humanitarian and 
human rights issues, combined with its commitment to a pooling of some national 
sovereignty, meant that FU attracted most of its support from a progressive left-liberal strand 
of politics, despite its cross-party or non-party aspirations. This is evident in the account of 
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one Mass-Observation diarist who noted at a meeting that FU did not favour capitalism or 
socialism, but was more concerned with human rights and ‘liberty for the individual.’34 
FU found support in the political sphere from Gollancz, activist Labour MP and 
founder of the Left Book Club, Ronald Mackay, a Labour MP devoted to federalism, Lord 
Beveridge, creator of the welfare state in Britain, and other MPs from the Labour and Liberal 
parties.
35
 These political figures, along with liberal supporters outside of Westminster such as 
Russell, H.G. Wells and Barbara Wootton, reinforced the perception that FU’s strands of 
humanitarianism, internationalism and progressive politics attracted those of a left-liberal 
disposition. Wootton may have claimed that federation was a non-political concept, and a 
‘neutral instrument’, but her own style of internationalist, democratic socialist, welfarist 
politics both won FU many of its early adherents, and typified the politics of FU members.
36
 
Yet despite the presence of political figures, many of FU’s members were described as highly 
idealistic ‘disciples’ of Wells and Russell, and ‘woolly-minded’, ‘crankish’ and ‘politically 
vague’ by Mayne and Pinder. The combination of political figures and idealistic “crusading” 
membership demonstrates that FU should be seen more as a protest movement than a 
movement with serious aims in institutional politics.
37
 In many ways, FU sought to portray 
itself as different to the more traditional pressure groups that operated in the ‘conservative’ 
political atmosphere that Lent claims was symbolic of the early post-war era.
38
 Rather than 
lobbying government with research data like other pressure groups, FU sought to build 
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momentum and influence public opinion in order to precipitate action. In the words of one 
report, 
An organisation devoted primarily to publications and research has a proportion 
of pressure work to do but by its very nature is already more akin to a pressure or 
‘respectable’ group than is a membership body of the Federal Union type. 39 
 
FU therefore attempted to remain detached from traditional politics, by promoting the 
progressive concept of federalism and challenging those politicians who had ‘lost their faith’ 
and were ‘chained by precedent to the past, tied hand and foot to the old systems…’.40 It was 
thus ‘willing to openly accuse Government and Opposition of endangering this country’ 
through their isolationist stance and their refusal to join the integration process.
41
 In addition, 
however, it targeted political parties for support of its agenda, claiming it would be ‘foolish, 
because of an obsession to keep clear of party politics, to ignore the Parties.’42 FU’s 
ostensible non-party character ensured its distance from the traditional political system and 
allowed it to challenge the agendas and actions of all political parties. It did this most 
staunchly during General Elections, recognised ‘as the time when Federal Union should be 
working at its greatest intensity’.43 Guidelines on approaching and questioning candidates 
were consistently produced, including a 1950s publication entitled ‘Election Topics’ with 
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instructions on sending deputations to candidates and organising meetings with candidates as 
speakers.
44
 The aim, according to the document, was to raise awareness that 
that there are people actively concerned with more than domestic issues; do this 
much and you are helping to create that mystical thing called Public Opinion – a 
force never more powerful than at the time of a General Election.
45
 
 
Criticism of the political elite was often more direct as well, reflected in their criticism 
of British delegates at the Rome Congress of the European Movement in June 1957. An 
observer noted how many delegates were absent from sessions ‘either because they seemed 
bored (the majority) or because they seemed embarrassed’, and how their complaints ranged 
from the Congress being ‘enough hot air for a lifetime’ to the hotel being ‘like a bordello 
without the compensating attractions’. One MP ‘clearly hadn’t a clue about what was going 
on in Europe’; another appeared ‘the type to support whatever the government says about 
foreign policy and seems to have considered the expedition something of a lark…’. By 
contrast, however, UEM stalwart Lady Rhys-Williams was described as ‘an astonishing 
person… angrily trying to stir MPs to action, bitterly critical of the Government and the 
Foreign Office…’.46 
On the whole, however, FU would pride itself on being different to “respectable” 
organisations such as the UEM and the Movement for World Government, claiming that their 
competitors’ combination of ‘big names’ and ‘policies far less radical than our own’ made 
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them a different type of membership organisation.
47
 FU was in many ways similar to the 
protest movements that it shared principles and personnel with, such as CND and SEN. The 
latter, for example, had the same pacifistic and humanitarian principles, and, like FU, sought 
to draw support from left-liberal and progressive thought, such as Liberal and Labour MPs, 
religious leaders, trade unionists and influential thinkers.
48
 Lady Violet Bonham Carter’s 
claim that the SEN was ‘Liberalism as I understand it’ as well as ‘Christianity’ can also be 
applied to FU.
49
  
However, while FU perceived itself as more radical than its contemporaries, the 
popular perception of FU as a protest movement with a radical agenda may have limited its 
support. Such perceptions were not helped by bold claims about the political impact that 
federalism would have, with Alexandre Marc, Secretary General of the European Union of 
Federalists (EUF), claiming that ‘federalism stands for an actual revolution, individual and 
collective, which demands the revision of all existing values.’50 With the term ‘federalism’ 
carrying such connotations, FU advised members on some occasions to not emphasise the 
word ‘federal’ in their correspondence to MPs and the press.51 The wartime account of one 
Mass-Observation diarist, however, shows that outsiders coming into contact with FU 
principles were ‘defeatist and suspicious of anything so radical’.52 Other diarists’ accounts 
show that FU membership was not widespread, and confined predominantly to ‘the artisan 
type and... middle-class intelligentsia’, and written off by some as a ‘liberal intellectual idea’ 
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that would ‘fizzle out... if it’s not got over to the people.’53 The Mass-Observation diaries also 
too often show a brief dabbling in the federalist movement, with only brief mentions of the 
occasional meeting attended or set up by the diarist. Some were interested in the idea but did 
not want to be actively involved in FU, or were put off by ‘interminable’ discussions, while 
some only understood the federalist principle vaguely, one diarist stating his intention to ‘get 
the Penguin book on it’.54 But while seventy per cent were aware of the term ‘Federal Union’, 
only thirty-eight per cent knew its meaning even vaguely, one of the many incorrect 
definitions being ‘[i]t’s some peace racket’.55 
By perceiving itself as a radical protest movement, FU was unable to generate the 
same sort of mass support enjoyed previously by the likes of the LNU and after the war by the 
United Nations Association (UNA), consisting of a couple of thousand members compared to 
UNA’s 85,000 members in 1949.56 UNA was able to attract internationalists and 
humanitarians through its work on human rights and post-war recovery, while its lack of 
supranational authority ensured moderate support was not alienated, and led to backing from 
the political elite.
57
 By contrast, support from politicians of FU along the lines of Attlee’s 
‘federate or perish’ statement was, according to Hugo Young, ‘pious, trenchant – and only of 
passing seriousness.’58 FU sought to be detached from institutional politics, but it lacked the 
endorsement and authority of senior political figures to counterbalance, or add credence to, 
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the more outlandish and radical aspects of its federalist agenda. As such, it lacked the political 
prestige or recognition of a pressure group and the widespread support of a successful 
political movement. 
The origins, aims and politics of the United Europe Movement 
The United Europe Committee was formed in January 1947 from the basis of the 
‘electric’ response to Churchill’s ‘United States of Europe’ speech in 1946 where, according 
to Richard Mayne and John Pinder, ‘[a] united Europe began to seem possible’.59 With aims 
of forming a larger, popular campaign, the Committee officially launched itself as the United 
Europe Movement at their large Albert Hall meeting of May 1947.
60
 The UEM’s rhetoric was 
less explicitly pacifist than FU, but placed the aim of peace alongside an emotive and positive 
appeal for strength and security through common European culture, heritage and identity. 
After its inception in 1947, Commander Stephen King-Hall set out the Movement in a BBC 
European Service broadcast as a positive, pro-active campaign for peace and unity, in defence 
of ‘a constructive cause not against anybody or anything, but for the people, the life, the 
culture and prosperity of Europe’ as well as ‘the cause of World peace’.61  
UEM sought to work for the peace and prosperity of Europe through a less radical 
promotion of Europeanism than FU, advocating integration on both cultural and governmental 
levels, and reinforcing a sense of shared European identity, principles and objectives. The 
Movement thus set out an aim of getting national governments to perceive themselves as 
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European, so that ‘they will begin to shape their practical policies always with the object of 
fitting them fruitfully into the general pattern of a United Europe.’62 However, from the outset 
the UEM attempted to popularise European integration from the bottom up, by changing 
public attitudes and making British people ‘conscious of their European status and 
responsibilities’.63 Churchill sought to direct the Movement’s campaign primarily toward the 
general public, believing that ‘[o]nce the sense of being Europeans permeates the minds of 
ordinary people… practical action by governments will swiftly follow.’64 While its aims were 
not as radical or as federalist as FU’s, the UEM therefore shared some similarities in both the 
breadth of its scope and its ambitions to become a mass movement. 
The UEM judged that its positive and sentimental campaign would resonate with the 
public, appealing to the ‘most imaginative and generous’ aspects of the British population and 
translating into a popular campaign for integration.
65
 As an example, the Movement asked 
Bertrand Russell for his personal reasons for supporting European unity, particularly if this 
related to European civilisation, heritage and identity, as this would be ‘the most interesting 
line from the point of view of the reading public…’.66 The UEM reinforced this romanticised 
notion of European identity by recalling the historical notion of a united Europe and attempts 
throughout history to achieve continental integration. Speeches by UEM figures made 
reference to ‘[i]ntelligent men’ who had been discussing united Europe ‘for centuries’, 
portraying the Movement’s goal as a ‘dream’ and ‘vision’ that everyone from ‘kings and 
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princes’ to ‘humble men’ had sought to implement.67 The UEM ensured that such an aim was 
presented as achievable, however. The publication ‘United Europe: A Short History of the 
Idea’ chronicled the philosophical aspects of the issue from ancient Greece to the twentieth 
century, but also called for ‘men of action’, and implied that readers could make history by 
ensuring ‘that the dream of the philosophers can become a reality.’68 It was in this manner that 
the UEM consistently sought to present European integration as an achievable goal, provided 
it dealt with those issues and tenets, encompassed by a shared identity, that naturally brought 
continental people together. Much of the UEM’s construction of this ‘European identity’ 
centred around this notion of a shared European history, described to Russell as making the 
public ‘think of themselves as having a great European heritage, as well as a national 
heritage’.69 The drive for European integration would also focus on the shared European 
values held across the continent, both cultural and religious, which proved a more difficult 
and controversial facet to define. The collaboration between British Churches and the 
European movements helped reinforce these values as central to the campaign for European 
integration. According to Philip Coupland, religious leaders saw Christian principles as the 
spiritual bond that held European civilisation together, and perceived European identity as not 
constructed by ‘“race”, ethnicity or language’, or by geopolitics, but by Christendom.70 This 
perception of Europe was central to UEM’s philosophy and, as with FU, the Movement’s 
religious dimension would shape perceptions of the political ideology of its members. 
                                                          
67
 Quote from Harold Macmillan at Birmingham United Europe Movement meeting, “Britain’s Message of Hope 
to Europe”, Birmingham Post, 7 February 1948, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/6/7, MRC, University of 
Warwick; Transcript of United Europe Movement speech by Stephen King-Hall, broadcast on Radio 
Luxemburg, 1 February 1948, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/3/16, MRC, University of Warwick; United 
Europe: News-letter of the United Europe Movement, no.1, 1949, Gollancz papers, MSS.157/3/UE/5/1, MRC, 
University of Warwick 
68
 “United Europe: A Short History of the Idea” by Sydney D. Bailey, published by National News-Letter, 1947, 
JOSEPHY J/12/9, BLPES 
69
 Letter from Kenneth Hare-Scott to Bertrand Russell, 24 January 1949, RHYS WILLIAMS, J/6/3/2, BLPES 
70
 Coupland, Britannia, Europa and Christendom, p.11 
 59 
 
Seeking to popularise European unity amongst the general public, and making 
European identity, civilisation and culture the focus of the campaign, UEM actively sought 
support from Christian leaders from an early stage. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey 
Fisher, was first contacted by the UEM’s Leo Amery, who promoted the conception of a 
spiritual European integration. Churchill then wrote to Fisher of the need to ‘arouse the 
fervour of a crusade’ for integration, winning the support of the Churches and appealing to 
public sentiment.
71
 UEM strengthened the spiritual and cultural aspect of the popular 
campaign for integration by launching the Christian Movement for European Unity (CMEU), 
seeking to unite Europe through religious values and ‘a spirit of mutual helpfulness’.72 The 
two organisations worked closely, with UEM providing funding and personnel to found the 
CMEU, and the CMEU using the UEM’s constitution as its basis to build up a mass 
movement, with ‘potentially vast support to be found throughout the country.’73  
However, UEM’s focus on the spiritual and cultural aspect of European identity would 
define these European values against an “other”; in this case the ‘Russian menace’ that 
threatened liberal democratic Europe.
74
 The speeches of Victor Gollancz on behalf of UEM 
demonstrate how this focus on the preservation of ‘the spiritual fabric and moral values of 
European life’ tied in with criticism of Soviet Russia.75 His speech for the UEM to be 
broadcast on Radio Luxemburg in 1948 called for the defence of ‘liberal or Christian’ values 
deemed as ‘infinitely precious’ and manifesting themselves in freedom of thought, speech and 
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religion. ‘Soviet communism’, by contrast, offered no such freedom and threatened Europe 
with ‘the loss, certainly for decades, probably for centuries, and possibly for ever, of the very 
spring, the very living seed, of human progress’, and meant that a united Europe would have 
to be a ‘United Western Europe’.76 The broadcast was deemed as ‘an attack on Russia’ by 
Radio Luxemburg and sections were not transmitted, leaving Gollancz angry that the speech 
was left as ‘a lot of platitudes.’77 His proclamation at a UEM meeting at Birmingham Town 
Hall, flanked by the Archbishop of Birmingham and Harold Macmillan, that European unity 
would ‘preserve Western values [that] are being terribly threatened by Communist 
penetration’ further demonstrates how UEM rhetoric interpreted European culture and 
identity to be “Western” or “civilised” culture.78 
The perception of the UEM being anti-Russian was reinforced by the predominance of 
‘Tory Strasbourgers’ in the UEM’s Executive Committee, with Churchill at the helm and his 
son-in-law, Duncan Sandys, as Honorary Secretary.
79
 Despite its Conservative image, the 
UEM was in fact comprised of what Arthur Marwick dubbed ‘middle opinion’ concerned 
with cross-party cooperation in social, political and economic planning.
80
 UEM’s members, 
both from within and outside of Westminster, belonged to a progressive strand of politics 
concerned with economic planning and social welfare, in addition to a united Europe. 
Macmillan, Boothby and fellow Conservative Oliver Stanley all had experience working with 
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planning organisations such as the ‘Next Five Years’ Group and Political and Economic 
Planning in the 1930s, while Lady Rhys-Williams, of whom Macmillan claimed had ‘a 
remarkable knowledge of technical economics’, was herself Vice-President of the Economic 
Research Council for some time.
81
 Stephen King-Hall, writer and broadcaster from a military 
background, was on the staff at the Royal Institute for International Affairs, a study group into 
peace aims and foreign policy with governmental links.
82
 He was also an associate of 
economist John Maynard Keynes, of whose followers included Boothby, ‘an early 
Keynesian.’83 That European integration was the international aspect of this type of far-
reaching progressive politics of planning and welfare is evident in Macmillan’s recollection 
that a united Europe was to be ‘a new order in the Old World – democratic, free, progressive, 
[and] destined to restore prosperity and preserve peace.’84 The UEM, however, was intended 
as more of a popular movement than the study groups these figures had experience working 
with, and was attempting to form public opinion as much as political opinion. Some UEM 
members were naturally suited to such a role, such as King-Hall who ‘saw himself as a 
mediator, whose information would be “respected by the expert, and acceptable to the general 
reader”.’85 In this sense, the UEM and FU as organisations lie somewhere between 
membership or associational political movements, think-tank study groups, and party politics. 
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The UEM may have been handicapped by its image of a Conservative leadership, but 
with prominent members belonging to “middle opinion” and cooperating with members of 
other parties, the campaign for European integration was in fact a mix of progressive 
Conservatives, Liberals, and Labour figures more disposed towards collaboration. In fact, 
although Ross McKibbin has claimed that organisations of an ostensibly non-political 
character covertly reinforced ‘Conservative electoral hegemony’, it can be argued that the 
UEM put progressive liberalism ‘firmly on the political agenda, even though the 
parliamentary Liberal parties of various guises were bent on splitting and self-destruction.’86 
As the British delegation to the Hague Congress endured an emergency landing upon their 
return to Britain, Macmillan’s call for ‘Women and Liberals first’, after Bonham Carter and 
Lord Layton ‘happily discussed the future of the Liberal Party for over an hour’, sheds some 
light on the political character of the campaign.
87
 Prominent figures worked for the Liberal 
Party outside of Westminster, including Lady Rhys-Williams as Honorary Secretary of the 
Women’s Liberal Foundation and chair of the Party’s publications and publicity committee, 
and Goddard, the UEM Secretary, as the party’s Director of Organisation.88 Bonham Carter 
also worked behind the scenes for the party, while King-Hall was a ‘liberal internationalist’ 
and Lord Layton, Honorary Treasurer of UEM, was chairman of the News Chronicle, seen as 
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a ‘beacon of liberal thinking’ in the 1930s.89 With the UEM housing such a combination of 
leading Conservatives, liberal thinkers and activist Labour supporters, perhaps another term 
can be borrowed from Marwick to describe their political stance – that of ‘centre-
progressives’, described as ‘the apostles of political agreement’.90 
The campaigning of Gollancz, and the support of the likes of Labour MP Gordon 
Lang and trade unionist George Gibson, also make the ‘Tory Strasbourgers’ tag not entirely 
accurate for UEM.
91
 The Labour Party hierarchy, however, felt the UEM amounted to the 
Conservative Party playing party politics, leading to their National Executive Committee 
(NEC) discouraging MPs against joining ‘Mr Churchill’s Committee’ which ‘excludes Russia 
from Europe’.92 Gollancz would come under attack for his continued cooperation with the 
UEM, one venomous attack warning him that 
If you can believe that the part-author of the insane and atrocious ‘policy’… of 
Unconditional Surrender, of Yalta, of Teheran, - yes, and despite his hypocritical 
handwashings and crocodile tears for its victims, of Potsdam: if you can believe 
that this cheap huckster of lies and hate that have for ever made a United Europe 
impossible, is interested in saving anything but the shattered political fortunes of 
Winston Spencer Churchill – then you will believe anything.93 
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Gollancz replied that he was ‘prepared to co-operate with anybody for a cause in which I 
believe – and then to leave the platform if and when it develops on lines in which I don’t 
believe’.94  
However, Gollancz’s attempt to ‘lift the thing definitely above party’ and establish a 
cross-party basis for the UEM, only using Churchill for his ‘immense prestige’ in Europe, 
would fail, as the UEM remained too Conservative and too rooted in institutional politics.
95
 
By cooperating with religious leaders in promoting a European identity and culture 
constructed against the ‘other’ of Soviet Russia, the political one-sidedness of the UEM was 
reinforced, and the lack of a cross-party basis of support would cause them trouble in future 
years. Grantham aptly encapsulates the UEM’s limitations with his claim that ‘in view of its 
objective the movement could not be non-political; in view of its leadership it could hardly be 
non-partisan.’96 These perceptions of UEM prevented it becoming a cross-party movement for 
European integration, and limited its support. 
Focusing on European identity and the spiritual side of integration also led the UEM 
to focus on a particular type of European unity, that of an “organic” union of Europe. This 
was partly down to the aforementioned desire of UEM to present European integration as a 
simple achievable aim, but also a product of its collaboration with Church leaders, advocating 
a spiritual and cultural unity and avoiding committing to any ‘mechanical schemes’.97 The 
UEM presented the public with a ‘broad and flexible declaration of intent’ behind which a 
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large movement could accumulate.
98
 Churchill’s message to followers from the outset was 
that the Movement’s task was to 
…spread the knowledge that this thing is really possible, so that the conviction of 
the people may be converted into the conduct of the nation. We must create a 
climate of opinion.
99
 
 
The UEM’s approach was hence concerned with issues of practicality and principle rather 
than the economic and political technicalities of European integration. This led to criticisms 
that British figures working for integration, in the words of Boothby, ‘concentrated too much 
on the spire, and too little on the foundations.’100 The desire to maximise public support by 
focusing on the idealistic aspects of European integration would backfire when that 
integration became a reality, as UEM’s desire to avoid integration on federal lines failed and 
its support declined thereafter. 
The UEM avoided discussion of the constitutional details of integration, for fear of 
alienating public support by backing a specific political scheme. With regards to the general 
public, popularising the idea of a united Europe involved overcoming psychological obstacles 
as much as political ones. Figures in the Movement thus wanted its reports to ‘deal with 
practical issues and not be over concerned with detail’, avoiding ‘academic detail’ and guided 
by ‘broad principle’ in an attempt to acquire widespread support.101 The economic aspect of 
integration was a particular issue that the UEM wanted to avoid discussing in detail. Roy 
Harrod, an economist and member of both the UEM and ELEC, claimed that the discussion of 
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tariffs by economists and politicians ‘smells of the lamp’ and ‘will tend to bog down the 
United Europe project’.102 Conservative MP Peter Thorneycroft likewise warned of the ‘real 
danger of getting so involved in the complex details of the financial mechanism required that 
we shall lose sight of the real objective.’103 Lady Rhys-Williams’s criticism of an economic 
report by David Eccles, a member of ELEC and a Conservative delegate to the Council of 
Europe, shows UEM were often critical of technical reports by study groups, Eccles’s report 
being criticised as a ‘governessy and featureless document’, ‘entirely disastrous’ and full of 
‘pious nonsense’.104 In this respect, despite the prominence of the “progressive planners” 
within its ranks. the UEM perceived itself as more of an idealistic movement than a 
technocratic, academic lobbying or pressure group. 
Another key reason why the UEM avoided discussion of constitutional details was 
what Macmillan described as both a preference for intergovernmental cooperation and a 
suspicion of federalism, and being ‘frightened of technocrats’.105 The concept of an “organic” 
development of European unity dominated UEM rhetoric, particularly Boothby, whose 
statement in the House of Commons called for ‘spiritual growth’ leading to ‘a series of 
organic acts of union’, and Churchill, who told Boothby that integration involved ‘not making 
a machine, [but] growing a living plant.’106 Traditional and familiar lines of development 
were preferred, with the UEM playing a significant role in founding the intergovernmental 
Council of Europe and Consultative Assembly, which proved a disappointment to continental 
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federalists.
107
 The UEM’s hopes for the Strasbourg Assembly were in line with its general 
aims for the campaign for integration – to ‘appeal to the imagination of people’ and ‘cultivate 
simplicity’, avoiding overwhelming reports and documents or ‘vast numbers of reporting sub-
committees’.108 However, it desired a ‘talking-shop’, which would become a dirty word for 
those that desired real constitutional union, despite the British wing of the European 
Movement identifying itself ‘with [the] desire to travel as fast as possible towards [a] really 
practical and desirable goal, not necessarily the most perfect on paper, but the one that will 
work.’109 
By not defining politically the sort of Europe they wanted, and remaining fixed on 
functional integration based on intergovernmental cooperation, the UEM would run into 
problems when more substantial federalist schemes were proposed. Churchill was particularly 
guilty of this sort of vagueness, ever since his “United States of Europe” speech, described by 
Macmillan as ‘an emotional appeal’ where ‘he did not attempt to expound a detailed plan’ but 
put forth ‘a broad and general appeal for European unity…’.110 From this speech onwards, it 
was unsure whether or not Churchill meant to include Britain, with its international ties, in his 
conception of a united Europe.
111
 An early warning in a Mass-Observation report about 
attitudes to European integration neatly sums up the problems with the UEM’s strategy, 
stating that ‘working up mass emotions… is a good deal easier than working up a balanced, 
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intelligent, long-term attitude’.112 This idealism and short-termism, and its image as a 
Conservative-led organisation, prevented the UEM from being an effective pressure group or 
a widespread political movement respectively. 
Tactics, activities and organisational structures of FU and UEM 
Despite differences in their aims for European unity and their levels of political 
support, both FU and the UEM sought to popularise the idea of integration by engaging the 
public through mass campaigns, rather than by directly lobbying governments. However, their 
differences were reinforced by the way both organisations operated. FU’s emphasis on 
membership and its perception of a more ‘radical’ disposition and more ‘radical’ aims, led it 
to focus more on grassroots activity. In this sense, it never transcended beyond being a fringe 
movement, or its own perception of being ‘similar to… other voluntary political 
organisations.’113 In contrast, the UEM utilised more of a top-down strategy to bring the issue 
to the general public more directly, to increase the popular demand for united Europe to 
complement their political influence. However, its elitist nature meant it struggled to capture 
the public’s imagination. 
FU saw membership as fundamental to its organisation as it perceived that other 
organisations, including the UEM, were ‘not membership organisations in the same way we 
are’.114 The emphasis was therefore on increasing membership, bringing in those who were 
‘politically minded and those capable of being aroused to political interest’ so that FU could 
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become ‘as nearly a mass movement as any movement can be.’115 In 1950, the aim was to 
double membership, seen as ‘essential’ as membership remained around the two thousand 
mark having fallen after a brief rise in the late 1940s.
116
 This increase was to be achieved 
through ‘more intensive branch work throughout the country’ and through a number of 
membership drives.
117
 Advice was issued to existing members to persuade people to join, 
including which matters to bring up in conversation and which phrases to use, ensuring that 
the ‘victim’ joins immediately if they display interest.118 Members were advised that 
persistence was the key, as ‘[i]t is only by increasing our membership in this way that we 
shall get anywhere.’119 
FU sought to influence opinion and increase membership through propaganda, both 
directly and via the press. FU combined the broad appeal in its humanistic, pacifistic rhetoric 
with a ‘pictorial and striking’ form in its posters and pamphlets in a universal approach to 
membership. The ‘popular language’ on display was thus ‘written to catch the interest of 
ordinary people, such as audiences coming out of theatres, factory workers, miners and 
housewives.’120 In addition, FU maintained good relations with the press both nationally and 
locally, with branches encouraged to contact newspaper editors and advised that ‘[e]ditors 
want news. A local Federal Union meeting is news.’121 Letters to the editor, even unpublished 
                                                          
115
 Minutes of meeting of Federal Union Administrative Committee, 10 October 1947, JOSEPHY J/1/12, BLPES 
116
 Minutes of Meeting of National Council of Federal Union, 24-25 June 1950, JOSEPHY J/2/5, BLPES; 
Minutes of Meeting of Administrative Committee of Federal Union, 6 January 1950, JOSEPHY J/2/5, BLPES; 
“Federal Union and the Future – An Opinion”, R. Stevens, 7 October 1948, JOSEPHY J/2/5, BLPES 
117
 Letter from Federal Union to Armed Forces members, 8 February 1946, JOSEPHY J/1/12, BLPES 
118
 “Hints on How To Get New Members” [n.d., 1950], JOSEPHY J/2/5, BLPES 
119
 Circular to Federal Union members regarding Election Committee’s suggestions [n.d., 1945], JOSEPHY 
J/1/11, BLPES 
120
 Report of Committee “A”, part of “The Way Ahead”, 6 November 1947, JOSEPHY J/1/12, BLPES 
121
 “Federal Union: Notes on Organisation” [n.d.], JOSEPHY J/1/4, BLPES 
 70 
 
ones, were perceived as useful as ‘[c]ontinuous pressure and the evidence of support of the 
federal idea would have a great effect on editorial policy…’.122 
From its inception, FU perceived itself as ‘a membership organisation with a 
democratic constitution’, and it was this constitution, along with a focus on grassroots 
activism and active membership that distanced FU from other pressure groups and 
movements in the minds of its leaders.
123
 Its branch structure fell under the coordination of 
regional organisers who, while being directed by the Executive Committee on policy matters, 
advised the Executive Committee on the formation of such policy.
124
 A dialogue between 
national and local levels was thus facilitated, giving FU both a top-down and bottom-up 
structure. This was reinforced by the creation of an Administrative Committee, assigned ‘to 
take decisions on all matters excluding those of extraordinary importance’ and placed below a 
more politically prestigious Executive Committee ‘elected because of their competence to 
give advice on matters of policy’.125 The Administrative Committee oversaw membership 
drives, and aimed to keep local members busy by encouraging existing members to find new 
recruits, fulfilling a dual purpose of increasing the membership and keeping it active.
126
 The 
rank-and-file were also kept active and enthusiastic by ensuring vacant places on committees 
were filled, as part of a ‘division of labour’.127 FU’s Administrative and Organisation 
Committees thus effectively linked local branches and members to the wider organisation, by 
ensuring achievable tasks were delegated, that branches were not seen ‘merely as fund-raising 
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bodies’, and that members ‘should never be allowed to sit out in the cold, seeing practically 
nothing for [their] money.’128 
This link was strengthened by FU’s publications, such as Federal News, seen as 
‘essential’ in maintaining the ‘interest and support’ of members.129 Current Topics, another 
FU publication, was more concerned with grassroots activism, maintaining the balance 
between informing members and initiating action. Sent to all members of FU regardless of the 
level of their subscription, it was a more accessible supplement to Federal News, providing 
information on ‘vital’ grassroots action that was ‘increasing rapidly’, and calling for 
contributions from the rank-and-file, claiming, 
One excellent way of showing a movement is a movement, a body with active 
limbs and a healthy brain, is to use “Current Topics”, as well as Federal News, as 
a medium for expressing your views…130 
 
 
The democratic publication was a success, the first issue receiving a ‘most encouraging 
response’ from members in comparison to more traditional informative pamphlets.131 Another 
publication, ‘Root and Branch’, followed by giving a series of ‘pointers’ to members on 
forming local branches, with a similar democratic approach calling for readers to contribute 
ideas or ‘lessons from bitter or pleasant experience’.132 
Branches were of particular importance because of the social dimension to FU. In 
spite of Lent’s definition of social movements being motivated by radical lifestyle politics, 
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this aspect of FU makes it more of a social ‘movement’, separated from the world of 
traditional politics and pressure groups, than has been acknowledged.
133
 Fittingly for a 
movement launched around a barrel of beer, social activities and events were locally 
‘essential to the life of a branch’, as well as having a wider ‘considerable financial and 
publicity value’.134 By bringing members together, a sense of association and fraternity was 
fostered within FU, and the idealism of members was maintained, by ensuring their 
enthusiasm ‘not killed by their “feeling alone”…’.135 Federal Union ‘dances’, held as part of 
the organisation’s Annual General Meetings in the late 1940s, were important for bringing in 
outsiders and spreading the name of Federal Union throughout the public sphere. While 
internal political discussion was encouraged at these dances, with areas set aside to sit and 
talk
136
, it was believed that 
If [people] are familiar with the words ‘Federal Union’, because Federal Unionists 
ran a dance they attended, they are much more likely to read a letter on Federal 
Union in their local paper, and to get some interest in it. Even if a dance only 
makes people ask ‘What is Federal Union’, it will have served its purpose as 
advertisement.
137
 
However, an additional purpose of FU dances, to attract ‘people who will never be 
interested in meetings, but who nevertheless are potential voters’, highlights the problem FU 
had in attracting active support.
138
 FU’s membership level did not surpass the figure of two to 
three thousand in the late 1940s, comprising of many hard-working devotees, but its radical 
aims and active branch work did not attract it to the outside observer. The fleeting mentions of 
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Federal Union by Mass-Observation diarists show how interest in the organisation was often 
short-lived and suggests FU had a high turnover of members. One diarist’s short-lived activity 
sums up the attitude to FU well, attending just one local branch meeting because he was 
‘interested in the matter but not disposed to do anything active in it’, and noting that the 
branch ‘nearly roped me into being on the committee.’139 FU thus remained small but active, 
experiencing a ‘paradox’ of dwindling membership and finance but increasing activities, 
publications and grassroots activity.
140
 Such developments reveal how FU was unable to 
make the transition from a fringe movement to a large popular political campaign. 
FU were initially concerned that the UEM would have mass movement intentions 
when it was established in 1947, and kept in close contact with its Honorary Secretary, 
Duncan Sandys, over the issue.
141
 It later felt reassured that the UEM was as a membership 
‘prestige group’ rather than a membership ‘movement’.142 However, Churchill did in fact 
intend to launch a ‘popular movement’ for European integration, and the UEM did seek to 
engage with the wider public, defining its role as ‘to educate, inform and inspire opinion’.143 
Its membership was in fact around the same level as FU’s in the late 1940s, with figures 
around three thousand described as ‘extremely disappointing’.144 This combination of 
membership and political prestige, with aims of both popularising integration and pressuring 
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government, meant that the UEM was something of a combination of a popular movement 
and ‘professionals’ forming opinion. Its character is evident in Lady Rhys-Williams’s claim 
that in promoting integration, 
It is by a genuinely enlightened public opinion that the Governments can be 
pushed into activity; and equally, it is by a thoroughly informed set of business 
and professional experts and workers who understand what is involved that the 
whole vast operation can be carried through.
145
  
 
The UEM therefore utilised a more top-down approach to mobilising the public 
towards European integration. UEM’s aforementioned aim of encouraging idealism by 
avoiding discussion of constitutional matters was reinforced by its own organisational 
structure. Oliver Stanley specified this at UEM’s initial Albert Hall meeting, stating that the 
Movement should avoid ‘any great mechanism of areas and branches’ and should focus on 
organising mass meetings rather than forming a network of branches or ‘the creation of a 
formal organisation with a detailed Constitution’, as ‘we do not wish to bury our ideals 
beneath an over elaborate machine’.146 Stanley did state that the UEM wanted ‘a two-way 
traffic in ideas’, but while the Movement looked into the question of decentralisation via 
regional networks of either honorary secretaries or county committees, this development 
never appeared to happen.
147
 Thus, the relationship between the UEM’s central organisation 
and its members remained limited and detached. In forming a connection between the two, the 
journal European Review was seen by the central committee as an essential informative tool, 
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but were concerned that it was ‘the only return our members get for their subscription’ and 
‘the only link between our members…’.148 
The foundation of UEM’s popular campaign began with the highly-publicised meeting 
at the Albert Hall on 14 May 1947, which was sold out after a ‘run on tickets’.149 The meeting 
was a publicity success, and was followed by large meetings in Birmingham, Manchester, 
Leeds, London, Bristol and Oxford.
150
 The United Europe exhibition was a similar success, 
with Churchill ‘rapturously received by a crowd which waited in the street to greet him’ and 
receiving ‘an equally warm welcome’ inside.151 Having brought the issue to the greater 
public, UEM leaders then sought to persuade the public to take action and inspire grassroots 
action for the European cause. The aim was now to take discussion of European integration 
‘out of the detached atmosphere of the London club, the college library, the fashionable 
salon’ and bring it to ‘the man-in-the-street and his wife’, leading to ‘mass support’ from 
‘ordinary men and women’.152 The emphasis was now on UEM members and the public to 
take action, with a Radio Luxemburg broadcast instructing listeners to  
…preach the gospel, make converts. Put the case to your work-mates; in pubs, 
cafes, clubs, wherever you meet your friends, spread the gospel of United Europe. 
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Work for the cause as if your life depended on it… YOU are Everyman and 
Everyman is you.
153
 
 
The UEM thus sought to increase the popular, grassroots aspect of its campaign by continuing 
to attempt to increase support through meetings, literature and propaganda. By providing an 
early lead, the UEM hoped that a position would be reached where its campaign could ‘grow 
and expand from the bottom up’, as ‘International Committees must be supported by popular 
campaigns, [and] the popular campaigns must be swept forward by the intellectual cavalry of 
discussion groups.’154 
However, UEM’s propaganda failed to capture the imagination the way it intended. 
The response to the United Europe Exhibition, which highlighted ‘the benefits of co-
operation, interchange of ideas and a fuller knowledge of the customs, ideals and the way of 
life among the peoples of Europe’, was that despite the good attendance, a ‘more positive 
theme must be evolved’ to attract support to the movement.155 Similarly, UEM films, seen as 
of ‘inestimable value’ to UEM ‘as a medium for educating public opinion in favour of United 
Europe’, were advised to appeal more to the imagination.156 Suggestions included displaying 
‘typical frontier scenery’ to romanticise the issue and ‘combat the impression that there is 
indeed a physical barrier’, and bringing in aspects of ‘hot-gospelling’ and ‘Romance’.157 A 
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certain snobbery was behind these suggestions, however, as it was suggested the ‘simple 
human tragic story’ was needed as ‘a majority of humans… are tragically simple…’.158 
The voluntarist, “crusading” identity of those involved in the UEM may also have 
reinforced a perception of elitism that prevented the Movement gaining mass support. When 
its propaganda and membership drives were unsuccessful, it was assumed within the UEM 
that failure was due to ‘a good deal of ignorance and sense of remoteness concerning the real 
issues involved’. 159 In some cases this was seen by some in the movement as due to ‘an 
appalling ignorance’ or ‘an almost complete apathy’ on European issues, due to the separation 
of the issue from the ‘individual daily living’ of the public.160 Rather than ignorance or 
apathy, however, Lady Rhys-Williams believed that the public had to be led on this intricate 
matter, and that Churchill’s idea of a United Europe ‘sprang like Minerva from his head, fully 
born, but for some time was too bright for mortal eyes to see clearly!’161 Subsequently, the 
UEM sought to target ‘the simple citizen’ in its policy statements, and advised its speakers 
‘not to speak over the heads of the audience’, once more avoiding technical issues in order to 
sustain idealism and popular momentum.
162
 
However, despite this utilisation of simple propaganda in an attempt to garner mass 
support, UEM’s desired combination of prominent figures and large membership was not 
achieved. Its focus on idealism over development of a constitutional structure, combined with 
its sometimes elitist attitude, reinforced the image of UEM as a committee-led “prestige 
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group”, and prevented its aims of a popular public campaign for European integration being 
completely achieved. By contrast, FU’s complex structure gave members and branches the 
opportunity to participate and influence policy. Its propaganda was similarly aimed at the 
general public, and developing its membership base was seen as pivotal to any future success. 
Yet its idealistic nature, combined with public indifference to federalism, meant FU did not 
develop beyond a close-knit group of left-liberal devotees, taking the form more of a protest 
group rather than a mass movement. These qualities, however, contributed to the longevity of 
FU throughout the 1950s while the UEM went into terminal decline. The next section of this 
chapter analyses how both organisations reacted to political developments, before 
demonstrating how both organisations were usurped by more technocratic, lobbying-oriented 
pressure groups less concerned with influencing public opinion or developing mass support. 
The 1950s – The ineffectiveness and decline of FU and UEM, and the rise of the study 
groups 
 
With FU perceived as too much like a radical protest group on the fringes of politics, 
and the UEM as too political and elitist, both organisations would continue to struggle to 
attract public interest and support in the 1950s. The escalation of the Cold War, including the 
Soviet consolidation of Eastern Europe, the Berlin blockade, and the outbreak of the Korean 
War, made the issue of European integration develop increasingly along ‘functional’ lines.163 
Issues of economics, defence and practical necessity replaced those of idealism. FU’s aims for 
federation became more limited and functional, recognising that a union involving Eastern 
Europe and Russia, while avoiding an anti-Communist impression, ‘leads us back to re-join 
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the Faries [sic] down the garden.’164 However, while European integration was now seen in 
the political sphere as a necessity, FU acknowledged a shift in public attitudes away from 
foreign affairs. In 1951, it perceived the political climate to be ‘the most unfavourable that 
Federal Union has ever experienced’, with the public ‘ignoring international politics’, having 
‘no faith in the future’ and having ‘lost all faith in ideals.’165 
Yet this was proclaimed despite the increasing popularity and success of the UNA and 
other internationalist movements. Religious leaders turned away from support of the 
European integration issue, according to Coupland, and towards more global and 
humanitarian concerns such as world peace, the Commonwealth and relations between 
Europe and developing countries.
166
 Thus when the discourse of European integration became 
concerned with economic rationality, humanitarian and pacifistic support for the campaign 
turned their attention elsewhere. The success of the UNA, for example, may have been due to 
its shifting concerns relating to charitable and humanitarian campaigns, and in the words of 
Frank Field, extending ‘beyond internationalism to a perception of “planet earth”’.167 It could 
therefore attract the political elite, who still believed in Britain’s world role and international 
position and the principle of total national sovereignty, and a combination of federalists, 
pacifists, humanitarians and environmentalists. The words of United Europe campaigner 
Victor Gollancz, that ‘[t]here is nothing so depressing as a movement which has achieved its 
aims’, are also relevant in this respect.168 For those FU members supporting European 
integration out of a concern with the international situation or pacifistic or humanitarian 
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concerns, the progression of continental unity in the 1950s meant that they, like Gollancz, 
may have turned their attention elsewhere in the belief that integration was a job done. FU 
was thus troubled by a combination of ‘external’ factors, namely international developments, 
and ‘internal factors such as [a] lack of coherent organisational policy’ throughout the 
1950s.
169
  
In response to the events of the 1950s, and in light of the aforementioned ‘paradox’ of 
a small but highly active movement, it was suggested by some leading FU members that the 
organisation should drop its mass movement ambitions and focus on targeting elite opinion. 
By the 1950s, membership had still not surpassed a few thousand, and was seen by some in 
FU to be of diminished importance. It was no longer necessarily vital as regards raising funds 
for FU, as by 1955 it amounted for only a quarter of its income, and only a massive increase 
in membership would raise that proportion.
170
 With FU unlikely to be a truly mass movement, 
membership was no longer regarded as ‘synonymous with influence’, yet there was still a 
desire in FU to engage with the public and create a popular momentum for European 
integration.
171
 Sustaining momentum and membership, according to Frances Josephy, was the 
only way to prevent a downward spiral and eventual closure.
172
 
The 1950s thus became a period of soul-searching for FU with regards to its tactics 
and internal organisation. The first suggestion that FU become an ‘efficient educational body 
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along Fabian lines’ was put forward in 1948, after a decline in membership from its wartime 
peak had led to a pessimistic outlook.
173
 The disappointment after the European Assembly 
meetings at Strasbourg also engendered suggestions that FU ‘withdraw into the wilderness’, 
‘pruning the dead wood and dangerous elements’ into a ‘small nucleus’ rather than being a 
large movement of ‘half-hearted support’.174 FU officially decided to ‘continue as before’ in 
its approach to the public, but discontent continued to surface.
175
 Talk of ‘retrenchment’ by 
cutting back on production of Federal News was linked to this shift away from membership, 
leading to Secretary Keith Killby resigning on the grounds that the Executive Committee’s 
proposal could ‘jeopardise the future [of] Federal Union as a Membership movement.’176 His 
successor, Douglas Robinson, continued to warn of FU developing into ‘one of a large 
number of glorified study societies; a sorry reflection of its former self.’177 Alternatives to 
mass membership continued to be put forward, however, including by Robinson who 
hypothesised that FU could become ‘a pressure and lobbying group’ or ‘educational in 
character’, before concluding that it should ‘go all out developing our membership and our 
ability as a pressure group…’178 
The division between strategies came to a head over a resolution on the ‘urgent 
necessity of increasing membership and reviving Branch activity’ for the 1960 Annual 
General Meeting. Antony Morris described this as looking at FU’s position in ‘purely 
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quantitative terms’ when ‘the quality of most branches is steadily falling’. Morris thus 
advocated a structure along the lines of the Fabian Society or Bow Group, aiming 
membership at the ‘exceptionally well-informed’ rather than being a ‘large, but ill-informed, 
organisation, swamped by amateurs and cranks…’.179 Responses regarding FU’s organisation 
‘ranged from mass provincial membership to suggestions for an intellectual closed shop’.180 
However, an amended version of the original resolution was passed, seeking to increase 
membership and engage both its members and the general public with the European 
integration issue.
181
 
FU’s decision in the mid-1950s to gain the support of those with ‘influence over the 
ideas and activities of others’, such as community leaders, ‘businessmen and trade unionists, 
politicians and journalists’, does, however, demonstrate how FU professionalised in this 
period and adapted to a change in discourse. Morris may have been right that the subject of 
European integration was becoming increasingly concerned with ‘economic and constitutional 
ideas which [are] exceedingly difficult to express in terms which will command wide 
acceptance among the sort of people who are normally attracted to a “popular” movement.’182 
Thus by focusing on professional organisations, and producing publications such as Ronald 
Mackay’s “Whither Britain” highlighting the economic benefits of Britain joining a European 
federation, FU adjusted from a campaign that on the whole had moved from positive idealism 
to economic practicality.
183
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The UEM had similar problems as a result of the developments of the early 1950s, 
with ‘intellectual confusion’ as to whether integration should be on a functional or federal 
basis.
184
 The refusal of successive governments to join the European Coal and Steel 
Community set out in the Schuman Plan left the UEM with a ‘lack of a clear and coherent 
policy’, waiting for a statement of governmental policy before ‘effective work could be 
done.’185 This once more demonstrates how the UEM was too tied to the political sphere, 
unable to take a lead independent of government or to generate its own momentum for a 
popular campaign after the issue disappeared off the political agenda. The departure of 
prominent UEM members to take Cabinet posts in the Conservative government in 1951 
reinforces this point of UEM being too political. Furthermore, while Churchill had turned 
away from European integration and became ‘obsessed with nuclear matters and Big Three 
summits’, his election as Prime Minister had a negative effect on UEM, as those who joined 
the movement attracted by his prestige felt that 
…because he has assumed the Premiership he can be trusted to do all in his 
power, consonant with the safeguarding of the interests to this country, to promote 
greater unity in Europe.
186
 
 
The departure of the likes of Robert Boothby and Lord Layton from UEM also reveals 
the rigidness of the sort of Europe most members of UEM desired, that of an 
intergovernmental union based on idealism and sentimental appeal. Both were firm advocates 
of an intergovernmental approach through the Council of Europe, Boothby claiming that 
federation outside of the Council would have ‘no roots in history, no traditions, and no 
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viability in terms of politics, economics, or military power’, and would be ‘totally void of 
mass emotional appeal’, ‘an artificial product of professional politicians rather than the 
outcome of any spontaneous natural growth, or popular demand.’187 As the discourse of 
European integration turned to economic and military matters, and continental federation 
started to take shape, UEM members either left the campaign or worked for European unity 
through other organisations such as ELEC. The Movement been made to look ‘out of date’ by 
the Cold War and then struggled to keep up with events on the Continent.
188
 
Like FU, the UEM also sought to target ‘professional organisations and their trade 
journals’ for finance and support, but a combination of rapid decline in membership and 
finance, being left behind by developments, and accusations of party bias left the UEM in 
irreversible decline in the 1950s.
189
 As continental integration without Britain started to take 
shape, its membership dropped to around one thousand eight hundred members by August 
1952, approximately half the figure of three and a half years ago.
190
 Within six months that 
figure fell to one thousand, and by 1956 there were only five hundred subscribers.
191
 This 
contributed to a financial decline that was initiated by the UEM’s loans to the UKCEM. With 
the UKCEM facing the possibility of legal action in the late 1940s due to their perilous 
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finance, the UEM loaned the UKCEM an initial advance of £3,500, followed by further 
loans.
192
 The UEM soon complained of this ‘very great strain’ which had ‘prevented it from 
developing its campaign in Great Britain and on the Continent on the lines which it had 
originally planned.’193 Furthermore, when the UKCEM was reorganised in 1949, the UEM 
was left both without purpose and money. Activities in the field of ‘converting public 
opinion’, membership, fundraising, meetings and propaganda were to be ‘carried out through 
the agency of the United Kingdom Council of the European Movement, and not through the 
United Europe Movement as at present’, and the UEM, thus ‘relieved of much of its present 
expenditure’, would contribute £15,000 to the UKCEM annually.194 This reorganisation 
coincided with the first ‘discreet injection’ of large sums of money from the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the United States, in a covert operation which, according to 
Richard Aldrich, was designed to undermine British political resistance to federalism.
195
 The 
UEM’s commitment to gradual, intergovernmental integration meant that, unlike FU, the EUF 
or ELEC, their leaders and members were perceived as ‘foot-draggers’, and it became 
sidelined as federalist development took hold.
196
 This combination of factors demonstrates 
how the UEM was very much left behind by developments in Europe, and with a fall in public 
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support it became a mere study group by 1957, in spite of its initial fanfare, while the prospect 
of it being subsumed into UKCEM was also discussed.
197
 
As the discourse of European integration became more economic and less idealistic, 
economic study groups became more prominent at the expense of both FU and the UEM. The 
British Section of ELEC, which broke away from the UEM in the late 1940s, was one of the 
more prominent of these study groups. Previously part of the United Europe Economic 
Committee, a decision was made after the Hague Congress, for immediate study of economic 
questions, ‘to expand and strengthen the British Section of ELEC.’198 The UEM retained an 
Economic Sub-Committee which, rather than delving too deeply into the technical aspects, 
was to attract publicity and propaganda for the cause of European unity with practical 
reports.
199
 Confusion and rivalry soon began to occur, however, given that in 1948, nine out 
of the thirteen UEM Economic Sub-Committee members also worked for ELEC.
200
 However, 
the marked difference between the publicity and propaganda produced by the UEM Economic 
Sub-Committee and the technical studies of the ‘Elekites’ remained.201 Moreover, by 
promoting ‘solidarity in every sphere, by the means judged to be the best in each case’, ELEC 
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was an ideal organisation to work for functional European unity in the 1950s.
202
 It summed up 
the new political situation with its claim that ‘Europe is uniting, too slowly to please the 
visionaries, yet at a rate that surprises – and at the same time satisfies – the world of business 
and of labour.’203 
ELEC’s work involved producing detailed technical publications, many of which were 
papers for European economic conferences which provided the ‘driving force and expert 
knowledge’ on economics to politicians.204 Their publications were therefore for political and 
governmental consumption, with ‘distinguished personalities’ and ‘[g]overnmental and non-
governmental organisations’ all ‘favourably impressed by the quality of our 
deliberations...’.205 Whereas UEM and FU’s appeals had been to the public, ELEC produced 
‘methodical and detailed studies of a highly technical level’ and ‘of the kind of quality which 
are usually produced only by the civil servants of Government departments for study by other 
civil servants…’.206 In this sense, ELEC was closed off from the general public, with ‘no 
system of membership… in the ordinary sense’ and no public meetings, but with ‘[s]tatesmen, 
economists, trade-unionists, business-men and others interested in promoting the economic 
co-operation between the States of Europe’ all being eligible for membership.207 Instead, 
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ELEC was rather a unison of business figures and politicians, from prominent economists and 
civil servants such as Lord Layton and Sir Harold Butler to six cabinet members of the 
Macmillan administration, including Macmillan himself and ‘old United Europeanite’ Duncan 
Sandys.
208
 This close connection between business and government therefore enabled ELEC 
to formulate European policy and opinion at an elite level without engaging, educating or 
forming public opinion in the way that the UEM and FU had sought to. 
Furthermore, by aiming their memberships towards figures from finance, industry and 
business, economic-oriented pressure groups were more able to raise larger sums of money 
than the likes of UEM and FU and survive through the 1950s. Despite Lady Rhys-Williams 
believing ELEC was running ‘on a shoe-string’ compared to the vast sums poured into the 
UKCEM accounts, UEM’s disappointment at raising £10,000 at a benefit dinner was due to 
the fact that ‘ELEC can do better than that without Churchill to help.’ 209 Furthermore, Central 
Intelligence Agency funding from the US had a role in promoting British industrial and 
business interest in European integration via commissioned studies by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit.
210
 One of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s studies led to the formation of 
Britain in Europe (BiE), founded in 1959 to study the economic implications of European 
integration and British Common Market membership. Similarly to ELEC, it targeted 
economic, industrial and business interests, producing publications it perceived to be 
‘essential… for every export executive and business economist, as well as all those in 
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industry, commerce, the trade unions and politics who study the economic processes affecting 
this country’.211 These ranged from short and concise presentation of the facts, through their 
‘Highlights’ publication, to large commissioned reports by the Economist Intelligence Unit of 
around 600 pages, but their target audience remained the same, aiming for ‘[a] “Highlights” 
on every chairman’s desk, and a News-Letter in the briefcase of every export or overseas 
factory manager…’212 
As with ELEC, BiE made little attempt to engage the public, and produced its reports 
in the hope of influencing business and government. Rather, it perceived it to be the 
government’s job ‘to form and guide public opinion’ rather than theirs, as public opinion 
‘cannot be expected to understand these intricate issues…’213 Subsequently, BiE felt that 
…there would not appear to be any need for the Government to feel any anxiety 
about British opinion; all it needs to do is give the lead and justify its 
decision…214 
 
In spite of this, BiE was often slow to challenge the government over its decisions on Europe 
in this period, and did not exert the same sort of pressure that UEM and FU sought to. While 
believing that ‘no government worth its salt should recoil from the task of moulding public 
opinion’, BiE also felt that ‘[i]t is not for us, of course, to criticise the Government’, that has 
to ‘cope with the situation as a whole, and with many pressure groups who see things from a 
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point of view dramatically opposed to ours.’215 BiE instead seemed to pride itself on the 
quality of its publications rather than its pressure work, having brought about an ‘increased 
awareness’ and ‘a more constructive climate of opinion’ which led the government ‘to be not 
unsupportive of [our] work…’216 Its assimilation of Europe House in May 1960, who 
organised public meetings in the aim of creating ‘a well-informed public opinion’ and ‘a 
lively public interest in European affairs’, and attempted to engage with the public in a more 
political campaign for Common Market membership, demonstrates how the economic study 
group came to dominate the campaigns for European integration by the late 1950s.
217
 
At the re-launch of the UKCEM in 1954, Arthur Woodburn noted that the EM’s 
problem in the past had been that ‘[g]overnments had refused to countenance the European 
Movement because it was regarded as an Opposition party, a pressure group for 
Strasbourg.’218 Pressure groups and movements promoting European unity, therefore, had to 
work closely with the government in the new political landscape of functional integration of 
Western Europe, of which Britain was on the periphery. Groups like ELEC and BiE 
established links between business and government, rather than informing and mobilising the 
public and forming links between public and government. It was decided that the UKCEM 
‘should be an educational and not a policy making body’ so as to not apply too much direct 
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pressure on the government over Europe.
219
 The UKCEM was still, however, not entirely 
comfortable on campaigning on a wholly economic basis, and sought a more inspirational 
political campaign capable of mobilising public opinion. A sign of how much the 
“functionalist” approach to European integration had changed the issue can be seen in the 
response from the public to an EM questionnaire in 1956. The EM perceived from the results 
that there was a risk of ‘neutralism’ in the void left by a decline in federalist faith, and that 
‘the appetite of politicians for precise definition in logical terms’ had led to stagnation in the 
campaign for integration. What was needed, the EM believed, was ‘[a] few Churchillian 
phrases’ to give ‘impetus and inspiration’, as part of an ‘emotional appeal’. Even if the appeal 
was ‘mythical and unattainable’, ‘[y]outh must crusade for something. If they are not offered 
a worthy ideal to pursue, they may well be attracted to unworthy ones.’ The EM therefore still 
saw the importance of a popular basis of support for European integration, and that where 
there were new fields of progress, including economic co-operation, EM needed ‘to present 
these to public opinion in the most inspiring way that can be devised…’220 
A letter to Rhys Williams on the opinions of ex-Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri 
Spaak and a group of London citizens also demonstrates the limitations of campaigning for 
integration on an economic basis. The correspondent had asked Spaak, a leading figure in the 
campaign for European integration, what the best line to persuade people to support a united 
Europe would be, and Spaak responded that, while continental Europeans would be attracted 
by the economic issue, he was ‘not sure that that answer is valid for Britain’. Members of the 
public also seemed to be attracted by the message of lasting European peace, ‘a simple and 
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easily understood argument.’221 Thus when it came to events such as economic conferences, 
the EM called for ‘a few general principles’ to be put forward to ‘arouse public opinion’, as 
when discussing ‘complicated economic problems… it will be difficult for the Press to 
distinguish the wood from the trees…’222 The EM thus attempted to engage with the public 
through the new stage of the European campaign, maintaining some of the popular mass 
movement tactics of the UEM and FU in their approach. 
On the whole, however, the groups that campaigned for European integration in the 
late 1950s were more “insider” organisations than the public-oriented campaigns of FU and 
UEM. The former, in the face of diminishing success, had flirted with the idea of becoming 
this sort of study group or educational group, before settling on a middle ground by increasing 
membership and targeting opinion-formers and influential figures. However, the economic 
and constitutional complexities of the European integration issue had left idealistic 
campaigning organisations such as FU and UEM struggling for influence and support, whilst 
“insider” organisations such as ELEC, BiE and UKCEM aimed to provide expertise to 
business and government. 
Conclusion 
In 1961, Rhys Williams, whose opinion on the ‘Catholic “Little Europe”’ of the 
Common Market had by now made her something of an opponent of British membership, 
wrote to Macmillan shortly before he would announce his government’s intention to apply for 
Common Market membership. Reminiscing about the manner in which Europe had come 
together, she recalled the failed attempt of UEM, ‘[i]n the old days under Churchill... to create 
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the image of “Europa” – the spirit of the European continent’, and base the campaign for 
integration around a common European identity formed through a shared heritage, shared 
values, and the collective experience of the horrors of total war. The attempt to form a popular 
campaign based on public pressure for a united Europe, had failed, and economic integration 
and the impetus of business had succeeded in forming the Common Market, but Rhys 
Williams warned that, 
Economic arrangements alone are not enough. They tend to disrupt rather than 
unite feeling except during the euphoria stage of a boom, which is now over. The 
strains begin to show, and only a real ideal can hold things together.
223
 
 
The attempt to form a popular campaign based on moral, positive ideals may have 
failed, but the attempt was there, and both FU and the UEM attempted to bring the matter 
from the world of high politics and intergovernmental conferences into the public sphere. 
Gollancz stated his and his colleagues’ reason for FU membership as ‘the expression of a 
simple aspiration, and to cooperate as individuals, and in any way we chose, with those 
working towards the same ends.’224 Both FU and UEM provided the general public the 
opportunity for this expression of a pro-European belief and identity, and the chance to 
participate in the crusade for integration.  These campaigns were flawed, often because they 
were of a quite elitist nature, particularly in the case of UEM whose inability to decentralise 
and engage the public in grassroots activity prevented it from forming a large mass 
membership base, which may have provided the momentum – or, almost as importantly, the 
income – to extend its activity throughout the 1950s. From the fanfare of the Albert Hall 
meeting of 1947, seen as the official birth of the wider European Movement, it faded into 
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obscurity in the 1950s. As UEM declined, the FU was torn between aspiring towards being a 
pressure group or a mass movement, as it grappled with the difficulty of framing complex 
issues in simple terms to the public. The intensification of the Cold War, the government’s 
ambivalent approach to European unity, and the trend towards a federal government of the Six 
left a void for the more professional UKCEM, and the economic study groups ELEC and BiE, 
to campaign for British integration with Europe. The discourse on British membership had 
become economic, and failed to truly inspire the public in the way that the campaign for 
peace, unity and the potential to achieve something historic had attempted in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. 
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CHAPTER TWO: ‘BUT WHAT OF THE PEOPLE…?’: THE BRITISH ANTI-EEC 
MOVEMENT, 1961-1973
1
 
 
The rise to prominence of more professional, technocratic pro-Market pressure groups 
in the 1950s helped to usher in what Stephen George described as ‘a gradual official 
realization’ amongst the British political elite of the need to engage with the EEC.2 There was 
a belief, however, that the lobbying activities of the pro-Market campaigns also had a 
negative effect. Miriam Camps, writing shortly after the de Gaulle veto of 1963, believed that 
the fervour for integration from ‘[t]he Common Market campaign carried on by the press and 
by the “European” groups’ at the turn of the decade ‘grossly oversimplified’ the difficulties 
inherent in Britain joining the EEC.
3
 Nevertheless, the perception of the close relationship 
between these groups and the government was criticised by the anti-Market groups which 
emerged in the early 1960s. In a booklet published by the Anti-Common Market League, an 
article by R. Hugh Corbet sought to expose the hidden federalist agenda of pro-Market 
pressure groups. Details were provided of the likes of the UKCEM, the United Europe 
Association, the European-Atlantic Group and BiE, backed by political figures on their 
executive committees and receiving the ‘naïve patronage’ of religious leaders. Under a 
‘façade of impartiality’, Corbet explained how  
Westminster and Whitehall, the City of London and Industry, are all no doubt 
well versed in these groups. But what of the people; the tax-payers, the ones who 
suffer the pay pauses and fight the wars?
4
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ACML furthered this line of argument throughout the booklet, with its Chairman and 
founder John Paul highlighting the ‘friendly persuaders’, organisations ‘with vested interests 
in British entry’ into the EEC, and with references to the resources and influence of ‘political, 
industrial and financial’ pressure groups elsewhere.5 Yet while these organisations may have 
had influence owing to their “insider” status, the reality of the process towards the first EEC 
application was more complex.
6
 Hugo Young has argued that key figures in Whitehall in the 
1950s, notably Michael Palliser and Sir Gladwyn Jebb in the Foreign Office and then Sir 
Frank Lee at the Board of Trade, were the drivers behind the government’s reassessment of its 
European policy.
7
 Furthermore, it is arguable that the final decision to apply for membership 
was the result of high political rather than economic factors. While, as Young points out, the 
economic superiority of the EEC became clear by the mid-1950s and the ‘truth was becoming 
available, for those who could count’, the ‘geo-political context’ was of greater importance.8 
Wolfram Kaiser has argued that the Foreign Office began to assume a greater role on the 
European issue than the Board of Trade, as it became more an issue of foreign policy than 
economics.
9
 Geopolitical concerns such as the desire to replace leadership of the 
Commonwealth with leadership of the EEC, to strengthen the transatlantic “special 
relationship” and to retain an independent nuclear deterrent meant, according to Kaiser, that a 
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failed application would still meet most of the government’s objectives.10 The application’s 
timing also sought to split the Labour Party over Europe, and the centrality of the EEC 
application to the Conservative Party’s modernisation policy contributed to its partisan 
nature.
11
 
However, the anti-Market groups’ perception of an elite-led campaign for European 
integration in the 1960s remains somewhat justified. Robert Lieber argues that prior to 1961, 
the EEC issue was predominantly discussed by government and officials and interest groups 
as elites became ‘increasingly receptive to the idea of EEC membership’.12 By contrast, public 
opinion on EEC membership was highly volatile during the first application, with the 
Macmillan government failing to provide a lead or rally the public to the pro-EEC cause.
13
 
Macmillan’s announcement to the House of Commons in 1961 immediately marked the 
starting point for a period of fierce debate outside of the parliamentary arena. An issue that 
had previously been the preserve of politicians and sectional interest groups became 
politicised, as political parties, the public and promotional pressure groups argued the case for 
or against EEC entry. As Lieber highlights, while a few promotional pressure groups existed 
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before Macmillan’s announcement to the House of Commons, ‘most sprang up in response to 
the suddenly increased salience of the European issue’.14 
With Macmillan’s announcement, according to Anthony Forster, cruder anti-European 
arguments were refined as ‘the landscape in which opponents of supranational integration 
changed markedly.’15 However, while the aforementioned example of anti-Market rhetoric 
demonstrated an inherent populism and desire to speak on behalf of the British public, pro-
Market pressure groups continued to target elites rather than mass support. While the likes of 
the UEM and FU had sought, and failed, to engage with the wider public on the EEC issue, 
Lieber notes how the Common Market Campaign, the ‘most important’ of the pro-Market 
groups, ‘operated on an elite basis to influence informed opinion’.16 According to Lieber, this 
was the result of seeking ‘to sustain and encourage an existing governmental policy’, and led 
to an elite-oriented appeal to the ‘non-partisan middle ground’, or the ‘middle opinion’ 
identified by Marwick.
17
 The only partial exception was the United Europe Association, 
founded by the UKCEM as its mass-membership wing in 1961 and ‘united by the common 
belief in the ideal of a United Europe.’18 As a result of this predominantly elite-based pressure 
group activity, and the political decision for application stemming from government and 
Whitehall activity, the anti-Marketeers perceived themselves to be in the position of targeting 
and mobilising public opinion on the EEC membership debate. 
                                                          
14
 Lieber, British Politics and European Unity, p.208 
15
 Forster, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics, p.12 
16
 Lieber, British Politics and European Unity, p.215 
17
 Ibid., p.215, p.217; Marwick, “Middle Opinion in the Thirties: Planning, Progress and Political ‘Agreement’” 
18
 Statement of aims of the United Europe Association, attached with minutes of the Executive Committee of 
UKCEM, 5 December 1962, 1 MH 229, UKCEM in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, 
Harvester Primary Social Sources. This group was unrelated to the UEM. 
 99 
 
This chapter will analyse the populist campaigns undertaken by anti-Market 
organisations, with reference to their more elite-oriented pro-Market counterparts, between 
1961 and 1973. Macmillan’s announcement led to the mobilisation of ‘a cluster of newly 
organised groups’ in response, each with different ideological standpoints.19 The three most 
prominent single-issue, promotional pressure anti-Market groups formed in 1961 were 
identified by Dewey as the Anti-Common Market League (ACML), the Keep Britain Out 
movement (KBO), and the Forward Britain Movement (FBM).
20
 ACML was formed after a 
series of meetings at the house of Peter Walker, a newly-elected Conservative MP and former 
Chairman of the Young Conservatives. Walker, believing the group should be ‘a research and 
information organisation’, left before the ACML was founded by John Paul and a group of 
Young Conservatives as a more vocal campaigning organisation.
21
 KBO was founded by free 
trade advocates S.W. Alexander and Oliver Smedley, and has been branded by Dewey as 
ACML’s ‘Liberal counterpart… on a much smaller scale’.22 In addition to the free trade 
liberalism of Smedley and Alexander, ‘entrenched in resurrected “dear food” battles of the 
past’, KBO’s liberalism incorporated defence of individual freedom and rights, as evidenced 
by Alexander’s co-founding of the Society of Individualists, and the later Vice-Chairmanship 
of Sir Ian Mactaggart, Chairman of the Society for Individual Freedom.
23
 FBM, founded by 
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trade union leader Richard Briginshaw, was aimed at other trade unionists, Labour members 
and peace activists, but fell into decline and inactivity after the failure of the EEC application 
in 1963.
24
 
In his analysis of opposition to the first EEC application, Dewey has claimed that the 
ideological inclinations of each of the aforementioned anti-Market pressure groups limited 
collaboration and co-operation between them.
25
 While citing ‘instances of collaboration’ in 
the form of rallies and public meetings, Dewey is right to highlight the lack of a ‘unified 
front’ amongst anti-Marketeers.26 However, focusing on the unsuccessful early umbrella 
movements which included more extremist and maligned elements detracts from the common 
ground shared between the three main groups.
27
 Anti-Market groups in this period, according 
to Robert Lieber, were all characterised by ‘the extent to which they found it necessary to act 
outside the corridors of power’, and the outsider status these groups held forced them ‘to aim 
at recruiting a mass clientele’.28 Furthermore, by focusing on issues that appealed to the 
public on a cross-party or non-party basis, these groups attempted to develop beyond their 
ideological origins. Dewey is right to underline ACML’s Conservative origins, but the 
repeated use of a number of its early statements and leaflets, including the unambiguous 
“Conservatives and the Common Market”, somewhat overstates the appeal to Conservative 
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voters, despite noting that ACML later ‘achieved a degree of cross-party membership’.29 
Furthermore, Nigel Ashford has noted that by February 1962 it had dropped the direct appeal 
to Conservatives from its propaganda to broaden its membership and publicity material.
30
 
The anti-Market organisations, after initially campaigning along more traditional 
ideological or party political lines, were by the end of the 1960s appealing to the public on a 
non-party or cross-party basis quite separate from the more liberalist and elite-minded ‘middle 
ground’ of the pro-Marketeers.31 The populist, non-party issues focused on by the anti-Market 
movement were more than ‘banal assumptions about the sanctity of national freedom and a 
common perception that Britain’s independence and international status were increasingly 
vulnerable’.32 Rather, they formed the common ground for the disparate strands of the anti-
Market movement to co-operate more closely throughout the 1960s. Bereft of access to party 
political machinery and lacking active support from established MPs, a nucleus of anti-EEC 
mobilisation was formed from the fringes of the parliamentary arena, leading to the creation 
of co-ordinating bodies such as the Common Market Safeguards Campaign (CMSC) and its 
affiliated subsidiary campaigns, and a cross-over of personnel between organisations. 
This meant the campaign occupied a unique, if sometimes confused, position in 
relation to institutional politics. The anti-Marketeers made clear their frustrations with the 
increasing cross-party consensus on the pro-Market side as the 1960s progressed, often 
spilling over to criticism of the functioning of political parties and the Westminster system 
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and even non-cooperation and confrontational protest tactics. Yet they simultaneously were 
unable to remove the issue from the realm of parliamentary politics, and were forced to direct 
their campaign as much towards pressuring politicians as generating a groundswell of 
opposition to EEC entry amongst the general public. They thus lay somewhere between what 
Helen McCarthy termed the ‘anti-party instincts’ of the likes of Oswald Mosley’s early 1930s 
New Party in their ‘critique of the parliamentary system’ and the more progressive, centrist 
outlook of their pro-Market forerunners, oscillating between their own conception of how 
parliamentary democracy should work and being forced to address the politicised issue of 
EEC membership.
33
 Preservation of the democratic rights of the individual, as much as that of 
national sovereignty, was central to the anti-Market campaign, along with other issues that 
resonated with and affected ‘the people’ regardless of party political ideology. 
The first part of this chapter will analyse these issues and arguments that would form 
the basis for a non-party campaign in the 1960s and early 1970s, leading to increased co-
operation between the separate anti-Market organisations. They focused on the political 
effects of EEC membership and the resulting loss of sovereignty throughout the 1960s, while 
the government and pro-Marketeers focused on the economic benefits of membership. The 
issue of sovereignty remained a cross-party issue, and focusing on it allowed the anti-
Marketeers to put forward a reasoned case against membership. The more emotive side of 
preserving sovereignty was framed within the wider argument of preserving national identity 
and heritage, as anti-Market groups espoused the kind of populist cultural opposition studied 
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by the likes of Gifford and Spiering.
34
 The symbolic resonance of British law, institutions and 
policies were defended in opposition to creeping “Europeanisation” in the same way that 
Britain’s unique and gradual path to democracy was placed opposite the perceived artificiality 
of federalism. Similarly, the Commonwealth, whilst declining in political and economic 
significance during the 1960s, retained a significant cultural weight. The appeals of an 
“organic” and trusted political system, free trade, and the ability to help Commonwealth and 
third world producers all formed a cross-party rationale for placing the Commonwealth 
system ahead of EEC membership. The increasing focus on the British consumer rather than 
producers in the 1960s also reflected the anti-Marketeers’ strategy of targeting as wide a 
range of public support as possible, and the targeting of women and housewives as politicised 
groupings also demonstrated the increasing importance of price rises and consumer 
economics and the cross-party nature of their appeal. 
The second part of this chapter will analyse the tactics and operation of the anti-
Marketeers, demonstrating how they sought to mobilise both outside and inside the political 
arena, with a “dual approach” of targeting both the wider public and political support upon 
which the success or failure of EEC entry legislation would depend. In contrast to their pro-
Market counterparts, anti-Market groups sought mass membership and targeted public 
support directly via simple propaganda. Large print runs of leaflets and pamphlets also 
ensured grassroots involvement in distributing propaganda and looking to increase 
membership, along with participation in mass meetings and demonstrations which intended to 
show the strength of public support on the issue. Anti-Market groups also engaged in more 
traditional pressure group activity, seeking to gain influence and exert pressure in 
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Westminster. Mass lobbying of parliament and MPs was combined with a systematic 
monitoring of MPs’ views in order to target those potentially sympathetic to the anti-Market 
cause. Independent by-election candidates were also a more direct engagement with the 
parliamentary sphere. 
In this sense, not only did groups like the ACML seek ‘to influence public and 
parliamentary opinion in every possible way to achieve a reversal of the disastrous decision 
[to apply for EEC membership]’ from their inception, they also sought to fulfil the typical role 
of pressure groups and NGOs in connecting the electorate with the political institutions 
intended to represent them, a vital function in their perception of an active parliamentary 
democracy.
35
 Yet the anti-Market groups’ engagement with parliamentary politics and attempt 
to pursue an “insider” strategy increasingly left its personnel disillusioned. The final part of 
this chapter will shed further light on the anti-political and anti-party nature of the anti-Market 
campaign, and further demonstrate their position in the gap between the political and public 
spheres. Their opposition to greater governmental interference on a European level and their 
suspicion of lobbyist involvement was combined with frustration with party machinery, such 
as increased centralised control over policy and candidate selection and the increased use of 
party Whips. This allowed them to present the anti-Market campaign as a disenfranchised 
dissenting voice, and as Gifford says, ‘as the representatives of the people and the guardians 
of popular sovereignty’.36 However, its inability to further mobilise public opinion into a 
national movement or a new political party represented its failure to make significant 
headway in either its public or political strategies. 
                                                          
35
 “Campaign Against Common Market”, unknown press cutting detailing ACML’s forthcoming first public 
meeting [n.d.], CIB 7/1, BLPES 
36
 Gifford, The Making of Eurosceptic Britain, p.132 
 105 
 
Issues and arguments: the anti-Market case 
Political effects: loss of sovereignty and defence of the public 
Opposition to the political and constitutional aspects of the EEC had been an aspect of 
anti-Market rhetoric since the antipathy shown by British politicians towards supranational 
European integration at the Council of Europe in 1949. When the Macmillan government 
presented its application in economic terms, anti-Market groups voiced their strong concern 
for retaining British parliamentary sovereignty. From the outset, groups such as ACML were 
most concerned about the political consequences of joining the EEC, and publicised the 
‘permanent, irrevocable loss’ of parliamentary sovereignty.37 Derek Walker-Smith’s article in 
the Daily Express on the political impact of EEC entry, quoted in ACML’s February 1962 
newsletter, spelt out the anti-Marketeers’ fears, claiming the government  
...should have to bring British law into line with the Common Market on a wide 
range of subjects.... Everything which might conflict with the Treaty of Rome 
would have to be repealed or amended, even if every single member of Parliament 
preferred it to remain as it was.
38
 
 
During the negotiations for Britain’s first EEC application, ACML continued to 
condemn EEC entry as ‘the greatest surrender of British parliamentary government and 
sovereignty, to an alien bureaucracy over which we should have no control’.39 In its 
arguments, ACML’s predominant concern, motivated by their ‘belief in British Parliamentary 
Government’, was the delegation of power and sovereignty away from Parliament to both 
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‘our own civil service in Whitehall’ and ‘a group of European bureaucrats’.40 Anti-Marketeers 
objected to the principle of EEC membership as they rejected, ‘[r]egardless of any “terms”’ 
the government could obtain, ‘the prospect of being ruled by [a European] Executive 
Commission... and by a council of Ministers’.41 This preoccupation with preserving the 
traditional British system of parliamentary sovereignty, democratic self-government and the 
authority of Westminster was central in attracting parliamentarians from both main political 
parties, such as Tony Benn, Enoch Powell and Peter Shore, to the anti-Market cause.
42
 A 
motion due to be presented to the House of Commons by the anti-EEC Common Market 
Committee on the day of Macmillan’s announcement in July 1961, ‘opposing any material 
derogation of British sovereignty’ resulting from entry into the Common Market, was 
evidence of immediate parliamentary opposition to the government’s application.43 
Yet with the Macmillan government, in fear of alienating public support, presenting 
the application in economic terms, anti-Marketeers faced the challenge of presenting the 
political consequences to the wider public. Anti-EEC pressure groups were aware of this 
difficulty; ACML’s collection of articles titled Britain, not Europe criticised both government 
and pro-Market groups for their continual emphasis on economic factors. Corbet’s 
aforementioned article on “The Federalist Pressures in Britain” described pro-Marketeers, 
‘[i]mbued with notions of world government’ and federalism, as ‘[s]ophisticated 
propagandists’ whose ‘public utterances today are chiefly economic.’44 ACML’s chairman 
John Paul also criticised the pro-EEC groups and ‘friendly persuaders’ who, aware that the 
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public would not support federalist arguments, ‘represent the issue as one of economics’.45 
Britain, not Europe signified the beginning of ACML presenting its own political and 
economic arguments against entry in order to counteract assumptions derived from pro-
Market propaganda. Publications such as William Pickles’ Not with Europe: the Political 
Case for Staying Out provided a more sophisticated critique of EEC membership, which was 
followed up by shorter leaflets on the threat to sovereignty.
46
  
Opposition to membership on political grounds remained central to ACML’s 
campaign approaching the second EEC application, soliciting financial support to produce a 
simple booklet on how the EEC would mean ‘the beginning of the end for Britain’s 
parliamentary government’ to be distributed widely.47 Increasing concentration on the 
political basis for opposing entry represented an increasing desire to present a more 
sophisticated and reasoned argument. In 1967, John Paul criticised the anti-Market case put 
forward on the television programme “This Week” by Conservative MP Sir Cyril Osborne, 
chosen by ‘some backroom mogul’, as ‘pathetic’ and ‘largely emotional and did no kind of 
justice to the sensible case, which we can put forward....’48 In another letter Paul complained 
that, having been rejected by the programme, his case ‘about the institutional aspects of EEC 
superseding Parliament was not made by anyone else.’49 ACML gradually learnt the 
importance of a ‘respectable’ and rational case against entry during the 1960s, and by 
persuading politicians and economists to put forward the arguments against entry, ACML was 
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afforded a greater level of respectability that a lack of access to elite decision-making and a 
lack of support from senior political figures had denied them. By 1969, the decision was made 
by ACML to further concentrate on and publicise the constitutional case so that ‘it will not... 
be so easy to brush it aside or ridicule it as the work of unenlightened non-conformists.’50 
1969 also saw the publication of a booklet on the Treaty of Rome by ACML, which, on the 
back of articles and published letters from MPs such as Derek Walker-Smith, Peter Bessell, 
Neil Marten and Douglas Jay, ensured ‘there was no point paying for an advertisement [for 
the booklet] until there was some diminution of interest’ on the subject.51 Walker-Smith’s 
article brought particular praise from ACML’s Executive Committee as ‘a sober appraisal 
rather than a head-on argument on the subject’, and a copy of the article was distributed with 
their July newsletter.
52
 By the turn of the decade, fears of the political consequences of EEC 
entry had begun to take hold in the Common Market debate across group boundaries and 
political affiliations. 
During the second application, the opportunity for presenting an anti-Market case on a 
constitutional basis changed as, according to Lieber, the cross-party consensus on EEC 
membership reduced the influence of pressure groups but ‘allowed a more direct treatment of 
Common Market entry with less need to disguise its political implications.’53 Furthermore, in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the economic argument for EEC entry became weaker, pro-
Marketeers began to stress the more political and idealistic motivations for membership. An 
analysis of the economic consequences of entry by Douglas Jay predicted that ‘Britain would 
lose all along the line’, and that ‘joining the EEC would be more nearly a case of economic 
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suicide.’ ACML also observed that in the face of the diminishing economic benefits of 
membership, pro-Marketeers such as Foreign Secretary and Deputy Labour Party Leader 
George Brown had ‘gone back to stressing the political side.’54 According to Uwe Kitzinger, 
however, pro-Marketeers tried to deliberately steer the debate towards economic issues, as 
pro-Market pressure groups felt on safer ground discussing the economic rather than political 
aspects of entry.
55
 By the turn of the decade, however, a combination of devaluation and 
inflation in Britain led to anti-Market groups challenging EEC entry as ‘far too high a price to 
pay’ based upon their own economic estimates.56 A fringe group associated with the ACML, 
called the Referendum Before Common Market Committee (RBCMC), summed up the 
change in the pro-Market case by highlighting how lobbyists were ‘now hastily saying that 
the issue must be regarded as an idealistic and not an economic one. There could hardly be a 
clearer admission of economic disadvantages.’57 
By contrast, anti-Market groups decided to increase their concentration on political 
and constitutional issues, as evident in the new umbrella group CMSC’s “Safeguard Britain 
Campaign” launched at the end of 1969. Its primary objective was to ‘safeguard Britain’s 
political independence and her ability to play her full part in democratic international 
institutions, while opposing the submergence of Britain in any federal state.’58 In many ways, 
this was a reaction on the part of anti-Market groups to events on the continent and the formal 
efforts of British governments applying for EEC membership. CMSC agreed in 1970, as a 
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result of the Brussels negotiations and of the Werner Report of 1969 planning the course for 
the EEC’s supranational political and economic development, to ‘concentrate increasingly on 
the political and constitutional aspects of the matter’ without being ‘led into the blind alley of 
arguing about how long a transition period there should be, as this is clearly no solution at 
all.’59 Likewise, ACML at this point was extremely perturbed by developments such as the 
Werner Report’s recommendation for a supranational ‘decision centre’, seen as ‘a euphemism 
for government – a central European government.’60 Consequently, anti-Market groups’ 
criticisms focused mainly on political and constitutional developments during the early 1970s. 
The government’s White Paper Costs and Benefits of Entry, which at the request of Heath and 
his ministers was heavily weighted towards economic aspects over the political issues of 
sovereignty and law, was strongly criticised by anti-Market groups.
61
 The Executive 
Committee of the Common Market Study Group, an all-party parliamentary anti-Market 
group, condemned it as ‘a propaganda document, superficial and full of generalisations’, and 
criticised the government for circulating a condensed version of the paper through the Post 
Office.
62
 It followed up these criticisms with calls for a Select Committee to examine the 
claims of the paper more closely.
63
 CMSC’s verdict on the White Paper was that it was 
‘ambiguously worded’ and had left the benefits of EEC entry ‘as unintelligible and 
mysterious as ever’.64 The anti-Marketeers’ focus on the White Paper demonstrated their 
determination to challenge the government’s avoidance of the political aspects of EEC 
                                                          
59
 Minutes of a meeting of CMSC, 2 November 1970, Hinchingbrooke MSS, D/MAP88, Dorset Record Office 
60
 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, November 1970, CIB 7/3, BLPES 
61
 Forster, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics, p.43 
62
 Minutes of meeting of Common Market Study Group Executive Committee, 7 July 1971, MS Eng. Hist. 
C.1131/79, Bodleian Library; Minutes of meeting of Common Market Study Group Executive Committee, 14 
July 1971, MS Eng. Hist. C.1131/80, Bodleian Library 
63
 Minutes of meeting of Common Market Study Group Executive Committee, 28 July 1971, MS Eng. Hist. 
C.1131/81, Bodleian Library 
64
 Common Market Safeguards Campaign Bulletin, no. 1, April 1970, CIB 1/1, BLPES 
 111 
 
membership, such as Neil Marten’s letter to Lord Balniel of the Ministry of Defence claiming 
the paper’s arguments were ‘purely hackneyed old European folk-lore and they need 
probing.’65 
The negotiations in Brussels were also criticised from a political perspective by the 
anti-Market groups. Marten complained about the negotiations’ avoidance of fundamental 
political and constitutional matters, stating that they 
...were not to change the character of the Common Market at all. Geoffrey Rippon 
raised no large issues. He questioned not one clause of the Rome Treaty. [...] 
Great issues of principle... were not put into the negotiations at all.
66
 
 
Marten also complained after the completion of negotiations in Brussels that concerns about 
the future political development of the EEC, which was of great concern to the public, had 
been ‘swept under the carpet during the negotiations’.67 The anti-Market groups’ concern that 
the public were either being misled or ill-informed on the negotiations and on the 
consequences of EEC membership was also evident in criticisms of the government’s 
negotiation of transition periods. These periods were described by ACML as ‘only of 
transitional significance’, and that after British membership was secured the EEC would 
‘creep towards a Federal Union without ordinary people being aware of what is happening. 
When they do realise it will be too late – their self-government will have disappeared.’68 
Terms discussed in the Brussels negotiations were therefore portrayed as mere ‘transitional 
arrangements’ and ACML claimed that ‘[w]hen this becomes clear towards the end of the 
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negotiation we shall be told that it is now too late to say ‘No’ particularly on political 
grounds.’69 Anti-Market groups thus saw themselves as defending the public by giving them 
clear information about the political aspects of membership, and were encouraged to view the 
negotiations’ concern with transition periods as a diversion from the fundamental issue of 
membership, and that they were, according to CMSC, ‘the option of slow strangulation rather 
than sudden death. After this we can only ask: What is there to negotiate about?’70 
On the issues of the loss of sovereignty and political integration into the EEC’s 
supranational structure, anti-Market groups therefore presented themselves as defenders of the 
public for whom these consequences would be widespread. CMSC Bulletins and ACML 
newsletters together dealt with the latest political developments in the EEC, in the absence of 
governmental information on such matters in Britain. While politicians negotiated on 
Britain’s future in Brussels, CSMC expressed that the public ‘have no wish to surrender in 
this way their right to order their own internal affairs, nor do they desire the emasculation of 
their parliamentary institutions and liberties.’71 Politicians were thus targeted on the political 
aspects, as groups like ACML mobilised their supporters to challenge election candidates in 
their constituencies on the loss of sovereignty and the danger of a federal Europe.
72
 Anti-
Marketeers had challenged the evasiveness of politicians before, with Richard Body 
criticising Michael Stewart’s prevarications on the economic effect of membership in a letter 
to the Telegraph, and stating that ‘[n]ot just Members of Parliament but every one of us 
should be given the opportunity of assessing for himself whether the Treaty of Rome should 
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be signed.’73 By contrast, before the publication of the White Paper an ‘authoritative study’ 
had been arranged by ACML to look at the economic consequences of entry, stating that ‘[i]f 
the Government refuses to publish their estimate of the cost to Britain, the League will do the 
job instead.’74 Accusations of a ‘cover-up job’ followed until the Government’s production of 
what ACML dubbed ‘Mr Heath’s Off-White Paper’, criticised as being ‘replete with 
propaganda’ and containing ‘little analysis of the political and economic issues involved’.75  
Anti-Market groups like ACML thus portrayed themselves as the link between policy 
and the public in the absence of impartial information on the issue from the government, and 
as defenders of the public’s true wishes, as evident in John Biffen’s claim that the 
government’s policy 
...totally misreads the fundamental nature of the decision and the widespread 
public unease lest freedoms and sovereignties are surrendered beyond recall and 
national economic advantages are traded away for intangible benefits which 
belong to some misty future.
76
 
 
Biffen’s concerns even went as far as fearing political violence resulting from the loss of 
sovereignty, the loss of respect for political institutions and the weakened bond between 
public and parliament; such were the concerns of anti-Marketeers to preserve the traditional 
Westminster model of democracy.
77
 In presenting these fears to the public, anti-Market 
groups from all sides sought the widest support base possible on a non-party political basis, 
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forming a consensus in opposition to constitutional aspects of the Treaty of Rome by the early 
1970s. 
Impact on British political culture: national tradition, history and heritage 
Concerns about British sovereignty being lost through membership of the EEC also 
contained a symbolic dimension beyond constitutional aspects and the removal of power from 
British institutions. In attempting to defend ‘traditional’ British sovereignty in the early 
1970s, Neil Marten sought to challenge the pro-European pressure groups over their 
confusion of national sovereignty and national identity, claiming, 
I have never heard anyone seriously claim that we would lose our identity – 
cricket, tea breaks, grumbling, straw boaters at Henley – they will continue in the 
same old way – just as Quebec maintains its particular identity in a federal 
Canada.
78
 
 
Anti-Marketeers were concerned, however, with the perceived threat to aspects of British 
identity inherent within traditional British law, institutions and customs. Loss of political 
sovereignty was contrary to Britain’s own particular progression to democratic government, 
and diminished the role of Parliament, itself a source of national identity and pride. 
Consequently, EEC membership’s threat to British parliamentary democracy was also a threat 
to Britain’s identity, heritage, and democratic development. Chris Gifford has also focused on 
how British political culture and identity were used in populist Eurosceptic discourse, 
including myths and assumptions regarding Britain and the “other” of Europe.79 However, by 
focusing on the Conservative rebellion against the Maastricht Treaty ratification, Gifford goes 
on to place this championing of British political identity, alongside issues of sovereignty and 
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trade, as part of a specifically right-wing strand of Euroscepticism. Gifford’s claim elsewhere, 
that the Europe issue was ‘no longer contained by the party system’, is more convincing, as 
earlier anti-Market groups aimed their appeal to a broad non-party support base, particularly 
when factoring in the symbolic issue of the Commonwealth.
80
  
From the first application in the early 1960s, anti-Marketeers emphasised how 
political sovereignty and ability to make independent decisions that Britain would lose upon 
joining the EEC was ‘the essence of independent nationhood, achieved in the early dawn of 
our history and resolutely safeguarded ever since.’81 EEC entry was therefore perceived as a 
threat to Britain’s identity and status as much as it was a threat to her political practice. Anti-
Market groups, imbued with a sense of patriotism, were willing to fight to preserve the 
traditional Westminster model of democracy in Britain. Sir Piers Debenham, the anti-Market 
candidate in the South Dorset by-election of November 1962, emphasised this by placing the 
preservation of ‘[o]ur system of government’ as his key reason for opposing the Treaty of 
Rome, ahead of wider concerns such as the Commonwealth and the impact on power-bloc 
politics.
82
 Anti-Marketeers therefore highlighted the differences between the British political 
system and that used on the continent, and were able to portray an inherent incompatibility 
that meant Britain would be better outside of the EEC. As an example, Derek Walker-Smith 
could present himself as ‘not against the Common Market’, claiming ‘in many speeches from 
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1961 onwards I have said that I wish them well, but unfortunately the structure of the Treaty 
of Rome does not suit British requirements.’83  
EEC entry was perceived to not only threaten traditional British institutions, which 
would be subordinated to supranational European institutions, but also traditional British laws 
and policies, such as the criminal system and habeas corpus.
84
 Concerns that continental law 
would supplant British law, and that British judges ‘would have to adopt the Continental 
practice’, permeated the literature of anti-Market groups, who appealed to British patriotism 
by appealing to traditional British identity inherent in Britain’s existing laws and policies.85 
The National Referendum Campaign aimed its appeal, for example, at those who ‘believe that 
our Constitution, the English legal system, [and] English law have served us well in the past’, 
and who wished to preserve British laws and policies from the ‘flood of draft proposals’ 
emanating from the EEC as part of ‘harmonisation’ with continental policy.86 On standing 
against Edward Heath as an independent parliamentary candidate in the 1964 General 
Election, ACML Chairman John Paul’s campaign combined an anti-EEC platform with 
opposition to the abolition of Resale Price Maintenance. Paul described the latter policy, with 
its ‘onus of proof’ clause, as ‘un-English’ and ‘typical of the Continental system of 
Jurisprudence, founded upon Roman Law… [and] in keeping with the authoritarian methods 
of the Common Market Executive Commission’s regulations…’87 Paul’s personal 
commitment to opposing the abolition of Resale Price Maintenance represented the 
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determination of anti-Marketeers to preserve traditional British policies as well as 
parliamentary sovereignty, further demonstrated by John Biffen’s proclamation that EEC 
membership would threaten the ‘continuing thread in [Britain’s] modern history... to 
maximise free and unhindered world trade’, a traditional British policy which ‘made good 
national sense’.88 
Successive governments’ “Europeanisation” of domestic policies was seen by anti-
Market groups as a threat to British national identity and as a precursor to full EEC 
membership. ACML’s newsletters regularly emphasised this stealth “Europeanisation” to its 
members throughout the 1960s, particularly in 1963 to stress that the threat from the EEC had 
not been removed by de Gaulle’s veto. Updates were published about the “Europeanisation” 
undertaken by ‘Government and Establishment’, such as the introduction of European road 
signs, the campaign for decimalisation, the use of the centigrade scale, and VAT seen as ‘the 
first taste we have of the meaning of ‘keeping-in-step’ with other Common Market 
Countries’.89 At first associated with ‘the European and anti-Commonwealth quartet’ of 
Macmillan, Sandys, Heath and Peter Thorneycroft in the Conservative Government, ACML 
would criticise the Labour Government in 1968 for continuing the policy of Europeanisation, 
outlining the cost of road signs, decimal currency, metrication, the Channel Tunnel and the 
stationing of troops in Germany at around £1.35 billion.
90
 On Target, a fortnightly publication 
produced the British League of Rights (BLR), also dealt with metrication and the introduction 
of EEC policies, emphasising the issue as not merely one of cultural sovereignty and national 
                                                          
88
 Speech by John Biffen to Denbigh Conservatives at Abergele, 22 January 1971, MS Eng. Hist. C.1138/238-
242, Bodleian Library 
89
 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, July 1963, CIB 7/1, BLPES; “Urgent”, ACML leaflet [n.d.], MS 
Eng. Hist. C1130/43, Bodleian Library 
90
 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, July 1963, CIB 7/1, BLPES; Anti-Common Market League 
Newsletter, February 1968, CIB 7/1, BLPES; 
 118 
 
identity, but as an issue of individual rights against what the Wolverhampton and West 
Midlands branch described as the ‘bureaucratic control’ behind the introduction of VAT.91 
Furthermore, according to ACML, it symbolised the lack of patriotism of British governments 
which, in the face of modernisation, lacked faith in traditional British policies and sought ‘to 
abandon British methods without enquiry, in the apparent belief that they are all antiquated 
idiosyncracies [sic] typical of this country.’92 
Anti-Market groups also saw national identity within Britain’s own particular 
historical democratic development, to which EEC entry was perceived to be both threat and a 
backwards step. Within ACML, the difference between British and continental institutional 
development was recognised at all levels. An article outlining the federalist agenda of the 
EEC described the British people as ‘politically mature’ with a ‘glorious history’, to whom 
federalism was ‘an experience beyond their ken.’93 Likewise, a letter from the 
Wolverhampton and West Midlands Branch of ACML to the House of Lords criticised 
politicians who, in supporting EEC entry, had ‘stopped the clock of evolution... halting the 
most dynamic period of our history from the time of Henry VIII’, and would ‘put the clock 
back 400 years’. EEC membership was thus seen as going against a Whiggish trend of 
national independence and increasing democratic government, where Britain would ‘once 
again [be] a subservient state of the Continent’, except ‘this time our taxes will go to Brussels 
instead of Rome.’94 CMSC similarly criticised transferring powers from Westminster to 
‘untried and undemocratic institutions’, against the democratic freedoms granted to the public 
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through the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, reform acts and female suffrage.
95
 Furthermore, 
the presence of historian Arthur Bryant in the anti-Market campaign – later as President of 
CMSC and Chairman of the National Common Market Petition Council – reinforced the 
centrality of Whig history and British historical development within its rhetoric.
96
 Anti-
Market groups presented themselves as defending the British public’s democratic rights, as 
evident in ACML’s condemnation of politicians that claimed the EEC issue was too 
complicated for the public to judge, its newsletter stating that the British public ‘did not win 
the political battles of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries to have this reactionary nonsense thrust upon 
us again.’97 Anti-Marketeers thus perceived themselves as representing a people ‘acheing [sic] 
for more intimate government and a greater sense of identity and compact between rulers and 
public’, and who wished for a further continuation of devolved democracy as opposed to 
Common Market membership.
98
 
Reverence for Britain’s historical path to democracy amongst anti-Marketeers was 
allied with a desire for Britain to retain its ‘great power’ status, for which the freedom for 
British governments to draw up their own policies was a vital component. During the first 
application in the early 1960s, ACML was concerned by the influence of the U.S. 
Government on Macmillan’s decision, and decried Britain’s ‘obedience to foreign interests’, 
particularly American policy designed, according to ACML, ‘to strip a subservient Britain of 
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her military and political independence.’99 De Gaulle’s intervention did not ease the fear of 
anti-Marketeers, who continued to be suspicious of U.S. influence on Britain’s ‘acceptance of 
the American Polaris deterrent [and] the panicky discarding of Empire responsibilities’ as 
well as the EEC membership bid; all were perceived to show a ‘lack of faith in Britain’s 
capacity to lead an independent life.’100 ACML’s appeal was therefore aimed at British 
patriots who still saw Britain as capable of remaining a global power, and called upon a new 
British policy of ‘ending defeatism [and] reviving British national spirit, independence and 
self-confidence’ – what Biffen described as finding ‘a meaningful patriotism in a post-
Imperial situation.’101 
National identity and patriotism were thus at the heart of anti-Market groups’ appeal to 
the public, and their protest actions were often imbued with a historical or traditional British 
imagery. From the motorcade of local anti-Market groups who unfurled ‘huge anti-Market 
slogans’ on the white cliffs of Dover and ‘solemnly burned’ EEC flags to the distribution of 
leaflets by ACML outside the Albert Hall at the Last Night of the Proms – where the 
possibility of infiltration with banners was discussed – anti-Marketeers sought a patriotic 
mobilisation free of party political allegiances.
102
 Demonstrations at war memorials were a 
particularly symbolic example of how Britain’s history and identity was utilised by anti-
Market groups, including Women Against the Common Market (WACM) laying a wreath at 
the Cenotaph during a day’s demonstration at Trafalgar Square, in memory of people ‘in this 
                                                          
99
 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, January 1962, CIB 7/1, BLPES; Anti-Common Market League 
Newsletter, December 1962, CIB 7/1, BLPES 
100
 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, November 1963, CIB 7/1, BLPES 
101
 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, January 1967, CIB 7/1, BLPES; Speech by John Biffen to Denbigh 
Conservatives at Abergele, 22 January 1971, MS Eng. Hist. C.1138/238-242, Bodleian Library 
102
 Letter from Denis Martin, Secretary of Dover & Folkestone District Anti-Common Market Group, to 
supporters, 22 March 1972, CIB 7/16, BLPES; Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 31 August 
1971, CIB 7/3, BLPES 
 121 
 
and other lands’ who had defended democracy, and ‘in the hope that no British Government 
will ever sign the Rome Treaty, which would be a total betrayal of all that Britain and the 
British Government have stood for.’103 A local ACML group also believed that a more useful 
tactic than that suggested by WACM, of organising a mass lobby of MPs on the day of 
voting, would be to hold anti-Market demonstrations at war memorials nationwide observing 
five minutes’ silence, emphasising the importance of national history and identity in the anti-
Market appeal.
104
 The Macmillan government was aware in 1962, after a study throughout the 
country, that most anti-Market views were the result of ‘“emotional”, patriotic reasons which 
were [hard] to overcome’.105 Anti-Market groups across the political spectrum played on these 
emotions, and by the end of the decade CMSC sought to unite ‘all those of good will and 
patriotism who are determined to resist this ill-conceived project and cry “Halt”.’106 
The Commonwealth: political, economic and symbolic resonance 
The Commonwealth, as an issue that encompassed national identity and heritage, 
political sovereignty and trade and economic power, was central to the early anti-Market 
campaign. John Paul’s election leaflet in the 1964 General Election called upon those electors 
of Bexley who wanted to keep Britain out of the EEC as ‘an independent parliamentary 
country... linked by the Monarchy and by ties of blood, friendship, trade and mutual interest, 
with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and other countries worldwide’.107 This alliance of 
independence and retention of the Commonwealth was seen by anti-Marketeers as key to 
Britain retaining its world power status, and prioritising the Commonwealth above any 
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European integration was a primary aim of the anti-Market groups, not least ACML with its 
slogan ‘Commonwealth Before Common Market’.108 Yet while the Commonwealth remained 
a serious issue in the Common Market entry debate, it had changed within the space of ten 
years from the heart of Gaitskell’s ‘thousand years of history’ speech at the Labour Party 
Conference of 1962 to an issue that appeared ‘to be going by default in the great debate.’109 
George Wilkes has argued that the party political basis of the three main anti-Market groups – 
ACML, KBO and FBM – meant that aside from political cohesion and tariff preference, ‘their 
consensus ended there’.110 Yet while the political and economic significance of the 
Commonwealth did decline throughout the 1960s, it retained a cultural significance which 
groups used to appeal to a broad base of support. The Commonwealth issue appeared to fade, 
yet it remained an ideal for patriots, internationalists and humanists to hold against what 
playwright John Osborne described as the ‘ugly, chromium pretence’ of the EEC.111 
ACML, formed at the aforementioned meetings at Peter Walker’s house, was initially 
driven by a pro-Commonwealth core, before deciding to oppose EEC membership on several 
fronts. Walker left ACML during its formation, but his defence of the Commonwealth 
continued as he called for its expansion and spread the anti-EEC entry message on a tour of 
the Commonwealth in June 1962.
112
 ACML’s newsletters, meanwhile, focused heavily on the 
Commonwealth issue between 1961 and 1964, claiming it to be ‘in greater jeopardy than it 
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ever was in the War.’113 Moreover, the Macmillan government was criticised heavily for 
‘selling the Commonwealth down the Rhine’, with leading figures such as Macmillan and 
Sandys accused of being ‘anti-Commonwealth’ and deliberately undermining the importance 
of it after the de Gaulle veto.
114
 This defence of the Commonwealth against ‘“progressive”, 
so-called Conservative opinion’ was seen as striking a chord with the general public, as 
ACML attributed the Conservative Party’s unpopularity in mid-1964 with its ‘strong anti-
Commonwealth line’.115 Labour anti-Marketeers also saw the Commonwealth as a populist 
issue, as Jay spoke of how EEC membership at the expense of ties with Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand was ‘something which the British public just will not accept’, as they 
‘understand, what Tory politicians apparently do not, that the Commonwealth is of far greater 
value to Britain than any part of Europe can ever be.’116 
While anti-Marketeers were unmoved by the emotive forces that lay behind the EEC’s 
formation, and did not recognise the common European spirit prevalent in the federalist 
groups of the previous chapter, it was the sentimental and cultural attachment to the 
Commonwealth that made it such a central theme of anti-Market rhetoric. The 
Commonwealth was in many ways an extension of British identity, as evident in Gaitskell’s 
televised broadcast referring to Australia, Canada and New Zealand as ‘very British indeed’ 
and ‘part of the family’. People from the Commonwealth, he explained, ‘speak our language; 
they learn our literature. They have our traditions; they have our political institutions; they 
share our monarchy.’ It was for this reason that Gaitskell, while playing down the political 
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effects of entry, saw the safeguarding of the Commonwealth as ‘the nub of the whole 
question’.117 Similarly, Arthur Bryant associated Britain’s ‘strong common identity’ and 
‘insularity spiritual as well as geographical’ with the bonds that made British people ‘far 
nearer in thought and emotional response to the English-speaking peoples of Canada and 
Australia, New Zealand and Rhodesia, and of the United States itself [than to Europeans].’118 
It was, according to ACML, more than common institutions and culture; Britain and the 
Commonwealth shared ‘sentiment and general outlook.’119 
Furthermore, the Commonwealth was perceived to be already proven as an effective 
international forum for politics and trade that had been slowly and organically established 
over many years. By contrast, the EEC, founded by ‘high level policies... based on false 
doctrinaire assumptions’, was predicted to founder in the same way as the United Nations, 
while the Commonwealth’s major strength against such technocratic edifices and against the 
threat of Communism was its ‘human appeal’.120 While ACML President Lord 
Hinchingbrooke saw the EEC as a ‘selfish, unity-shattering organisation’ likely to lead to 
conflict, anti-Market groups from both political sides saw the Commonwealth as an 
international forum capable of preserving peace.
121
 John Paul’s election campaign called for 
revival of the Commonwealth as ‘a powerful world force for good’, while Lord Attlee, 
speaking on behalf of the Labour Committee on Britain and the Common Market, described 
the Commonwealth, ‘with its members in five continents, as a far more hopeful foundation for 
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peace and democracy than any narrow European group.’122 A letter sent to Gaitskell by a 
supporter demonstrates the cross-party appeal of the Commonwealth, its author stating, 
Many like myself who have been actively engaged in the anti Common Market 
Campaign differ widely in party political matters but are all united in the belief 
that by retaining our political independence and forming closer bonds with the 
Commonwealth we can make a better contribution to both material and spiritual 
progress than by diluting ourselves in the maelstrom of the European nations 
forming the EEC.
123
 
 
Despite its prominence in the early 1960s as a key issue in the EEC debate, defence of 
the Commonwealth was used less in anti-Market rhetoric towards the end of the decade, and 
cropped up far less often in ACML newsletters, replaced by issues of rising prices and 
political effects of entry. However, as Britain’s trading patterns began to shift towards 
Western Europe and away from the Commonwealth, anti-Market groups placed great 
emphasis on the need to protect Commonwealth producers who would be at risk from EEC 
entry.
124
 Protection of poorer producers was seen as part of Britain’s “civilizing mission” in 
the Commonwealth, adding a humanitarian aspect to British national identity. ACML’s call as 
early as 1962 for a British and Commonwealth policy outside of the EEC and ‘based on 
national pride, independence and a real drive to help the under-developed parts of the globe’ 
demonstrated their global outlook and rejection of the EEC as narrow and inward-looking.
125
 
Likewise, Lord Hinchingbrooke bemoaned the lack of British investment in the 
Commonwealth during the first application and declared that ‘Britain needs a dose of 
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economic morals and the present laisser-faire system does not provide it.’126 Hinchingbrooke 
favoured the ‘really worthwhile’ industrial policy of exporting products ‘to the developing 
countries of the Commonwealth and the rest of the world for the raising of living-standards’, 
and believed that ‘British Government policy [should be] directed towards an unselfish 
attempt to raise living-standards overseas to something nearer to what is enjoyed at home.’127 
In Commonwealth countries that traditionally exported foodstuffs such as sugar, butter 
and meat to Britain, EEC entry would be ‘a disastrous prospect for these producers, many of 
whose industries were encouraged by Britain and developed for her market.’128 As a result, 
humanitarian organisations such as Oxfam and Action for World Development began to 
oppose EEC entry on the grounds of the effect it would have on developing countries.
129
 Anti-
Market groups were thus able to mobilise a more humanitarian appeal irrespective of party 
political allegiances, although national identity and national interest were at the heart of the 
desire to protect Commonwealth producers. CMSC proclaimed that both ‘[s]elf-interest and 
honour equally dictate that [Britain] make[s] the safeguarding of Commonwealth trade a 
sticking point in negotiations with the Six’.130 Furthermore, the importance of free trade 
within a global market was seen as an inherent facet of British national identity and historic 
development, particularly to the free trade advocates within KBO who ‘summoned Cobdenite 
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interpretations of Britain’s imperial heritage’.131 As demonstrated by Frank Trentmann, free 
trade and open markets had become an integral part in the ‘popular narrative’ of British 
democratic development, ‘a national story of liberty and freedom that was contrasted with the 
militarist path of protectionist countries like Imperial Germany’.132 John Paul, harking back to 
Britain’s historic commitment to free trade, opposed the idea of restricted trade within the 
EEC, arguing that ‘Britain’s market is the world.’133 This combination of free trade principles 
with a humanitarian, global outlook meant that the political, economic and cultural 
preservation of the Commonwealth could attract support across political boundaries. 
Targeting the consumer: economics and price rises  
In opposing EEC entry based on its perceived economic consequences, as with 
concerns about political sovereignty, anti-Market groups aimed their rhetoric towards the 
British public by highlighting the effects that EEC membership would have on the wider 
population as a whole, and its impact upon their daily lives. In addition to focusing on the 
more large-scale, macroeconomic issues of entry such as the impact on the country’s balance 
of payments, anti-Marketeers were extremely preoccupied with matters such as the 
introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) and the rise in the price of foodstuffs resulting from 
new EEC trade laws, and their effect on the average British consumer or family. Issues such 
as food prices remained free of the influences of party ideology or social class as, despite the 
concerns of left-wing groups such as WACM and Trade Unions Against the Common Market 
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about the effects of price rises on the most vulnerable, concerns about the quality and 
nutritional value of foodstuffs and the effects of VAT upon British producers were also 
prominent. By the early 1970s, consumers and housewives had become key politicised anti-
Market groupings in themselves in the EEC entry debate, while remaining separate from party 
political ties. Indeed, WACM attempted to appeal beyond the “housewife” tag to a wider 
female identity, appealing to women on a cross-party or non-party basis. 
The issue of rising food prices increased in prominence in anti-Market rhetoric in the 
mid-1960s, as concerns about the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy and its impact upon 
British agriculture shifted towards the impact of entry upon the general public and the 
individual consumer. Although in the early 1960s it was acknowledged by some anti-
Marketeers that food prices would rise
134
, the ACML was more concerned with the effect of 
entry on British farmers resulting from ‘the end of the Agriculture Acts of 1947 and 1957 as 
the cornerstone of [British] agricultural policy’ during the first application, where trade tariffs 
and agricultural subsidies dominated the negotiations in Brussels.
135
 Rather than concerns 
about the British consumer, ACML’s rhetoric during the first application represented a 
preoccupation with agricultural output, in the belief that EEC membership would mean 
‘British agriculture will never achieve the same prosperity and productivity again’, echoing 
the Chief Economist of the National Farmers’ Union’s claim that removal of agricultural 
guarantees would lead to ‘a loss to our producers... greater than any gain accruing from the 
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Common Market Commission’s agricultural proposals.’136 This early concern with agriculture 
reflects ACML’s initial Conservative support base. 
By the mid-1960s, however, anti-Market rhetoric was beginning to shift towards a 
defence of the general public, as evident in ACML’s plans to draw up a leaflet in 1966 with 
points on prices, the economy and agriculture ahead of those on politics and the 
Commonwealth, emphasising the increasing importance of standard of living and daily life in 
the EEC debate.
137
 On the same day, ACML Vice-President Sir Robin Williams set out 
ACML’s policy ‘to bring home to ordinary people of Britain the consequences of Common 
Market membership’, particularly ‘the higher food prices that would follow if Britain had to 
adopt the EEC food and agricultural policy with its high tariffs and levies’, and proposed a 
national campaign to print the potential rise in prices on food packaging and leaflets on the 
rise in prices.
138
 The following year, ACML began to publish statistics on price rises to its 
supporters, claiming that ‘the prompt acceptance of the Common Market’s dear food policy’ 
would ‘increase the cost of food in Britain by about 6/3d per head per week.’139 The 
government’s publication of estimates of the cost of entry in advance of the White Paper led 
to more persistent and substantial claims in from anti-Market groups about rising food prices 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. CMSC claimed the White Paper could not hide ‘the savage 
increase in the price of food and cost of living, and a massive permanent burden on the 
balance of payments.’140  
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By 1971, anti-Marketeers were observing that ‘[t]he local elections and parliamentary 
bye-elections show that the cost of living is the dominant factor in British politics’, and the 
price of food was therefore, according to Neil Marten, ‘a key issue to hammer.’141In doing so, 
anti-Market groups aimed their literature highlighting the cost of living directly to the general 
public. Both ACML and CMSC mass-produced simple leaflets detailing the prices of 
essential foodstuffs, clothes and white goods, comparing either the average Common Market 
price or a specific example from one member state with the equivalent price in Britain.
142
 
CMSC’s leaflet “Why Food Is Dear” proved ‘very popular with members and supporters’, 
with 50,000 copies printed and distributed widely.
143
 Leaflets such as these fitted ACML’s 
policy, explicitly stated in the mid-1960s, to target a broad range of people across the general 
public. According to John Paul, while ‘[ACML’s] literature has to cater for all types and 
classes of people, many of whom require full explanations such as we endeavour to give’, 
there were ‘also people who require something more abbreviated...’, and thus ACML sought 
to produce ‘even more down to earth literature, to cater for as wide a range of folk as 
possible.’144 
In targeting the general public for support, anti-Market groups thus presented the food 
prices issue as one that affected the population as a whole, both as consumers and producers. 
As alluded to above, anti-Market groups, particularly those with more left-wing foundations, 
were highly concerned about the impact of price rises on the most vulnerable. KBO 
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commented that the rise in cost of living would lead to ‘widespread poverty and great 
hardship’ for the most vulnerable sections of society.145 Neil Marten, Vice-Chairman of 
CMSC, also believed that the introduction of VAT, a ‘reversal of our present way of life by 
taxing food’, would be ‘[h]ard on the poor.’146 A letter from an ACML supporter painted 
perhaps the bleakest picture of life after the price rises, predicting sections of the population 
being too poor to afford meat, eggs, dairy, bread or tea, with ‘some of the very poor... trying 
to eat tins of meat sold as dog food’. The end of agricultural life, a loss of industrial jobs due 
to cheap labour, and even a higher suicide rate were predicted. The fault for these 
developments lay, according to the supporter, with ‘stupid politicians’ who had not ‘stopped 
to think about ordinary people like you and me’.147 The effect of price rises on the quality of 
life and nutritional quality of food was a key concern for anti-Marketeers, with ACML 
claiming the government’s varying estimates on the rise in expenditure on food, based on 
‘changes in the pattern of consumption’, meant ‘in plain English that people will buy 
margarine because they can no longer afford butter’, as well as other lower-quality 
substitutes.
148
 It was also believed that the introduction of VAT would increase the cost of 
living for the public as a whole, particularly as foodstuffs would be subject to it.
149
 Price rises, 
therefore, continued to prove a resonant and cross-party issue within the anti-Market case. 
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Targeting the housewife: mobilising support along gender, not party, lines 
The issue of price rises thus made the marketplace a focal point for cross-party or non-
party activism, and made consumers a politicised grouping, in the debate over EEC entry. 
WACM, for example, sought to follow in the footsteps of the protests of the British 
Housewives’ League (BHL) on rationing in the late 1940s by combining with them in 
organising a mass protest in Parliament Square against EEC entry and food prices rises, 
‘given the publicity now being given to meat prices’.150 People were encouraged to protest 
against entry after the discovery of future price rises via the publication of the White Paper 
led to what CMSC described as ‘an immediate and hostile public response’, with three-
quarters of housewives in one poll believing food prices would rise ‘alarmingly’.151 By 
following the model of activism set by BHL, WACM’s anti-EEC activism in the marketplace 
moved the issue of Common Market entry away from idealistic issues to those affecting the 
average person on a day-to-day basis.
152
 The shopping baskets used by WACM members to 
raise money outside the House of Commons were also symbolic of the new target audience of 
the anti-Market campaign, as well as being a more subtle approach to fundraising than the use 
of collecting tins.
153
 WACM also supplied polythene bags bearing the slogan ‘No Common 
Market’ both to individual shoppers and anti-Market organisations such as KBO, CMSC and 
the Conservative Anti-Common Market Information Service (CACMIS), spreading the anti-
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Market message across party political boundaries.
154
 The instance of a left-wing organisation 
like WACM selling shopping bags to both CACMIS and delegates of the Liberal Party 
Conference demonstrated how the issue of price rises and the effect of entry upon the British 
consumer was a truly non-party facet to the anti-Market campaign, appealing to ‘the ordinary 
type of British people’ who were ‘strongly represented’ at WACM’s Trafalgar Square rally.155 
By the early 1970s, partly as a result of WACM’s efforts, housewives became an even 
more established politicised group in the Common Market debate.
156
 WACM’s 
demonstrations outside supermarkets and in shopping centres identified the female consumer 
as a potential anti-Marketeer, and other anti-Market groups began to set out to ‘appeal to the 
Housewife to say ‘No’ to the Common Market and the high cost of living’.157 In 
Wolverhampton, housewives were thus encouraged to write letters to MPs and the local press 
on the rising cost of living, while the local group pressured the Ministry of Agriculture on the 
rise in price of butter, culminating in an attempt to get housewives to take ‘an active interest’ 
in the build-up to the parliamentary vote of October 1971.
158
 One pro-Market organisation, 
the parliamentary grouping Conservative Group for Europe (CGE), sought to directly 
challenge the anti-Market propaganda aimed at housewives by setting up a Women’s 
Advisory Committee described as ‘a very vital key point at the moment in relation to the cost 
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of living, housewives, etc’, and produced the leaflet “Housewives and the Common Market”; 
both were aimed at gaining the support of women’s organisations for EEC entry.159 The 
female consumer remained a key target for propaganda after entry into the EEC, with Renee 
Short of CMSC suggesting directing a campaign aimed at women’s organisations in light of 
the still-rising food prices.
160
 The importance for anti-Market groups of having the support of 
women, and not just the female consumer, was made explicit by Christopher Frere-Smith, 
Chairman of KBO, who advised ex-Labour MP Anne Kerr that the anti-EEC consumer 
movement that became WACM should have reference to the word ‘women’, and stated that 
Mr Heath recognises that it was the women of this country who were responsible 
for the defeat of the Labour government. It is the women of this country who can 
save this country and our people from the politicians' folly.
161
 
 
Those within WACM shared this belief that ‘woman [sic] generally should be appealed to and 
not always just “housewives”’, and that demonstrations should extend beyond shopping 
centres and marketplaces to ‘factory gates where women are working’, extending the potential 
non-party base of support against EEC entry further.
162
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In appealing to the consumer, the internationalist, the humanist, the traditionalist and 
those concerned about protecting a traditional British model of parliamentary sovereignty, the 
anti-Market groups’ appeal lay outside of the party political framework and by the 1970s 
could form the basis for a cross-party campaign. Groups with Conservative, Labour or Liberal 
origins had become concerned with the same issues of political and cultural sovereignty, 
national identity, and price rises, and thus tailored their message to the public on the whole 
rather than any party political or ideological faction or support base. Attempts to inspire a 
large-scale mass campaign on behalf of a public majority believed to be disenfranchised by 
the cross-party consensus on the EEC issue by the late 1960s were in contrast to pro-EEC 
pressure groups’ elitism that left the public unconvinced by the arguments for EEC entry. The 
following section will assess the operations of anti-Market groups, where mass movement 
tactics coincided with campaigns to pressurise and influence MPs and act as a form of 
“parliamentary watchdog” on the issue.  
 
Tactics and operation 
Seeking mass support 
While the antis sought to attain and demonstrate mass support, pro-EEC pressure 
groups were less concerned with mass mobilisation and seeking grassroots support. In the 
run-up to Macmillan’s announcement in 1961, and in the wake of a declaration from the EM 
that national councils should have ‘direct subscribing members’, UKCEM discussed the 
possibility of creating an affiliated movement for individual membership.
163
 The United 
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Europe Association was launched as a result, on a provincial basis and with the support of 
local bodies and personalities, but by the end of 1962 only one regional committee had been 
launched.
164
 The major cross-party pro-Market pressure group during the first application, the 
aforementioned CMC, was founded by key figures from FU and Britain in Europe to 
influence elite opinion, its press release signed by leading pro-EEC political figures and 
distinguished signatories.
165
 Seeking to influence informed opinion and ‘invariably aimed for 
the top’, CMC had ‘no enrolled members, no regular subscriptions and no widespread 
regional organisation’.166 Furthermore, it declined to amalgamate its campaign with the 
United Europe Association, despite their common objective.
167
  
Intra-party pro-EEC groups were just as distant from rank-and-file supporters. CGE, 
(previously the European Forum until 1970), drew its support from Conservative MPs and 
prospective candidates, as well as leading pro-Europeans and industrialists, attracting 
complaints that the group should do more to attract ‘the grass roots of the Party’, such as 
through a large mass meeting at the Party Conference.
168
 On the Labour side, the Labour 
Common Market Committee (LCMC), active during the first application, was not intended to 
be a mass membership organisation, and was instead to concentrate on the ‘vitally important’ 
task of ‘influencing members of the Parliamentary Labour Party’ and ‘uncommitted 
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Parliamentary colleagues’, with a sub-committee set up to arrange meetings exclusively for 
Labour MPs for this purpose.
169
 Concerns were therefore raised that the LCMC ‘was 
insufficiently known to Constituency Party members and rank and file trade unionists’, yet its 
Chairman Roy Jenkins and Treasurer John Diamond, both key figures in the cross-party 
CMC, continued the policy of concentrating on influencing MPs.
170
 Its publications, such as 
the regular Newsbrief, left the ‘mass market’ propaganda to Labour newspapers such as the 
Daily Mirror and Daily Herald, considering it ‘better to try to appeal to reasonably informed 
opinion, rather than to antagonise it by merely uttering slogans.’171 Re-launched as the Labour 
Committee for Europe (LCE) after de Gaulle’s first veto, it cast its net wider with a form of 
Associate Membership established in 1967, offering individual members of the public a 
subscription to publications and notification of its activities, in order to attract more support 
from local CLPs. Yet this development came in for immediate criticism from Tribune who 
accused the LCE of having ‘first and second class citizens’.172 It also felt restricted by 
leadership policy, avoiding campaigning in constituencies until 1966 ‘in order not to 
encourage an anti-EEC counter-campaign.’173 Such a cautious and top-down approach was 
typical of the way pro-EEC groups operated in the campaign for EEC entry. 
By contrast, groups like ACML set themselves out from the outset to directly 
influence public opinion. Declining the more research-based, intra-party approach preferred 
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by Peter Walker, ACML’s foundations were in membership and activism, and it had, 
according to Lord Windlesham, ‘from the start the ambition to become a mass movement’, 
and was ‘concerned to present its message directly to the general public.’174 Its early 
membership forms, therefore, declared ACML’s aim as ‘to enlighten and influence public 
opinion in every possible way’ and mobilise enough public opposition to prevent EEC 
membership.
175
 In 1963, its membership had reached ‘over 30,000 people of all parties’, and 
they had managed to retain around 10,000 members by the end of the decade, with the 
number of active, ‘hard-core’ members rising quickly during 1970.176 That ACML managed 
to remain in existence when Common Market entry was off the political agenda, such as after 
the de Gaulle veto when the ‘apathy on the whole subject’ claimed victim to FBM, 
demonstrated both the appeal of ACML and the reactive nature of anti-Market groups.
177
 
CMSC, who sought to operate on the two levels of ‘intellectual debate and propaganda’, had 
around 10,000 members on its mailing list and was making print runs of 100,000 copies of its 
newsletters.
178
 
That the anti-Market groups’ printed literature exceeded their membership figures 
indicates that this was their predominant method of communicating directly with a large 
public base. With much of its literature produced in simple pamphlet form, ACML ensured it 
covered a broad base from intellectual explanations to propaganda. It therefore consistently 
                                                          
174
 Windlesham, Communication and Political Power, p.164, pp.174-75 
175
 ACML membership form [n.d., 1961/1962], CIB/7/1, BLPES 
176
 The figure of 30,000 was quoted in both the Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, August 1969, CIB/7/1, 
BLPES and a letter from John Paul to electors of Bexley, 30 September 1964, CIB 7/1, BLPES. A letter was sent 
to 3,000 ‘hard-core’ members informing them of Paul’s death while 7,000 more were chased up for active 
support: Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 25 June 1969, CIB 7/3, BLPES. The number of 
newsletters sent rose from 3,808 in October 1969 to 5,277 in August 1970: Minutes of ACML Executive 
Committee meetings, 22 October 1969, 16 September 1970, CIB 7/3, BLPES 
177
 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, February 1966, CIB 7/1, BLPES 
178
 CMSC memo, “Office Administration and Organisation” [n.d., 1971], CIB 1/2, BLPES; Minutes of a meeting 
of CMSC Executive Committee, 28 July 1971, CIB 1/2, BLPES; 
 139 
 
sought a ‘more persuasive approach’ than its pro-entry counterparts.179 Widespread 
distribution of its literature was a tactic adopted during the first EEC application, with a 
million copies of its “Common Market Quiz” distributed door-to-door in 1962 and separate 
leaflets produced on different aspects of opposition to entry.
180
 In his study of ACML’s early 
activity, Windlesham estimates that it produced and distributed as much literature on the 
Common Market issue as the Conservative Party during the first application, despite the 
disparity in their resources.
181
 One example of their ability to mass-produce leaflets to counter 
pro-Market literature was at the Conservative Party Conference in 1961, where ACML 
members handed out 3,000 leaflets produced at very short notice, before pro-EEC literature 
has been distributed.
182
 Over 50,000 copies of a booklet on the Common Market were 
distributed in 1967 during the second application, despite the retrenchment that had occurred 
in previous years.
183
 The revival of the Common Market entry issue in 1970 was matched by 
the production of leaflets with print runs between 10,000 and 100,000.
184
 Some of these took 
the form of ‘very simple’ propaganda, such as its “Don’t Be Fooled in 1971” leaflet, listing 
basic political and economic consequences of entry.
185
 ACML estimated that approximately 
470,000 items of literature were distributed in 1970, rising to over 750,000 in 1971.
186
 Anti-
Market advertisements were also placed in the national press in the early 1970s in a joint 
effort between ACML and RBCMC.
187
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Grassroots activity 
However, the debate between ACML and RBCMC over the effectiveness of 
advertisements in the press is indicative of the importance that ACML placed upon active 
membership and grassroots campaigning. While RBCMC’s chairman S.E. Scammell sought 
an extensive advertising campaign through local and national newspapers, Sir Robin Williams 
placed more importance on both ‘gradually increasing [ACML’s] membership’ and working 
‘to produce literature and encourage our supporters to distribute it locally – thus spreading the 
word.’188 While Scammell considered leafleting supporters to be preaching to the converted 
and a waste of money, Williams believed that the massive number of leaflets being distributed 
by active supporters was crucial to increasing support, claiming 
...if we can recruit ten times as many active members we can similarly increase 
our distribution. I believe that the return in actual value on our expenditure is 
immeasurably greater than the return on your expenditure.
189
 
 
Grassroots activity and active membership was thus a key facet of the anti-Market campaign. 
An article in the Globe and Mail on the different anti-Market organisations referenced 
ACML’s ‘extremely active members’ and CMSC urging its members ‘to knock on doors 
[and] distribute leaflets (which it also prints)’.190 Circulating literature was a key task for 
members, including ACML’s who were asked to picket ‘meetings, exhibitions, concerts etc’ 
with leaflets.
191
 Increasing membership and demonstrating their strength of public opinion 
was valued extremely highly by anti-Market groups, with CMSC stating in its Bulletin that 
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‘[o]f course we need money – but perhaps we need people more – a large number of extra 
campaigners to spread the word and develop our activity.’ Members were therefore asked to 
approach sympathisers and ask them to join CMSC, ‘a very simple thing everyone can do’ 
that could potentially ‘double and treble our membership in a short period’.192 Likewise, from 
the outset ACML felt that its grassroots should be ‘obtaining more members’ all the time.193 
The National Common Market Petition, launched by leading figures of ACML in 
1968 with a committee (NCMPC) comprising of leading anti-Marketeers of all sides, was 
another aspect of the anti-Market campaign driven by grassroots activity.
194
 NCMPC claimed 
that as ‘public opinion cannot easily express itself by normal methods’ due to the general 
cross-party support for entry, the Petition, addressed to the Queen, was a way ‘to enable the 
voters to make their wishes known.’195 What was envisaged was something on the scale of the 
League of Nations Union’s Peace Pledge Ballot in the 1930s, a ‘monster petition’ with ‘many 
millions of signatures’ against EEC entry.196 By 1970, despite 1,000 signatures a week being 
collected for the Petition it was seen as ‘not nearly enough’ by ACML, with 133,864 
signatures registered.
197
 This figure had risen to over a quarter of a million within a year, 
before being presented in May 1972 with approximately 750,000 signatures.
198
 It was local, 
grassroots involvement that helped bring about this rapid rise in signatures, with ACML 
publicising some of the best individual efforts in its newsletters, from the 84-year old 
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supporter in Scotland who had acquired over 500 signatures to the dairy farmer in 
Hertfordshire canvassing for two hours each evening despite having to be up at 4.30am each 
morning.
199
 According to ACML, the Petition was ‘an effort in which everyone, in every walk 
of life, can make a contribution’, and ‘[e]ven the most inactive supporter... should have a 
[petition] form in the house’.200 
Mobilisation: meetings and demonstrations of support 
The involvement of grassroots activists at mass meetings and demonstrations was 
central to the anti-Market campaign; According to Ron Leighton, activists favoured the sort of 
assembly where people did not simply ‘listen patiently to speeches’ but were given the 
opportunity to take action and ‘something which allows our members to participate, and “do 
something”.’201 ACML organised a large number of public meetings during the first 
application, which they had believed to be an ‘enormous success’.202 Of the thirty-five public 
meetings held in 1962, alongside the 205 meetings held at other clubs and societies, the 
largest was the public rally at Westminster Central Hall in September, with nearly 2,000 
people attending, yet the fact that many of its meetings were arranged at short notice 
highlights the decentralised nature of ACML’s support.203 The early 1970s saw a revival of 
large-scale public meetings in light of the parliamentary debate on EEC entry, with Central 
Hall again used for a CMSC rally in June 1971. This ‘mammoth rally’, held to show ‘a 
massive demonstration of public opposition’ to EEC entry and to send ‘an unmistakable 
warning to the Government’, was seen to be ‘highly successful’ and led to discussion of 
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holding a rally in Trafalgar Square for the autumn ‘when the atmosphere would be critical’.204 
The rally, a ‘national united demonstration’ held four days before the Common Market vote in 
Parliament, had the support and participation of all major anti-Market organisations, in 
contrast to an earlier rally in March organised by WACM and KBO that had been less 
successful.
205
 The 24 October rally organised by the National Anti-Common Market 
Demonstration Committee, a subsidiary of CMSC, was reported by CMSC as having been ‘a 
great success [with] the Square filled.’206 Some demonstrations organised by anti-Market 
groups even had a militant edge to them, in particular two attempted demonstrations by KBO 
in Brussels and Calais that brought police intervention and arrests.
207
 WACM also attempted 
to get its members to stand their ground if asked to move whilst demonstrating and 
fundraising outside the House of Commons, and although WACM’s chairman Anne Kerr 
stated that there were to be ‘no martyrs [or] militant methods yet’, it shows that disobedience 
was a tactic considered by WACM.
208
 Furthermore, a supporter of WACM ‘not normally 
stirred to militancy in any sphere’ wrote to Kerr explaining she was drawn to WACM because 
of their ‘constructive ideas and the will to get things moving.’ Keen to take action on the EEC 
issue, she added, 
As in my old C.N.D. days when I was a student, the question for me is what on 
earth can the individual do to preserve the way in which he or she would prefer to 
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live? It is all too easy to sit back and accept it as a fate decreed by the 
unapproachable politicians, about which the housewife and the worker can do 
nothing except grumble to the neighbours.
209
 
 
There were, however, problems with ensuring mass meetings and rallies gained 
enough in the way of publicity and attendance. The less successful Trafalgar Square meeting 
in March 1971, held the same day as a St Patrick’s Day parade, received bad publicity owing 
to reports of ‘derisory attendance’ and suggestions that there were ‘more pigeons than 
people’.210 Bad publicity due to poorly attended meetings was particularly damaging given 
that anti-Market groups were increasingly concentrating on utilising newsworthy ‘gimmicks’ 
to ensure coverage in the national press and on television and radio, such as the presentation 
of the National Common Market Petition ‘in a colourful way’ as part of a mass lobby and 
rally.
211
 Lack of finance, as well as the successful passage of the European Communities Bill 
in parliament, after which the number of mass meetings had declined, both restricted the 
impact of mass demonstrations and rallies by anti-Market groups. 
One way to counteract this was to direct mass pressure towards the political 
establishment. With amendments to the European Communities Bill about to be discussed, 
Leighton called upon CMSC members to take action in a mass lobby of Parliament, hoping 
for ‘the press and T.V. to have pictures of thousands of people “besieging” Parliament’.212 
This tactic shows that while the issue of Common Market entry was being discussed in 
Parliament, it remained a highly politicised issue rooted in the political sphere, despite the 
best efforts of anti-Market groups to publicise it and demonstrate their mass support. CMSC 
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therefore placed great emphasis on ‘the value of public pressure continuing whilst the 
Parliamentary proceedings were in progress’, as did ACML, which as early as 1967 was 
seeking to ‘mobilise public opinion so as to support [anti-Marketeers] who share our 
views.’213 Demonstrations and rallies often had a political target, such as those held outside of 
the House of Commons, the Ministry of Agriculture, or Chequers during a meeting between 
Heath and French President Georges Pompidou.
214
 The anti-Market campaign thus sought to 
use its mass pressure against the government, and make clear to the government that the 
majority were against EEC entry. 
Pressure group activity: lobbying, opinion polls, political pressure 
Anti-Market groups did this directly through meetings with politicians. The mass 
lobby of Parliament staged on 2 May 1972 by CMSC was intended to demonstrate the 
strength of public opinion directly to MPs during the discussion of amendments to the 
European Communities Bill; one amendment called for a referendum, the other for a general 
election.
215
 A deputation presented the Common Market Petition to the government, followed 
by a mass lobby of MPs combined with a rally at Westminster Central Hall, a tactic that 
served to emphasise ‘the value of public pressure continuing whilst the Parliamentary 
proceedings were in progress.’216 Action had previously been arranged for members to lobby 
their constituency MP at Westminster on the day of the vote in Parliament, with the aim of 
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applying some late pressure.
217
 WACM’s Executive Committee also arranged a number of 
meetings in Westminster with leading politicians, including Harold Wilson, Michael Foot, 
Geoffrey Rippon and Jeremy Thorpe, and a deputation from the Committee was received by 
MPs in the House of Commons Lobby.
218
 WACM lobbied politicians in order to demonstrate 
the extent of anti-Market opinion evident ‘from contact with the public’ of which WACM 
‘claim[ed] to speak for the majority of... and particularly for housewives.’219 A local branch of 
one anti-Market organisation, British Business for World Markets, even claimed to have 
‘established close contacts with a number of MPs on both sides’, making them ‘a valuable 
“lobby”’ instigating a ‘two-way exchange of ideas and opinions’.220 
Another tactic utilised by anti-Market groups to demonstrate the strength of public 
opinion, particularly in the early 1970s, was to conduct local opinion polls and referenda. 
ACML ‘objectively conducted’ many of these polls and, when the result was an anti-Market 
majority, supporters were informed that ‘[e]very opportunity should be taken to bring these 
results to the attention of MPs...’.221 This gave activists the opportunity to campaign, with 
ACML’s Wolverhampton and West Midland Branch encouraging its members to canvass for 
signatures and show them to those MPs and parliamentary candidates who may have been 
open to persuasion.
222
 Local groups in CMSC and KBO also organised referenda, with KBO’s 
referenda in July and October 1971 showing anti-Market majorities in ten constituencies, with 
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generally between 32 and 73.5 per cent of the electorate polled, and over half the electorate 
polled in six of the constituencies.
223
 The Political Freedom Movement (PFM), a small anti-
Market organisation seeking to increase the electorate’s political power and strengthen 
democratic government, also held a number of referenda, including in Heath’s constituency of 
Bexley, where around a third of the electorate was polled.
224
 
Other pressure groups, however, felt that politicians and parties should be targeted 
more directly than via a demonstration of popular sentiment. The BLR, for example, 
suggested after the Common Market vote in Parliament focusing on pressurising anti-Market 
MPs into demanding a referendum, rather than ‘spending energy trying to whip up public 
support for the campaign’, which was ‘a mere beating of the air.’225 In the run-up to the 
parliamentary vote, the direct targeting of MPs was seen as critical by the anti-Market 
campaign in order to prevent passage of the European Communities Bill in Parliament. Anti-
Market groups therefore approached MPs directly to apply pressure, concentrating on those 
with no firm viewpoint on the EEC issue who could be influenced against entry. This policy 
was in operation from the first application, with ACML encouraging supporters to write to 
MPs to voice their opposition, yet it became more systematic and directed more towards 
impressionable MPs as the issue became more politicised.
226
 In the early 1970s, both locally 
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and nationally, letters were sent ‘to all those [MPs] under pressure’, with MPs from all three 
parties targeted.
227
  
A great deal of pressure was exerted, however, on Conservative backbenchers who 
were perceived as ‘wobbly’ in the face of pressure from the party leadership and whips, both 
leading up to the parliamentary vote and the following stages of the bill’s passage.228 Those 
Conservative MPs who had already revealed themselves to be anti-Marketeers were supported 
through letter-writing campaigns organised both locally, such as the Folkestone & District 
Group who sent letters to the ‘Conservative 70s Group’ of rebels led by Derek Walker-Smith, 
and nationally, with ACML encouraging its members to congratulate the thirty-nine 
Conservative rebels ‘on their courage, integrity and patriotism and [pledge] support for the 
future.’229 Yet this was not merely to show support, as demonstrated by KBO who claimed 
the stance of anti-Market Conservatives was of ‘paramount importance in the Parliamentary 
battle’, and CACMIS who in June 1972 perceived the parliamentary debate to be ‘at a crucial 
stage’.230 It was an attempt to influence enough MPs into voting against the EEC legislation 
so as to obstruct or sabotage it, such as in the Second Reading where CMSC sought to ‘ensure 
that as many as possible of the 39 Conservative MPs who voted against entry on 28
th
 October 
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do so again’, with supporters urged to ‘assure [their MPs] of strong support in the 
constituency for this point of view.’231 
With the passage of the bill hanging in the balance, anti-Market groups therefore acted 
as a type of parliamentary “watchdog” on the EEC issue, keeping check on MPs’ views and 
attempting to ensure the failure of the legislation. Again, anti-Market groups had been doing 
this since the early 1960s, encouraging letters be sent to MPs and candidates to ascertain their 
position on EEC entry, and publicising their views, such as in ACML’s 1964 election 
newsletter which distinguished ‘the really keen Common Marketeers’ from anti-Marketeers to 
its supporters ahead of the election.
232
 As the issue became further politicised in the early 
1970s, ACML and CMSC collaborated on drawing up a set of questions for members to ask 
MPs and parliamentary candidates, ‘designed to embarrass pro-Market MPs and disconcert 
doubtful MPs.’233 The resulting document, “Question Your MP”, followed the distribution by 
CMSC of a set of questions for members to ask candidates in 1970.
234
 This action coincided 
with the distribution of Voters’ Veto forms, perceived as ‘a very effective way of obtaining 
the true interest of your MP’ on the EEC issue.235 The Voters’ Veto forms were first 
distributed to ACML members during the General Election campaign of June 1970 and were 
                                                          
231
 Letter from Ron Leighton to CMSC members [n.d., early 1972], MS. Eng. Hist. C.1131/19, Bodleian Library 
232
 Anti-Common Market League Newsletter, September 1963, CIB 7/1, BLPES; Anti-Common Market League 
General Election Newsletter, September 1964, CIB 7/1, BLPES 
233
 Letter from Sir Robin Williams, Chairman of ACML, to Stephen Haseler, Honorary Treasurer of CMSC, 20 
August 1971, CIB 7/13, BLPES; Letter from Sir Robin Williams to ACML supporters [n.d., 1971], CIB 7/13, 
BLPES 
234
 Minutes of a meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 28 May 1970, CIB 7/3, BLPES 
235
 Circular/minutes of Wolverhampton and West Midlands Branch of ACML [n.d., April 1971?], CIB 7/15, 
BLPES 
 150 
 
signed and forwarded to MPs threatening the loss of electoral support if they revealed 
themselves to be pro-entry until the parliamentary vote of 28 October 1971.
236
  
Pressuring candidates to declare their position on EEC entry before elections and 
threatening to withdraw support for pro-entry candidates was intended, according to CMSC, 
to both ‘bring great pressure to bear on our representatives and ensure that this is a live 
election issue.’237 While trying to influence uncertain MPs into opposing entry, anti-
Marketeers such as Neil Marten monitored the parliamentary levels of support for and against 
entry in anticipation of the vote in Parliament. Uwe Kitzinger’s Diplomacy and Persuasion 
details the activity of Conservative Party Whips and CGE in attempting to monitor and secure 
sufficient support in Parliament for the Bill to pass, while on the opposite side, Marten was 
keeping a record of anti-Market Conservatives, estimating between seventy and eighty MPs in 
early 1971.
238
 The parliamentary vote was thus keeping anti-Market activity rooted within the 
political arena. 
Pressuring MPs into declaring their position thus allowed anti-Market groups to 
mobilise campaigns against those who favoured British membership and increase opposition 
to membership in Parliament. Victor Montagu, formerly Lord Hinchingbrooke, criticised 
referendums and polls that were ‘ignored by the executive’, emphasising the importance of 
backbenchers in Parliament and explaining that ‘[t]he only thing which frightens a tough 
executive is the presence behind him in the Chamber of passionate men with half drawn 
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swords.’239 ACML, belying its Conservative origins, believed that it was therefore ‘of utmost 
importance that anti-Market candidates be returned whether they be Conservative, Labour or 
Liberal’.240 Anti-Marketeers stood as candidates for general and by-elections from the first 
EEC application. Arguably the biggest electoral impact of an anti-Market candidate EEC was 
in the South Dorset by-election in November 1962, which the Conservatives lost after 
independent anti-Market candidate Sir Piers Debenham, supported by the previous incumbent 
Lord Hinchingbrooke, polled 12.3 per cent of the vote.
241
 
However, after de Gaulle’s veto independent anti-Market candidates struggled to make 
an impact, not least because, according to Montagu, single-issue candidates were standing 
‘chiefly on a recessed issue’.242 For example, John Paul’s ‘full-scale, responsible’ campaign 
against Heath in Bexley obtained only 2 per cent of the poll.
243
 Although anti-Market groups 
continued to put forward independent anti-Market candidates, their limited finances led them 
to proceed with caution, concerned that parties would use the electoral results as propaganda 
to show the majority of the public favoured entry.
244
 For this reason, active Labour anti-
Marketeer Douglas Jay opted not to support independent candidates, claiming that ‘the risks 
are too great, and that we have to go on working through the Party machines.’245 Furthermore, 
cross-party groups had to be careful not to associate themselves too closely to parliamentary 
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candidates. Frere-Smith, standing as an independent by-election candidate at Sutton and 
Cheam, downplayed the election campaign’s connection with KBO, as KBO was 
...supported by many Members of Parliament and other prominent Party 
politicians and they would obviously find it impossible if they were to support 
organisations which run candidates against their own Party.
246
 
 
This, in combination with ACML’s statement on the election of anti-Market candidates 
regardless of party, emphasised both the need for anti-Market groups to collaborate on their 
Westminster efforts, but also their need to present themselves as cross-party or non-party in 
order to obtain political influence. 
Anti-Market organisations thus found themselves positioned between the spheres of 
parliamentary politics and mass protest. They directed their message to the general public, 
distributing vast quantities of literature and propaganda and calling upon large numbers of 
supporters to voice their opposition to EEC entry, yet they were never able to completely 
control the issue or remove it from the political arena. As a result, reactive campaigns to 
prevent the passage of legislation required the patronage of anti-Market MPs, and the 
presence of anti-Market MPs within the House of Commons. Anti-Market groups lacked 
political influence, yet remained convinced of the fact that the majority of the public opposed 
EEC entry. Supported in large numbers but denied access to the decision-making process, 
they therefore sought to fulfil the typical role of a ‘protest’ pressure group or NGO, 
perceiving themselves as bridging public opinion and parliamentary decision-making. Their 
frustrations with what Herbert Kitschelt called ‘highly bureaucratised political party machines 
and interest groups’ also added an anti-establishment and anti-political element to their 
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rhetoric.
247
 In tandem with seeking to preserve Westminster sovereignty, they sought a new 
form of direct, active democracy in the belief that traditional democratic participation had 
been obstructed by party machinery and lobbying groups. The final section of this chapter will 
assess this critique of the parliamentary system that kept anti-Market groups in the ground 
between politics and the public sphere. 
Non-party or anti-party? The anti-Market campaign on the political fringes 
In encouraging public participation and attempting to preserve and increase the 
public’s democratic influence, anti-Market groups perceived themselves as promoters and 
defenders of the traditional conception of an active democracy. For many anti-Marketeers, 
Britain’s entry into the EEC against the wishes of the majority was viewed as a systemic 
democratic failure. Anti-Market organisations operating in the gap between Parliament and 
electorate and between parties and grassroots support, therefore, represented the fringes of a 
larger political debate on how active parliamentary democracy should work. Their 
championing of direct democracy over centralised power reflected the liberalist and anti-
statist nature of their campaign. In the words of a colleague of John Paul, campaigning against 
the permanent implementation of British Summer Time that was viewed as a way of aligning 
Britain to continental time, they felt the public ‘must make Democracy work by 
participation...’248 
Protecting the rights of the individual against the powers of centralised government 
and bureaucracy formed a part of the anti-Market groups’ rhetoric. They believed that EEC 
membership would further dissociate the public from the governmental process, and 
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perceived that, as with communism, the ‘centralization of power’ was at the heart of EEC 
policy.
249
 Similarly, groups such as ACML were against this centralising trend domestically, 
claiming that the creation of regional councils as part of EEC policy meant that ‘[a]ll the time 
the representation of the individual is being diminished’.250 In addition to protecting 
individual rights, the belief that ‘larger units of government do not get more efficient but... 
less so’, as expressed by a member of WACM’s Executive Committee, lay behind opposition 
to the EEC.
251
 As John Biffen told a meeting of Conservative supporters, 
We have learned to live with the twin evils of growing government and its 
increasing inaccessibility; they were evils richly fed by the years of socialism. The 
question is now whether or not we wish to add to both the scale and remoteness of 
government.
252
 
 
This belief went beyond centralisation of government and criticised the influence of 
wealthy, professional lobbying and study groups on governmental policy. R. Hugh Corbet, in 
ACML’s Britain, not Europe, wrote of the influence of pro-European groups such as those 
formed by FU and the Federal Trust for Education and Research, the latter described as ‘a 
highly organised, highly sophisticated, political machine.’ Politicians, he claimed, had 
become ‘the tools of highly organised pressure groups’, and that while pressure groups 
defending the interests of a country and its people were ‘the life-giving blood of a healthy 
parliamentary democracy’, the contempt federalist groups had shown for Britain and its 
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people showed that such democracy was ‘diseased’.253 In its most extreme form, this disdain 
for wealthy, organised pro-European groups was evident in one anti-Marketeer’s letter to 
Gaitskell blaming international financiers, and the ‘unscrupulous type of wealthy international 
Jew’, for Britain’s EEC application and for founding PEP ‘with the sole purpose of bringing 
in a totalitarian state in Britain.’254 
Frustrations with party hierarchies 
Anti-Market groups such as ACML, BLR and PFM were more concerned with the 
lack of party democracy and the systemic failures of the two-party system in Westminster that 
were ostracising the views of rank-and-file supporters and voters. ACML was preoccupied 
with the increasing distance between Conservative Party leadership and grassroots supporters 
from its inception, founded as a ‘group of rank and file Conservatives’ disillusioned with 
Macmillan’s decision to apply for EEC membership.255 John Paul expressed disappointment 
at the limited opportunity for anti-Market speakers at the 1961 Conference, and called the 
following year’s Conference ‘so unrepresentative of rank-and-file views’ as to be ‘almost a bit 
of a laughing stock’.256 Furthermore, party loyalty of the ‘hard core of Party office-holders 
and Agents’ meant it would have been ‘an unprecedented shock to the Government’ if the 
Conference had voted against EEC entry, and ACML claimed that the two hundred votes and 
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numerous abstentions for Robin Turton’s amendment was ‘indicative of the feelings of 
millions of the rank and file of the Party.’257 
Thus, on the one hand anti-Market groups believed rank-and-file opinion against EEC 
membership was being ignored, and on the other hand they believed that leadership policy 
and the party organisation were pressuring the rank-and-file into changing their views on EEC 
membership. In place of real party democracy, according to RBCMC’s S.E. Scammell, were 
resolutions favouring entry passed by ‘a few score “trusties” who [are] concerned only to 
support the Party Line on the ‘my leader right or wrong’ basis.’258 Lord Hinchingbrooke, in 
response to those Conservative Party association workers in his old constituency of South 
Dorset who felt betrayed by his support of an independent anti-Market candidate in the 
November 1962 by-election, was also critical of how constituencies’ loyalties to their local 
candidate or MP had been superseded by loyalty to the Party leader, increasing the party 
hierarchy’s stranglehold over grass-roots opinion.259 Justifying his actions to a President of a 
local Conservative Association, Hinchingbrooke bemoaned the ‘disastrous Maxwell-Fyfe 
reforms’ which increased central control over associations that had ‘developed from the 
ground upwards’, claiming ‘[i]f [party] loyalty is to be directed to the party leaders only, then 
we can pack up representative government altogether’.260 
Hinchingbrooke’s frustration with the Conservative Party hierarchy would only 
increase when he found them to be ‘totally unhelpful’ in his efforts to be reselected as a 
Conservative Party candidate, his correspondence in the Daily Telegraph about associations 
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and candidate selection leading to other activists criticising the ‘self-perpetuating cabals’ that 
controlled Conservative associations.
261
 MPs and party workers who followed the 
Conservative Party’s policy on Europe were condemned by ACML as ‘sycophants and blind 
followers of the Government line’, while the promotion of pro-Marketeers was seen as 
‘actively encouraged by the top.’262 Those pro-European Conservative politicians who placed 
loyalty to the policies of leadership above principle were described by Michael Shay as 
‘professional politicians’ who contributed to the ‘face-less image of the Conservative 
Party’.263 In contrast to those loyal to governmental policy, anti-Market MPs believed their 
views were also being ignored by the party hierarchy, with Marten complaining in 1971 about 
‘a complete lack of serious contact between the Party machine and the antis.’264  
Political parties’ control over their MPs on the issue of EEC membership was 
increased by the use of party Whips, which anti-Market organisations were quick to criticise 
as an affront to the views of the public. Heath, as a Conservative Party Whip in the late 1950s, 
came under attack from ACML in the 1960s as being preoccupied with ‘the authority of 
Parliament’ on the EEC issue, whereas according to ACML, ‘it is the wish of the electorate 
that should count.’265 The passage of the European Communities Bill through Parliament 
increased the role of the Whips, leading to what Marten called ‘the unparalleled exertions 
which are being made to secure the passage of the Common Market legislation... against the 
preponderant will of the electorate.’ Marten claimed ‘the party organisation, radiating from 
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Conservative Central Office’ were attempting to ‘cajole and suborn office-bearers and 
supporters behind the backs of Members of Parliament’, applying pressure on them to go 
along with government policy.
266
 For example, ACML and WACM were concerned that Toby 
Jessel, the Conservative MP for Anne Kerr’s Twickenham constituency who had previously 
been an outspoken opponent of EEC membership, had ‘been under strong Party pressure to 
take the Heath line’ in the run-up to the parliamentary vote.267 It was for this reason that, 
when listing those MPs strongly for or against membership in each party in a general election 
newsletter, those Conservatives who were not listed as anti were presumed by ACML ‘to be 
mostly followers of the Party line, and thus liable to vote as the Whips dictate.’268 However, 
while party politicians such as Marten felt that, although the system was being abused, Whips 
were ‘as essential to life in politics as a system of police is to life in towns’, groups such as 
the PFM called for the abolition of the Whip system and free votes on every parliamentary 
issue.
269
 According to PFM, those who voted on principle and against the Whips would 
...publicly be ‘on the mat’ – but more odiously, they will be subjected to the more 
pernicious ‘backdoor’ methods of ‘disciplinary action’. Their wisdom and their 
consciences are nought. The Party comes first.
270
 
 
As early as 1962, Lord Hinchingbrooke was expressing the belief that the combination 
of discipline from the party organisations and the system of Whips was making the 
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governmental system more presidential.
271
 Anti-Market organisations thus argued that this 
was disenfranchising the electorate and making it difficult for anti-Market opinion to be 
articulated. The situation was made more difficult for anti-Marketeers in 1967, when all three 
main parties supported British EEC membership in principle for the first time. NCPMC’s 
formation was justified by Douglas Jay on the grounds that ‘it was difficult for public opinion 
to express itself easily by normal methods’, or through normal party political channels.272 The 
Sunday Telegraph also expressed concern at the possible consequences of consensus among 
parties on the European issue, as the lack of a party ‘raising an alternative banner under which 
the sceptics can rally’ would lead to a ‘disenfranchised’ majority and the possibility of ‘new 
party alignments’, with which ‘the consensus politics of the last decade [would be] unable to 
cope.’273 Anti-Market groups emphasised how centralised government, a lack of party 
democracy and the American-style growth of the ‘power of the caucus’ had led to the public 
being ‘disenfranchised’.274 However, according to BLR this problem was a systemic problem 
with party politics, as much to do with the two-party cycle of government and opposition as 
with a lack of party democracy. BLR argued that regardless of the changes in government, 
governmental policy remained the same, and that, despite the ‘encouraging sign [of] growing 
grass-roots anti-Common Market opposition’, in party politics ‘there are not enough people at 
the grass-roots concentrating on policy instead of party loyalty or “not rocking the boat”.’275 
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With political parties perceived to be unresponsive to the views of their rank-and-file 
supporters, there was a void within which anti-Market groups could operate and mobilise for 
support. As alluded to above, pro-Market organisations failed to capitalise on this 
disenfranchised rank-and-file, and sought to influence elite and parliamentary opinion. The 
European Forum and CGE had little connection with the Conservative Party’s grassroots 
support, while LCE maintained a policy to remove ‘all obstacles within the Labour Party’ and 
build relationships with continental socialists, which did not seek to increase and mobilise 
grassroots support.
276
 LCE recognised this problem in 1968, calling for a nationwide tour of 
Brains Trusts on the EEC issue as ‘there was a gap in European thinking between local and 
national level in the Party.’277 Organisations such as WACM therefore sought to appeal to the 
disillusioned anti-Market grassroots of the Labour Party, and criticised, ‘those Labour lights, 
who talk of high ideals, while obviously so out of touch, with how a worker feels. [...] Too 
long the Party’s suffered its Non-Socialist élite.’278 Emmanuel Shinwell, who although 
reluctant to join ACML co-operated closely with John Paul, sought with his Labour 
colleagues to influence local grassroots support and reported to Paul that their ‘decision... to 
persuade Labour Constituencies is having an excellent effect.’279 Likewise, aware that anti-
Market opinion could not express itself effectively at Conservative Party Conferences, ACML 
sought in 1970 to ‘pay more attention to the Conservative rank and file and convert the 
“doubtfuls” through the constituencies’, and planned a public meeting in Blackpool to 
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coincide with the Party Conference.
280
 Gaining support of the general public, and parties’ 
grassroots support, was therefore essential to the anti-Market campaign, with RBCMC 
speaking of the Conservative Party hierarchy ‘who wholly misrepresent the grass-roots of 
their local Conservative vote’, and that ‘[t]reachery on this issue at the head, [and] 
subservience to the party line below, are destroying the Conservative Party for a 
generation.’281 
A systemic problem? Anti-party and anti-establishment tendencies of the anti-Market 
campaign 
 
In the perceived absence of party democracy, with the opinions of grassroots voters 
either being manipulated or ignored, anti-Market groups in some cases demonstrated an 
attitude bordering on ‘anti-party instincts’ of which McCarthy wrote.282 As early as 1962, 
ACML wrote of how party machinery’s control of candidate selection and maintenance of 
party unity had left political parties ‘divorced and centralised from the minds and souls of the 
people.’283 John Paul, in an appeal to the newly-elected U.S. President Richard Nixon in 
1969, wrote of how ‘party politicians’ standing is lower in public esteem than probably ever 
before’ and how the anti-EEC majority had become ‘estranged from the bulk of party 
politicians who put the contrary point of view’, allowing ACML and other non-party anti-
Market groups to capitalise upon the disenfranchised grassroots who were unable to influence 
party policy.
284
 It was this disillusionment with political parties, combined with his strong 
anti-EEC views, which had led to Paul’s independent candidacy at the 1964 General Election. 
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Paul’s election leaflet lamented that ‘defeatism has since the war been widespread in all 
Parties, and in the “Establishment”... [and] the intellectuals and “top brass” generally.’ 
Candidates independent of political parties, ‘free of Party Whips and their insidious patronage 
and “Jobs for the Boys”’, had ‘led in several pieces of important legislation in the past’, but 
the decline of independent candidates, according to Paul, had led to Parliament being 
controlled by the machinations of political parties.
285
 ACML elaborated on this anti-party, 
anti-establishment stance in the mid-1960s claiming that ‘[m]ost thinking folk are so 
disillusioned these days with politicians (and their parties) that their abuse... especially at 
election times... is taken for granted and largely ignored.’286 Anti-Marketeers thus believed 
party politics and parliamentary politics had been skewed by the highly organised machinery 
of political parties. Powell emphasised this by describing in an interview with the Guardian 
that political parties should not be manipulating grassroots opinion, but rather, 
Politicians articulate, crystallise, dramatise if you like, render intelligible and 
therefore render capable of being turned into action, legislative or administrative, 
something which is present already in people’s minds. If this were not so, I can’t 
think what would be the meaning of democracy.
287
 
 
The PFM articulated this anti-party, anti-establishment sentiment most clearly in the 
early 1970s, its motto calling for a ‘new concept of British politics’.288 PFM was founded in 
response to the European issue, and the passage of European Communities legislation in 
Parliament was viewed by PFM as ‘the tragedy of Party politics endangering the existence of 
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the nation.’289 With the aim of returning political power to the electorate, PFM called for the 
abolition of Whips, free votes on every issue in Parliament, power transferred from the 
Executive back to MPs, and ‘[r]eform of the Electoral System to achieve a true and fair 
representation in the House of Commons with a real choice by the voters.’290 In “Let Us Try 
Democracy”, PFM’s founder Air Vice-Marshal Don Bennett called for wide-ranging reforms 
that would implement ‘a truly democratic system of representation’. His strongest criticisms 
were reserved for ‘the unconstitutional Party system of Government’, described as one of ‘the 
greatest single causes of mediocrity in British Political Life’ and as ‘machinery to defeat the 
purpose of Democracy, and as such it functions extremely well.’ Party loyalty and the power 
of party leaderships meant that issues could not be debated honestly in Parliament, and the 
free vote was therefore called for to ensure the majority’s true views were represented. In the 
words of Bennett, 
A ‘Non-Party system’ is ‘normal’, and there appears to be no reason why normal 
methods which function in every other activity of men should fail to function in a 
free Parliament.
291
 
 
This sentiment could be found in other anti-Market organisations, with calls for ‘an 
Independent Party, dedicated to carry out the wishes of the People, as in all true 
Democracies.’292 However, while ACML wrote in 1963 that it received ‘a constant stream of 
letters suggesting that the time is ripe for the formation of a new political movement’, 
representing ‘a surge of feeling and a general disillusionment with the present parties’, it was 
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aware that more finance was needed ‘to convert today’s unease into wider action’ in the 
future.
293
 Lord Hinchingbrooke, as President of ACML, also felt that it was ‘purely a national 
movement, formed for a specific purpose’, and that its expansion into a new political party 
was not necessary in the 1960s. Hinchingbrooke wrote that political parties ‘are not formed by 
the propagation of sets of principles in favour of a special set of ideas, even though those 
ideas are utterly praiseworthy’, and instead their formation ‘takes place in an atmosphere of 
crisis, and by splitting allegiances out of the old parties under stress of popular acclaim.’294 
Thus, while Hinchingbrooke and his colleagues disagreed with a number of Conservative 
Party policies such as EEC membership and ‘over-swift’ decolonisation, Hinchingbrooke 
wished to preserve the fundamentals of the existing political system, claiming that ‘[t]he 
formation of a new political quarter or identifiable group within the Conservative Party is not, 
in my opinion, called for.’295 Similarly, despite his work with CMSC and CACMIS, Neil 
Marten, as a Conservative MP, called upon Conservative Central Office to produce objective 
publications stating the anti-Market view not only to increase anti-Market support, but also, 
… [to] at all costs avoid giving an impression of a divided Party so far as the 
public is concerned. We certainly do not wish to get into the position where 
Conservative MPs – and other prominent Conservatives – have to attack the 
publications of our own Party and the views expressed in them.
296
 
 
 
This contrast between the inherent party loyalty of the majority of anti-Market MPs and the 
unaffiliated activists within anti-Market groups would later be problematic, as chapters three 
and four will demonstrate, as politicians within the organisations were accused of being too 
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conservative. In the 1960s and early 1970s, however, it predominantly demonstrated the 
inability of the anti-Market campaign to make sufficient progress in the public or political 
spheres to transform anti-Market sentiment into a mass movement or a political force. 
Conclusions 
Anti-Market groups thus found themselves positioned between the political sphere and 
mass mobilisation. They sought mass support through populist arguments and issues which 
would lead to organisations founded around particular party political ideologies campaigning 
together on the same common ground, leading to the foundation of the umbrella group 
CMSC. Political sovereignty, national identity inherent in British political culture, the 
Commonwealth and price rises all had a resonant, cross-party appeal. In contrast to elite-
oriented pro-Market groups, they directly targeted the general public and sought mass 
membership, yet their parallel targeting of political support through the monitoring and 
lobbying of MPs reflected their position on the political fringes. Their anti-establishment 
character, borne out of frustration with bureaucratised political party machinery, reinforced 
the image of anti-Market organisations as protest groups, unable to attain political influence 
and locked out of political decision-making processes. 
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CHAPTER THREE: ‘DEMAGOGUERY WITH A VENGEANCE’?: ANTI-EEC 
ORGANISATIONS, 1973-75
1
 
 
The anti-Market campaign was left, as one group admitted, ‘in the dumps’ in 1973.2 A 
combined rally on 30 December 1972, and a few demonstrations to tie in with the Fanfare for 
Europe in the first week of 1973, signalled a determination to continue campaigning. 
However, the battle to prevent British membership of the EEC had been lost, and in the initial 
months of membership there appeared to be a lack of direction and policy amongst the anti-
Market organisations.
3
 Indeed, the CMSC’s outgoing Director, Ron Leighton, had to reassure 
other anti-Market groups in early 1973 that it had not collapsed.
4
 Whereas in the 1960s, anti-
Market groups went into relative dormancy after British attempts at EEC entry were blocked, 
the campaign now had to both maintain the saliency of the EEC issue and continue to 
mobilise the public against it. 
The period between EEC entry and the referendum is predominantly viewed through 
the framework of party political manoeuvring, with the anti-Market groups that combined 
under the National Referendum Campaign (NRC) umbrella in 1975 portrayed as actors in 
intra-party battles.
5
 Those works that do focus on the activities of anti-Market organisations 
do so in a cursory manner, such as Philip Goodhart’s brief summary of the constituent 
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organisations within the NRC being GBO, CMSC and ‘a smattering of smaller 
organisations’.6 Another contemporary account of the referendum by Butler and Kitzinger is 
more comprehensive and employs a greater focus on nationwide campaigning activities, but 
still remains fairly Westminster-centric.
7
 Julie Smith’s article assesses the umbrellas 
organisations’ campaigning and the issues being debated in impressive detail, in spite of a 
lack of archival material.
8
 Elsewhere, emphasis is instead laid on Labour Party leader Harold 
Wilson‘s attempt to maintain unity amongst a party divided over, but broadly opposed to, 
EEC membership. Renegotiation of membership terms within the EEC’s Council of 
Ministers, followed by an election pledge to allow a public vote on EEC membership via a 
referendum, served to contain a great deal of intra-party dissent on the issue. While anti-
Market groups capitalised on these tactical devices of renegotiation and referendum, the 
issues under discussion were those on which they had campaigned for several years, and had 
continued to do so after 1973. References in Labour’s 1974 election manifesto to the ‘consent 
of the British people’, ‘imposition of food taxes on top of rising world prices’, ‘draconian 
curtailment of the power of the British Parliament to settle questions affecting vital British 
interests’, and the Common Agricultural Policy’s ‘threat to world trade’, all correspond with 
the rhetoric of anti-Market organisations in this period.
9
 
This chapter will assess how these organisations approached the situation between 
Britain’s EEC entry and the referendum, when they were ‘now attacking the status quo 
instead of defending it’ and having ‘to sell the idea that Britain to survive must get out of the 
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Common Market’.10 Anti-Market organisations were once again positioned between mass 
protest and institutional politics, targeting both political and public support but failing to 
attract substantial backing from either. While concern over the same cross-party issues and 
occupying a common ground had previously brought anti-Market groups closer together, 
questions of strategy now became a divisive element in the anti-Market campaign, particular 
when the referendum brought the issue fully into the public domain.  
This chapter will first analyse the two major cross-party issues which the anti-Market 
campaign focused on – prices (particularly of foodstuffs) and sovereignty – and explains how 
their differing nature and resonance reflected a wider division between the campaign’s public 
and political outlook. These subjects guided NRC’s two major aims, ‘to restore to the British 
Parliament the exclusive right to pass laws and impose taxation binding on citizens of the 
UK’ and to ‘re-establish the power of the UK to trade freely, particularly in the case of food, 
with any country in the world’.11 The Get Britain Out campaign also rejected what it saw as 
the two main principles of the EEC, supranational authority and community preference in 
trade, making the issues of prices and sovereignty central to the campaign.
12
 The issue of 
rising food prices, in a time of economic crisis and severe inflation, was a particularly populist 
one. By focusing both on the threat to the poorer sections of society and the decline in quality 
and choice in the marketplace for the more affluent, anti-Market groups targeted the wider 
public as consumers, across class or party boundaries. However, defence of the consumer 
often led the campaign to employ anti-establishment rhetoric, particularly when pro-
Marketeers attempted to deflect the issue. Furthermore, a rise in food prices on a global scale 
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led other anti-Marketeers to push for sovereignty to be the campaign’s key issue. Monitoring 
the introduction of EEC legislation immediately became a task for anti-Market groups, who 
sought to provide examples to the public of a loss of sovereignty. However, the issue did not 
appear to be resonant with the public, and the importance with which anti-Market MPs 
attached to sovereignty demonstrated its political, Parliament-centric nature.  
The clash between seeking political and public support is also evident in the image 
which the anti-Market campaign wished to present. The second part of this chapter will assess 
the character and tactics of anti-Market organisations, and the incongruous strategy of seeking 
political support and respectability whilst also employing anti-establishment rhetoric. Groups 
like the ACML, as political outsiders, had been previously been extremely critical of 
governments and politicians to secure EEC membership, and revealed an anti-establishment 
character in the process. However, in the period leading up to the referendum, both the 
ACML and the CMSC sought support from the political sphere. The NRC brought together 
MPs from across the political spectrum, and sidelined the more extremist anti-Market groups, 
in order to present a respectable image. Its Chairman Neil Marten and Vice-Chairman 
Douglas Jay met with senior government figures and media representatives in order to ensure 
fairer and more equal media exposure and treatment. In response to the increased media 
prominence, anti-Marketeers needed to present a respectable case and a united front, which 
sat uneasily with the anti-political, anti-establishment tendencies within the campaign. Once 
again, partial access to the political sphere and parliamentary elites meant that anti-Market 
organisations occupied a middle ground between political lobbyists and outsider protest 
groups. The referendum defeat by a vote of two to one represented a failure in both spheres, 
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and reflected a fragmented coalition and an inability to unite the public and political strands of 
the anti-Market campaign effectively. 
Key issues of the anti-Market referendum campaign: public and political 
Food prices 
The previous chapter demonstrated how the issue of rising food prices had become a 
central pillar in a non-party, populist campaign against EEC entry, as an issue both affecting 
the public across party, class and gender lines and relating to the broader issues of the 
Commonwealth and agriculture. In the British economic downturn of the mid-1970s, the issue 
of inflation and rising prices continued to be a major concern amongst the public, dominating 
both of the general elections of 1974 and becoming what David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh 
called ‘the central issue of the period’.13 Anti-Market groups maintained their focus on the 
issue of food prices which had remained high after EEC entry, and continued to monitor food 
policy and changes to trade patterns. Again, their arguments were not solely centred on the 
economic effects of rising prices upon consumers, but were also concerned with issues of 
food quality and nutrition, and threats to British national identity. In defending the rights of 
the consumer over the profiting producer, the campaign adopted an anti-establishment tone in 
its attempt to mobilise support. The connection that anti-Marketeers drew between the issue 
of food policy and the problems of inflation also demonstrates how they saw the food prices 
issue as a microcosm of the wider economic problem in Britain, and saw a return to liberalist 
free trade as an economic panacea. 
                                                          
13
 Butler, D. and Kavanagh, D., The British General Election of October 1974 (London: Macmillan, 1975), p.24 
 171 
 
The issue of rising food prices appeared to have continued resonance with anti-
Marketeers in the pre-referendum period. CMSC’s aforementioned “Why Food Is Dear” 
leaflet, aimed directly at the public, plainly set out the rise in prices of essential foodstuffs 
within the previous three years and attributed this to the pursuit of EEC membership. It 
criticised some of the aspects of Common Market food policy, such as the Intervention Board 
which it perceived as having the ‘sole job… to keep up prices in Britain by buying up food, 
storing it, and if necessary mixing chemicals with it to make it unfit for human 
consumption.’14 The CMSC subsequently decided that ‘emphasis on food prices was right and 
should continue’ and the ACML also continued to produce leaflets on rising food prices and 
VAT.
15
 By February 1974, ACML personnel perceived the issue of food prices and the EEC 
to be ‘the people’s issue in [the general] election’ and the issue which would resonate most 
with the public in their campaign.
16
 This was reinforced by several opinion polls, including a 
MORI poll which showed that 58 per cent of the electorate saw the cost of living as the key 
issue, which ‘showed that shop prices had much more appeal than sovereignty.’17 In another 
poll in 1974, two-thirds of respondents cited EEC membership as a cause of rising food 
prices.
18
 Douglas Jay, Chairman of both the CMSC and its Labour Party counterpart and 
Vice-Chairman of the NRC, was a key exponent of the arguments on food policy, writing 
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articles for the Spectator and Sunday Express and leaflets for the CMSC on price rises.
19
 Jay 
went as far as to declare after the referendum that the issue 
...should have made the central if not the only, theme of the campaign. It was true. 
It was overwhelmingly important for the whole nation. And the public both 
understood and believed it. [...] But some perfectly sincere and indeed fervent 
anti-Marketeers had not the propaganda sense to see that in public sentiment the 
cost of food was the dominant and decisive issue.
20
 
 
 Anti-Market groups within the wider network perceived the widespread impact of the 
price rises and VAT to be affecting consumers and ‘people in all walks of life’, and presented 
it as a cross-party issue.
21
 The Anti Dear Food Campaign (ADFC), formed in 1973 by former 
Keep Britain Out figures Oliver Smedley and S.W. Alexander, also contributed to the anti-
Market campaign by criticising many of the changes in food policy attributed to EEC 
membership.
22
 Its particular target was the Intervention Board, seen as ‘the weakest link in the 
armoury of the Common Agricultural Policy’ and as both ‘vulnerable to attack’ and ‘difficult 
to explain away to the public.’23 Repeated reference was therefore made to it in leaflets, and a 
number of demonstrations were organised outside its British headquarters in London.
24
 By 
what Butler and Kitzinger called pointing ‘emotively to the [Intervention Board’s] creation of 
beef mountains, butter mountains and wine lakes’, anti-Marketeers were thus aware of the 
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public perception of the Intervention Board, and intended to make it the focus of a popular 
campaign.
25
 The NRC also sought to portray the Intervention Board’s hoarding and 
denaturing of food and the sale of surplus food at a lower price to Russia as ‘immoral’.26 Its 
attempt to shun the use of ‘raw statistics’ at press conferences in favour of ‘data which relates 
to family life’ and which was within ‘most peoples [sic] experiences’ also made food prices 
and the household budget a key theme in the campaign, and directly targeted public support.
27
 
Furthermore, in the early months of Britain’s EEC membership, the ACML felt that a 
campaign centred on food policy rather than EEC withdrawal would attract more support 
from moderates, believing a slogan such as ‘Stop Taxes on Food’ to be less divisive than ‘Out 
of the Common Market’.28 
While the ADFC retained a focus on mobilising support against EEC food policy 
through leafleting and demonstrations, research on the issue was undertaken by the ACML 
and the Open Seas Forum, who together compiled ‘more detailed information’ before 
presenting it to the public.
29
 A network of groups on the food prices issue therefore began to 
form, with the ADFC having close connections with female consumer group the British 
Housewives’ League, sharing meetings, members and, at one point, premises.30 It later 
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became affiliated with both the CMSC and the NRC, with Smedley being appointed to the 
Committee of the former, due to its contribution to the campaign against rising food prices.
31
 
 
The “Hungry Market”: impact of price rises on the most vulnerable 
Organisations with a specific concern about the public’s position as consumers made 
claims, which in hindsight seem exaggerated, about the EEC’s food policies driving up the 
cost of food to such high prices that a large section of the population would be under-fed. 
Women Against the Common Market was still claiming after the referendum defeat that the 
EEC’s food policies were ‘driving us into starvation – no less.’32 Their spiritual antecedents, 
the British Housewives’ League, took the argument directly to the government, with a 
delegation meeting Joseph Godber, the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. It 
warned that ‘rocketing prices of basic foodstuffs might lead to widespread malnutrition’ and 
that a national subsidised loaf should be introduced to aid the most vulnerable.
33
 Joyce Mew, 
an active figure in both the British Housewives’ League and the ADFC, spoke at a meeting of 
the latter to advocate further protection and information for consumers. She asked, 
How can the housewife budget to withstand this economic blizzard? Much can be 
done by the experienced and knowledgeable. Unfortunately, many of the ignorant 
and the aged are already suffering from malnutrition and if prices continue to rise 
as they undoubtedly will, then the outlook will be grim.
34
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The anti-Market campaign’s direct message to the public was similarly austere and 
alarmist. “Why Food Is Dear” highlighted that the price rises affected ‘pensioners and large 
families with low earnings’ the most, and that the CMSC would ‘safeguard the housewife 
against rises in food prices and the cost of living’.35 The NRC’s broadcasts also targeted the 
consumer by highlighting the impact of price rises on both ‘the housewife’s food bill’ and the 
most vulnerable. One broadcast featured female shoppers interviewed in a market who were 
informed that price rises ‘hit people like yourselves of course who are on relatively low 
wages’ and that ‘[i]f you’re a pensioner, or a single person, or have got a large family, or a 
low income’, the consequences could be even more severe.36 Consumers were also warned of 
the impact of VAT, a ‘tax on consumption operating through a rise in prices and therefore, in 
so far as it is imposed on necessities... hits the low paid harder than the better off.’37 Anti-
Marketeers thus argued that price rises would be more damaging for the poorest sections of 
society, such as pensioners, who ‘spend more of their money on food than any other class.’38 
The interests of ‘[m]illions of working people – the self employed – the small traders – the 
pensioners – the retired – all people living on fixed incomes’ were juxtaposed with ‘those 
who organise monopolies and price rings’ who formed part of the establishment that had 
brought Britain into the EEC.
39
 
 
                                                          
35
 “Why Food Is Dear”, CMSC [n.d., 1973], CIB/1/3, BLPES; “The Common Market: Too High a Price?”, 
CMSC newspaper advert [n.d.], CIB/1/3, BLPES 
36
 Transcript of NRC broadcast on BBC Radio 4, 27 May 1975, NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives 
37
 “1975 Referendum, the Common Market: In or Out”, Labour Research Department, March 1975, NRC/1, 
Parliamentary Archives 
38
 “Never Cheap Food Again?” leaflet [n.d., 1975], 1 AT 259-60, Anti-Common Market League in Britain and 
Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources 
39
 “Statement no.5 – The Common Market: a conspiracy against the people” [n.d., 1975], 1 PX 8, Liberal “No to 
the Common Market Campaign” in Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary 
Social Sources 
 176 
 
The “Tasteless Market”: Food quality and Commonwealth imports 
As well as seeking to defend the poorest sections of society from food price rises, the 
anti-Market campaign’s concentration on issues of quality and choice revealed liberalist and 
free-market perspectives, demonstrating the cross-party nature of the campaign on food 
policy. Concerns about the nutrition and quality of food under new EEC regulations combined 
the interests of both the working and middle classes. Certain foods being priced out was a 
concern, with the ADFC claiming that increases in the costs of cheese may remove ‘the old 
age pensioner’s cheapest source of protein’, and that ‘the British people are now consuming 
less beef per head than in the last months of rationing.’40 More alarmist stories emanated from 
anti-Marketeers about European housewives having to boycott expensive dairy products ‘[i]n 
spite of the glut of dairy produce in the EEC’ and the cheap sale of butter to Russia.41 While 
these examples indicate a concern for the nutritional well-being of the more vulnerable, the 
anti-Market campaign was also concerned with maintaining the quality of traditional 
foodstuffs. 
The ADFC’s main objectives were therefore not merely concerned with the 
availability of cheap food but also to ‘work for policies that permit British consumers to 
purchase good food at the cheapest possible prices’.42 The quality of milk became a concern 
in the first year of membership, with EEC regulations leading the introduction of skimmed 
and semi-skimmed milk, and the limitation of whole milk to 3.5 per cent fat compared to the 
previous British minimum of 3.7 per cent fat, where people ‘drink milk as it comes from the 
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cow’. When questioned, the Milk Marketing Board responded that they had ‘kept up the 
quality of milk and can’t see any reason why we should lower it. The change can only add to 
the butter glut [across the EEC].’43 The debate surrounding skimmed milk continued beyond 
the referendum, both inside and outside Westminster.
44
 The use of continental wheat within 
the EEC also led to anti-Marketeers seeking to maintain the quality of British bread. British 
producers were unable to take advantage of surpluses from Commonwealth harvests, meaning 
that bread in Britain would no longer be made from ‘hard Canadian wheat’ and would ‘get 
dearer and nastier until in 1978 it reaches full Community price and quality, and the loaf that 
was 10½p will cost you at least 20p for poorer bread.’45 EEC regulations on the import of 
Commonwealth sugar also led the Get Britain Out campaign to remind the public that, once 
the shortages in granulated sugar had passed, they should ‘remember why you can’t get caster 
sugar, cube sugar or brown sugar.’46 An NRC leaflet also made reference to Britain’s market 
for fresh fruit, describing it as ‘very selective, insisting upon the highest quality.’ Importing 
fruit from Commonwealth harvests allowed Britain to purchase fresh fruit throughout the 
year, and despite the price being affected by the overhead costs of refrigeration during long 
sea journeys, the leaflet argued that Commonwealth fruit ‘nevertheless secures the market it 
deserves by its extremely high quality.’ Under EEC regulations, ‘the UK consumer would be 
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compelled to eat low quality (long stored) fruit outside the Community season instead of the 
high quality freshly gathered supplies from the southern hemisphere.’ These examples, along 
with the EEC’s ‘debasement of high-quality meat by freeze-storing’, meant that the quality of 
food was as much a concern as its price and availability.
47
 With price rises making it more 
expensive to maintain current standards of eating, Marten warned that the EEC ‘will be a 
Hungry and Tasteless Market.’48 
Free trade and cheap food were seen as the cornerstones of British commercial policy, 
the latter alluded to in several references made by the British Housewives’ League and the 
ADFC to the repeal of the Corn Laws. ADFC believed that Britain’s prosperity began with 
the repeal in 1846, and Smedley envisioned the organisation as ‘the twentieth century 
equivalent of the Anti Corn Law League which brought cheap food to the people in the 
1840s.’49 VAT highlighted to anti-Marketeers the ‘sharp contrast between British and 
continental social and economic conventions’, as Britain had ‘scrupulously avoided a VAT on 
foodstuffs’ and other consumer durables and essentials.50 Continental systems were also 
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criticised for having inefficient agricultural production propped up by CAP funding, and 
fishing methods that were ‘more like massacre’ where cod had ‘become a luxury food’.51 
The solution proposed by anti-Marketeers was withdrawal from the EEC along with 
the return to a traditional British agricultural policy that would benefit both producer and 
consumer and keep prices down.
52
 Anti-Market rhetoric on food policy was therefore 
concentrated to some extent on issues of national identity, which was already threatened by 
EEC membership affecting trade policy and food consumption. Britain’s role, for example, 
was perceived to be outward-looking and at the centre of global trade, importing a large 
proportion of the food it needed. Its previous agricultural policy was to subsidise farmers to 
guarantee prices for the producer and keep prices low for the consumer, a national policy 
which anti-Marketeers called for a return to.
53
 Anti-Marketeers thus perceived the traditional 
British policy to be ‘a well tried trading system among friends, based on mutual benefit and 
respect and having an essentially liberal foundation.’54 
The demand to import high-quality Commonwealth food therefore reinforced this 
strand of free-trade liberalism within the anti-Market campaign, perhaps most evident in the 
ADFC with the likes of Smedley, Alexander and Frere-Smith having been previously 
involved in Liberal politics.
55
 This liberalism was often more explicit in the wider economic 
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solutions advocated by the ADFC, who saw the food policy issue as a microcosm of Britain’s 
economic problems and relations with the EEC. In its “Manifesto for Survival”, for example, 
it set itself aside from ‘measures being advocated by the conventional politicians of left and 
right’ in advocating withdrawal from the EEC and a return to free trade.56 In addition to these 
solutions, the ADFC also advocated a reduction of taxation on wages and consumer goods as 
the liberalist basis for an economic recovery.
57
 It sought to gain the support of free-market 
capitalists, calling for British politicians to introduce ‘free trade, sound money and taxation of 
site values’, leading to new businesses, new employment opportunities, reduced taxation 
earnings, and allowing Britain to break out of its ‘protectionist stranglehold’.58  
Change in food policy was therefore seen as the first step to economic recovery, 
tackling inflation and stabilising the value of the pound, and giving the British consumer 
‘money of high quality and purchasing power not the present confetti currency which 
introduces grave injustices and discord into our community.’59 Statements by anti-Marketeers 
about the right to buy food from global markets were underlined by the desire for good 
quality food and the prerogative of consumer choice. The call to ‘take more advantage of the 
seasons, the climates and soils of the whole world instead of being compelled to confine our 
purchases largely to a European temperate zone’ was implicitly concerned with the quality 
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and variety of food available to the British consumer.
60
 Statements made during the 
referendum campaign by Sir John Winnifrith, ex-Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, elaborated on these benefits of global free trade, advocating the 
import of foods from places ‘where the climate or the quantity or quality of farmland make 
production cheaper’ and where there was a ‘natural advantage’ to producing certain foods.61 
The import of dairy products and lamb from New Zealand, for example, which Winnifrith 
described as coming ‘straight off the grass’, implied a superior quality due to climate and 
landscape.
62
 Underlying the anti-Marketeers’ concentration on the price, availability, quality 
and variety of food available to purchase in Britain was a belief that ‘[t]he consumer is 
entitled to buy what he wants, where he wants and when he wants it.’63 
Championing the consumer: anti-establishment rhetoric in the food prices argument 
Anti-Marketeers therefore pitted the interests of the public as consumers in opposition 
to those of producers in their rhetoric. They argued that while the previous system encouraged 
free trade and gave the consumer ample choice and low prices, the protectionist EEC system 
worked for the benefit of the producer over the consumer, giving, according to an NRC 
broadcast, ‘the farmers more money each year, so when their prices go up, the housewife’s 
food bill goes up.’64 They also emphasised the bias towards producers when discussing how 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) ‘provides a floor and not a ceiling’ for prices, 
                                                          
60
 Letter from S.W. Alexander to MPs,1 June 1973, CIB/10/7, BLPES 
61
 “Food Costs More in the Common Market” by Sir John Winnifrith, published by CMSC, March 1975, NRC/1, 
Parliamentary Archives; Speech made by Sir John Winnifrith at NRC rally at Conway Hall, London, 12 April 
1975, NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives 
62
 Speech made by Sir John Winnifrith at NRC rally at Conway Hall, London, 12 April 1975, NRC/1, 
Parliamentary Archives 
63
 “Commonwealth Trade: The True Facts” by S. Stanley-Smith, NRC, April 1975, MS. Eng. Hist. c.1148, 
Bodleian Library 
64
 Transcript of NRC broadcast on BBC Radio 4, 27 May 1975, NRC/1, Parliamentary Archives 
 182 
 
guaranteeing income for farmers but maintaining high prices for the consumer.
65
 Import taxes 
and levies were thus seen as artificially inflating the price of food ‘for the benefit of 
subsidising Continental agriculture.’66 Furthermore, anti-Marketeers attributed the huge 
surpluses of food in the form of ‘butter mountains’ and ‘wine lakes’ to a lack of control of 
production, implying that consumer demand was no longer controlling agricultural output; in 
his criticism of the Intervention Board, Neil Marten said that under a British system, 
‘[s]ensible people grow food to eat.’67 Their priority was to protect the consumer, and the 
removal of marketing boards and guarantees under EEC membership was perceived to 
remove the link between producer and consumer and introduce an element of instability.
68
 
This rhetoric was permeated with the aforementioned anti-establishment element 
found in the anti-Marketeers’ wider argument, with Heath criticised by the ADFC for being 
‘in favour of a dear food policy in the interests of a section of the community’ and looking to 
‘secure special privileges for great sectional interests.’69 Powerful farming pressure groups 
that ‘get their way over consumers and taxpayers’ would combine with the government ‘to 
make the workings of the Common Agricultural Policy even more restrictive and unjust in the 
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interests of that great sacred cow, British Agriculture.’70 Groups like the ADFC were 
therefore looking to combine together and ‘smash the highly protected vested interests of 
agriculture, industry, commerce and finance’ which had supported EEC membership and 
whom the anti-Marketeers positioned themselves against in their bid for popular support.
71
  
The image of a connection between producers and pro-Marketeers was reinforced by 
Britain in Europe’s close association with food manufacturers, after the formation of an 
umbrella lobby group of several trade organisations and an information service on food policy 
and prices.
72
 Britain in Europe responded by drawing consumers into their meetings with 
representatives of the food industry.
73
 However, the anti-Marketeers’ ‘potentially damaging 
argument’ that presented the referendum debate as the pro-Market Establishment ‘against the 
interests of “ordinary people”’ would continue to trouble BiE.74 Its initial strategy to ‘counter 
attack on prices’ in the referendum campaign displayed an awareness of the issue’s 
significance.
75
 BiE had established food, along with sovereignty, as the ‘most difficult 
themes’ of the campaign, the former being the ‘[m]ost important issue’ to ‘face up to.’76 
Aware that the anti-Market campaign’s concentration on food policy could attract more 
support from women, they produced leaflets aimed at housewives in order to develop a 
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stronger line on the issue.
77
 Similarly, both the Labour Campaign for Britain in Europe and 
the Liberal Europe Campaign targeted families in their referendum campaign literature, 
defending EEC food policy, promising a better standard of living and promoting the EEC’s 
social policy.
78
 ‘For the family’s sake’, the public were encouraged to vote Yes.79 However, 
as the campaign progressed it was felt within BiE that food prices was the strongest issue 
within the anti-Market case, and for pro-Marketeers to continue engaging and publicising it 
‘will be (and may already have been) damaging’.80 
Anti-Marketeers therefore attempted to counter pro-Market propaganda through the 
adoption of an anti-establishment line in much of their rhetoric. The ACML appealed to the 
public to place their trust in the anti-Marketeers that had ‘prophesised that food prices would 
rise and hence wages and so the cost of goods generally’, rather than the pro-Marketeers that 
had overestimated British economic performance within the EEC.
81
 Anti-Marketeers therefore 
used the issue of food policy to distance themselves from the majority of politicians who had 
voted for EEC entry and caused the increase in prices. While political parties blamed each 
other’s policies for inflation and an economic downturn, anti-Marketeers highlighted ‘their 
apparent failure to put any blame on our membership of the Common Market, as the main 
cause of inflation’, ‘a shocking admission of the conspiracy which surrounds any adverse 
points. It is about time Politicians faced up and told the people the truth.’82 Edward Heath was 
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criticised in the first years of EEC membership for having ‘forced up food prices to the 
highest levels ever known in this country’ by pushing Britain into membership.83 The ADFC 
also targeted Heath’s Bexley constituency by leafleting in the run-up to the February 1974 
election ‘so as to make his constituents aware of the forces behind the recent shocking rises in 
food prices.’84 
By 1975, this anti-establishment aspect had become more explicit, with an NRC 
research officer suggesting that the campaign’s television broadcasts ‘should continue to harp 
on food and jobs, with frequent attacks on the other side, that we are not being told the truth, 
think for yourself, commonsense etc.’85 These themes were elaborated in the suggestions for 
the broadcast on prices, with the pro-Marketeers likened to Napoleon the pig in George 
Orwell’s Animal Farm in that ‘all foods are dear, but some foods are dearer than others!’ At 
the expense of housewives, the only people who would be able to afford higher prices would 
be ‘the well-heeled city-slickers, the expense account businessment [sic] and all their 
sympathisers.... Not the ordinary people of this country.’ The other underlying theme was 
therefore to inform the public not to listen to pro-Marketeers, as ‘[t]hey are not interested in 
your welfare.’86 Anti-Marketeers thus portrayed themselves as defending the general public 
from the combined forces of the EEC, Westminster politicians and big business. However, 
this anti-establishment image would be problematic when seeking to present a respectable 
political case, as will become clear later in this chapter. 
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Furthermore, anti-Marketeers’ arguments on food prices began to weaken as the 
referendum date neared. Each organisation had focused on rising prices since the late 1960s in 
an attempt to provoke opposition on materialist and moral grounds, but by the time that the 
NRC was formed, Neil Marten was warning of changing food prices in world markets. While 
previously it had been a central argument, Marten questioned ‘how far this is genuinely still a 
very strong card to play’, and that it should be ‘played with some caution for the time 
being.’87 The fact that a greater proportion of the public attributed price rises to an increase in 
world price rises than EEC membership in a 1974 opinion poll reflected how the anti-Market 
argument had weakened in the build-up to the referendum.
88
 Julie Smith has also noted how 
the emphasis on EEC price rises came at a time of ‘profoundly altered global conditions’ 
where world food prices had risen above EEC prices.
89
 
Anti-Marketeers were thus unsure how to combat the point put forward by pro-
Marketeers that ‘[t]here is no cheap food being made in the world any more’ and that the CAP 
‘brings Britain stable supplies at reasonable prices’.90 These two points became something of 
a mantra for pro-Marketeers, with organisations keen to stress the security and stability that 
EEC food policy would bring, and reiterating that ‘the era of cheap food is over’.91 Britain’s 
position as an importer of food, combined with rising fuel costs, poor harvests and growing 
demand, meant that it would ‘be safer in the Community which is almost self-sufficient in 
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food’, and pro-EEC rhetoric therefore centred on food security, to ‘safeguard supplies’.92 The 
attempt was to create a positive image of EEC food policy, providing steady prices in times of 
uncertainty, as ‘the Common Supermarket’, with ‘[w]ell stocked shelves’, ‘[b]ulk buying 
values’, ‘[p]lenty of choice’ and ‘[f]air prices’, based ‘just around the corner.’93 
The fading of the food policy issue after the referendum also demonstrates the decline 
in its relevance in the mid-1970s. After the referendum, anti-Marketeers focused on political 
moves towards further integration in the EEC that were not sanctioned by the referendum 
result, with leading anti-Marketeers supporting the creation of a body to oppose moves 
towards a federal Europe.
94
 The aims of the new organisation were to ‘monitor Common 
Market developments, ensure that the vote was used to protect British interests, press for 
effective Parliamentary supervision of EEC laws and oppose moves towards... a Federal 
Europe.’95 Although the ADFC, which greatly declined in significance after the referendum, 
sought to continue to mobilise on food prices and campaign for a return to ‘cheap food’, it 
was an exception amongst fellow anti-Marketeers, including previous food prices campaigner 
Douglas Jay who now believed the priority was ‘to expose the damaging absurdities of the 
EEC and resist all further invasion of British liberties and independence.’96 Food prices may 
have had populist appeal, but they lacked the political currency of the ongoing argument 
regarding the loss of sovereignty, which this chapter will now assess. 
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The attempt to ‘sell’ the issue of sovereignty to the public 
Self-government and the preservation of political sovereignty became the key issue in 
the anti-Market campaign upon British entry into the EEC. Anti-Marketeers saw the ‘second 
round’, having been defeated in the battle over EEC membership, as one that would be 
‘fought between the federalists and anti-federalists’, and thus believed a campaign to ‘Speak 
up for Britain’ inside the EEC could gain the support of those who were previously pro-
Market.
97
 The “anti-federalist” line was therefore seen as a way of appealing to political 
moderates. The task for anti-Marketeers was to convey its intrinsic importance to the public 
before the referendum, and demonstrate how EEC membership and regulations had 
introduced ‘[a] lot of today’s evils’ such as VAT and the Intervention Board.98 Frere-Smith of 
Get Britain Out thus sought to use EEC regulations as a scapegoat for Britain’s domestic 
situation, suggesting that ‘[e]verything that goes wrong from now on we shall be able to 
attribute to Common Market membership’ and that it was ‘essential... that we are able to 
exploit every opportunity that arises and the opportunities will be enormous.’ Anti-Market 
groups were to be ‘well-informed on everything that is happening’, including ‘what draft 
regulations and directives, recommendations and opinions are in the pipe line in Brussels.’99  
This did not mean, however, that anti-Marketeers were to treat sovereignty as a subject 
merely for research and lobbying in order to pressurise governments and politicians. The 
campaign attempted to gain public support through the tried and tested methods of 
pamphleteering, by highlighting the threat to independent British policies posed by EEC 
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membership and providing examples of how the public were already being affected. Neil 
Marten’s pamphlet for the CMSC, “The Common Market: No Middle Way”, set out the 
federalist structure and course inherent in the EEC and the dangers of membership, claiming 
that ‘[t]he fundamental question is ‘go federal’ or ‘stay independent’ – the other questions are 
peripheral.’100 The ACML, in the run-up to the referendum, stated their belief that 
parliamentary sovereignty must be continually accentuated and that, in addition to Marten’s 
pamphlet, a more popular leaflet on sovereignty and independence would be required.
101
 Its 
contribution to targeting public support on sovereignty, “Common Market – Out!”, was a 
short leaflet highlighting the worst consequences of membership.
102
 The NRC’s publications 
also gave strong emphasis to aspects of sovereignty and independence, with one of their four 
themed leaflets and broadcasts dedicated to the issue. Their two-thousand word leaflet, 
distributed to every household, also gave ‘[e]qual emphasis’ to the issues of sovereignty and 
food prices, the two pillars of the anti-Market argument.
103
 Impetus for campaigning on 
sovereignty was not exclusive to the campaign leaders, however. Grassroots campaign 
members operating in local groups were also passionate on the issue, with a branches 
conference of the CMSC unanimously passing a resolution from the North Kent branch ‘to 
emphasise the issue of British self-government in the campaign ahead.’104 
The NRC, in considering how to broadcast the issue of sovereignty to the public, made 
it clear that it should be used as an issue underlining ‘all the points we have made on food 
prices/taxation, regional policy, trading agreements etc.’ It was made clear that the campaign 
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‘must not treat the subject in the abstract’ but rather use ‘examples that really touch the man 
in the street’.105 Anti-Market publications also often focused on issues that affected the daily 
lives of the public, including ‘such obvious targets as CAP and undemocratic legislation’.106 
By ensuring that anti-Marketeers both ‘stress the present as well as the prospective loss of 
self-government (our national sovereignty) that Common Market membership involves’, the 
campaign was able to focus on both the EEC’s federalist development and the changes it had 
already brought to the British public.
107
 The ACML’s “Common Market – Out!” leaflet thus 
focused on the introduction of EEC regulations concerning unpopular juggernaut lorries, and 
other regulations that ‘deal with our taxes, banks, motor insurance and thousands of other 
things – even what goes into our own ice-cream, sausages and “pints”...’108 The Referendum 
Before Common Market Committee also used the example of the introduction of juggernaut 
lorries as evidence of a diminished powers of both the electorate and government, reducing 
the ‘Mother of Parliaments’ to a farce.109 The EEC’s effect on British law, from ‘the kind of 
tax we pay [to] the size of lorries on our roads’, was therefore used to highlight the extent to 
which it could intrude upon the daily lives of the public.
110
 Neil Marten highlighted the 
introduction of VAT as both evidence of a move towards economic and monetary union, and 
that ‘the supremacy of Parliament is under assault’, and called for politicians ‘to assert the 
role of the Commons as guardian of popular liberties.’111 The EEC Commission proposal to 
increase the minimum driving licence age to eighteen years was also criticised by Marten due 
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to the potential bypassing of Parliament and the removal of the connection between MPs and 
the electorate. Marten called upon MPs to see EEC directives ‘not as some remote and 
complicated nonsense but as part of our own domestic law-making system. For that is what it 
is.’112 All of these examples were used, therefore, because of the perceived relevance and 
resonance amongst the public of 
the effect which people feel the Common Market will have on their lives – heavier 
and noisier lorries, food prices, increased steel prices and general interference (for 
no good purpose) in the way we do things in this country. Sacrifices to be made 
on the altar of harmonisation – standardisation of everything – proposed by non-
elected civil servants in remote Brussels – these are the things which cause 
disenchantment. [...] For the constitutionalist, it has now been demonstrated how 
far we surrendered our sovereignty...
113
 
 
Lack of resonance: a parliamentary, not public, issue 
As with food prices, sovereignty was seen by Britain in Europe as one of the more 
difficult themes to deal with, and one on which the anti-Marketeers and media would force 
them onto the back foot.
114
 However, anti-Marketeers found it difficult to put across to the 
public the loss of sovereignty that had occurred since the start of EEC membership. Neil 
Marten, the key “constitutionalist” of the anti-Market campaign, declared it ‘essential to 
define exactly what we mean by [sovereignty], e.g. the sovereign power of an independent 
Parliament and the power of the British people to govern themselves’, in order to make the 
issue best understood by the public.
115
 Christopher Frere-Smith, despite basing much of Get 
Britain Out’s campaign around the issues of national independence and self-government, even 
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went as far as to suggest the term ‘sovereignty’ should not be used at all by anti-Marketeers, 
claiming it was ‘no good talking about sovereignty except to sophisticated audiences.’116  
After the referendum result, it was claimed that Frere-Smith had criticised Marten for 
suggesting that the issues of sovereignty ‘had penetrated to the public’ during the campaign, 
believing that pro-Marketeers had helped prevent the issues getting across.
117
 
Frere-Smith’s anti-establishment character may have led him to divide public and 
parliamentary campaigns and issues in too absolute a manner, but he may have been correct in 
suggesting that the issue of sovereignty resonated more with the parliamentary rather than the 
public sphere. As noted above, opinion polls showed sovereignty had less appeal than food 
prices amongst the public, and Butler and Kitzinger stated that, in spite of the introduction of 
EEC regulations,  
...if voters did not already realise that Britain’s Common Market membership 
involved a substantial loss of sovereignty, it was not clear how at this late date the 
point could be brought home to them.
118
 
 
The lack of public interest in issues of sovereignty during this period has been noted 
elsewhere. Opinion polls showed that while a consistent majority believed Britain would have 
less say in her own affairs, a high proportion also believed Britain would be able to protect 
her interests better as an EEC member, and that the loss of sovereignty ‘was not, in practice, 
of great importance’.119 Furthermore, the Hansard Society noted that in spite of prominent 
examples of loss of sovereignty through administrative acts, the specialised impact of EEC 
legislation meant the effects went unnoticed by the majority of the public, and that the House 
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of Commons exhibited greater anxiety on the issue given the effect on its powers and 
procedures.
120
  
The difficulty of conveying the threat of a loss of sovereignty to the public was 
underlined in a discussion on the forthcoming televised NRC broadcasts. A broadcast was to 
feature Michael Foot and Enoch Powell, the campaign’s ‘two aces’, on the question of 
parliamentary sovereignty and ‘the rights of the people to decide and not the politicians.’121 
However, while programmes on subjects such as food prices were to have a ‘quick and bright’ 
style featuring numerous ‘major/minor examples of Brussels lunacy’, the sovereignty 
broadcast was perceived to be ‘in many ways the most difficult content-wise’.122 The attempt 
by constitutionalists such as Powell, Foot and Anthony Wedgwood Benn to preserve the 
traditional Westminster system, and prevent the transferral of power from the House of 
Commons, demonstrated how the issue had its roots in the Westminster paradigm, and failed 
to resonate as much with the public. For the likes of Neil Marten, and dissenting Labour 
cabinet ministers, sovereignty was the central concern, with other issues, as Marten repeatedly 
stated, ‘peripheral’.123 
The division of anti-Marketeers between the more public issue of food prices and the 
political issue of sovereignty also demonstrates the somewhat fragmented unity of the 
campaign. As Butler and Kitzinger noted, the campaign became shaped around two camps: 
those more concerned with the economic effects of membership such as food prices and 
balance of payments, including Douglas Jay and Barbara Castle, and the constitutionalists 
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such as Marten, Powell and Benn.
124
 While Jay and liberalist anti-Marketeers within the 
ADFC and the Get Britain Out campaign saw prices as a populist issue upon which to stir up 
opposition, the likes of Marten saw sovereignty as the most serious issue. Marten also 
believed it was an issue upon which a groundswell of fundamental opposition to membership 
could emerge, from the millions of ‘moderate middle of the road people who have no instinct 
for rule from Brussels’ and ‘patriotic people with a love of independent self-government.’ 
Marten believed this was the issue that made ‘Conservatives, Liberals and Labour join on the 
same platform to oppose membership’.125 However, the division between the populist and 
political themes of prices and sovereignty led to campaigning taking on something of an ad 
hoc, disunited character. This division of the public and political was reflected in the character 
of the different anti-Market groups and the personnel within the anti-Market campaign, which 
this chapter will now analyse.  
Character and tactics of the anti-Market referendum campaign 
The confused position of the anti-Market organisations between the spheres of politics 
and protest was reinforced by their composition and their rhetoric. On the one hand, anti-
Market groups in this period, both before and during the referendum, approached anti-Market 
MPs in Parliament for support and political influence. The CMSC, with parliamentarians such 
as Jay and Marten occupying prominent positions, took the initiative in forming the NRC. 
This umbrella movement needed an image of respectability and unity in order to court the 
media and receive favourable coverage. The establishment respectability of its opposite 
number, Britain in Europe, reinforced the need to appear as politically moderate and 
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respectable. Yet at the same time, anti-Marketeers had presented themselves as anti-
establishment demagogues, and anti-statist and “anti-political” tendencies tended to colour 
their rhetoric.
126
 The tensions between organisations with more political aims, such as the 
CMSC and the ACML, and those with more of an anti-establishment ideology such as Get 
Britain Out and the ADFC, reinforced the disunited image of the anti-Market referendum 
campaign. 
Political “respectability”: anti-Market groups seeking political support 
Anti-Market organisations that coveted political influence, such as the ACML and the 
CMSC, actively sought the support of MPs. In 1973, in an attempt to revitalise itself after 
failing to prevent British EEC entry, the ACML courted controversial Conservative MP 
Enoch Powell, who had been an opponent of British membership since the late 1960s. The 
Executive Committee offered Powell a position as the League’s Vice-President, and also 
wished to publish one of his recent speeches as a leaflet.
127
 However, despite Powell co-
operating with the League in certain areas, including the anti-Market bookstore hired for the 
duration of the Blackpool Party Conferences, Powell declined both the position and an 
invitation to speak at a meeting.
128
 While few Conservative MPs had been willing to vote 
against their party on the European Communities Bill in Parliament, even fewer were willing 
to play an active role in anti-Market organisations.
129
 In the hope of mobilising more 
Conservative opposition in the build-up to the referendum campaign, other Conservative MPs 
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were approached, but John Biffen and Roger Moate, who were consecutively asked to join the 
Committee, both declined.
130
 Ronald Bell eventually accepted a position on the Executive 
Committee but failed to attend any of its meetings before resigning around six months later.
131
 
Bell, alongside Conservative colleague Hugh Simmonds, launched the fairly insignificant 
Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome as a successor to the Conservative Anti-Common 
Market Information Service in March 1975, which may explain his absence from the 
League’s Committee meetings.  
The CMSC encountered a similar problem in finding more Conservative MPs to join 
its Committee, with Marten asked to find a parliamentary colleague to join himself, Jay, and 
Sir Robin Williams at the launch of his “Common Market – No Middle Way” pamphlet.132 In 
addition to this, Jay’s initiative inviting a number of Labour MPs to become Patrons of the 
CMSC demonstrates how the Campaign sought political influence and prestige on a cross-
party basis.
133
However, the CMSC, with the largest amount of political support on its 
Executive Committee, appeared as the most moderate and respectable of the anti-Market 
organisations. In a draft letter in 1973 appealing to the government for funding on the same 
basis as the European Movement, the organisation’s more moderate aims aside from 
withdrawal, such as ‘protect[ing] vital British interests against interference from Brussels’, 
were emphasised.
134
 Perhaps as a result of this moderate reference to “safeguards” in its title, 
the Campaign had, in the words of political journalist David Watt, ‘the political names’, 
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headed by ‘leading light’ Douglas Jay, and assumed the de facto leadership of the anti-Market 
campaign.
135
 Jay and Frere-Smith became Vice-Chairmen of the NRC, but in his role as 
Chairman, Neil Marten was described by the ACML as being ‘spokesman for all of us with 
the Government... and with the BBC and ITV’.136 Butler and Kitzinger also emphasised 
Marten’s respectability as ‘an agreeable, respected person’ who, though ‘not a high flyer 
among parliamentarians... had a certain influence as a straightforward and moderate 
person.’137 
Leading anti-Marketeers desired this image of respectability to run through the NRC. 
Subsequently, a formula was devised whereby affiliation with the NRC would be limited to 
‘anyone who was primarily concerned with opposing membership of the Common Market’. 
As a result, extremist groups such as the National Front and minor political parties could be 
excluded, although the Scottish Nationalist Party, the Ulster Unionists and Plaid Cymru 
would all later be affiliated.
138
 This led to the refusal to accept the affiliation of the 
Conservative Trident Group, a right-wing rival to the party’s Monday Club, and the British 
League of Rights, a right-wing civil liberties group described as ‘anti-semitic and white 
supremacist’, which was only allowed to send an observer.139 The question of the affiliation 
of the National Council for Anti Common Market Organisations proved more problematic. It 
was viewed with suspicion upon founding itself as a rival organisation to existing anti-Market 
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groups in May 1973, acting as an umbrella for a number of local groups.
140
 Suspected of 
‘being embarrassingly right-wing’, its leader Air-Vice Marshal Don Bennett was described by 
one newspaper report as being ‘the durable eccentric who tried for years to mobilise a 
political movement [the Political Freedom Movement] from Blackbushe Airport.’141 While 
leading anti-Marketeers wished to include the National Council within the NRC, they 
believed that some of their groups were largely comprised of National Front members, 
although Bennett denied this when Jay put it to him at a CMSC committee meeting.
142
 Anti-
Marketeers thus had to find the right balance between a mass campaign and a “pressure 
group” image of respectability and prestige. 
NRC’s media campaign 
The need to court the media during the referendum campaign was another key reason 
for the formation of the NRC. Originally stressed by the National Council in a motion at the 
CMSC’s Branches Conference, the issue of fair media treatment was taken up by Jay and 
Marten, the two leading politicians in the anti-Market campaign.
143
 In what Butler and 
Kitzinger described as ‘pre-emptive strikes’, Jay exchanged letters with Harold Wilson over 
the issue of equal media coverage and released the letters to press conferences, while Neil 
Marten contacted figures in the media.
144
 It has even been argued that the anti-Marketeers’ 
obsession over media balance meant they elevated it ‘virtually into a campaign issue in 
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itself’.145 In an exchange with Chairman of the BBC Sir Michael Swann, Marten spoke of the 
plans to form an umbrella movement which would ‘act as a focal point’ for providing 
speakers to the media, thus avoiding situations where ‘a pro-Common Market producer could 
invite an unattractive dunderhead to put the anti-Market case’.146 Anti-Marketeers’ 
recommendations of finding a respected ‘director’ figure ‘to represent the campaign to the 
media’ – following the success achieved by the likes of Shelter and its media-savvy director 
Des Wilson in the late 1960s – and of excluding extremists from the Communist Party and 
National Front, accentuated the desire for unity and respectability.
147
 The NRC was thus 
formed as a respected co-ordinating committee ‘to be the focal point of any conversations 
which might be needed on the anti-Market side with the Government or the media.’148 
Good media relations, and presenting a respectable image to the media, were therefore 
central to the anti-Market campaign. Having had some limited success in attaining publicity 
for the anti-Market cause on television, the CMSC was aware that the referendum’s 
battleground would be on television and radio and in the press, as they had been in the 
Norwegian referendum.
149
 After the launch of the NRC, the anti-Market campaign received 
television features on programmes such as Midweek, Panorama and The Westminster 
Programme.
150
 Figures from the NRC also continued to meet with the BBC and Independent 
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Television Authority to ensure fair broadcasting.
151
 With this increased media presence, anti-
Marketeers deemed it ‘essential that a united front was presented to the media’.152 
Furthermore, strong emphasis was placed on the importance of a clean campaign, given the 
controversialist nature of some of the campaign’s figures. Marten was a particular advocate of 
this. Warning that the pro-Market campaign would try and discredit the anti-Marketeers and 
‘play it dirty’, Marten recommended the antis ‘expose these tactics but remain absolutely 
clean ourselves.’153 At the launch of the NRC, Marten pledged to ‘use such influence as I 
have to encourage a fair debate’ and that there would ‘be no repetition of some of the 
nastiness which occurred in the great debate of 1971/72.’154 Emphasis was therefore laid on 
fighting ‘a clean campaign’ with ‘arguments... based on reality’, and even the more 
confrontational Get Britain Out encouraged its supporters to promote the ‘respectable case’ 
against membership.
155
 
Despite endeavouring to present a respectable, united front to the media, attempts to 
use the media to further the anti-Market campaign had disappointing results. David Watt 
attributed this to the NRC’s ‘arthritic character’ and old-fashioned approach. Watt questioned 
the decision to attribute so much money on leaflets and advertisements rather than the 
televised broadcasts, and blamed it on the ‘decidedly old-fashioned’ leadership.156 By 
contrast, it was reported that Britain in Europe had spent £100,000 on the television and radio 
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broadcasts for the referendum compared to £3,000 spent by the NRC, and commented on the 
‘professionalism’ and ‘domination’ of the advertising experts in the pro-Market campaign.157 
The employment of film director Charles Guggenheim led to Britain in Europe producing 
what its President Roy Jenkins described as ‘rapid-paced, confrontation-situation, attention-
gripping’ programmes.158 The NRC attempted to produce more professional and persuasive 
pieces by employing journalists such as Patrick Cosgrave as presenters, but opinion polls 
showed their programmes to be failures.
159
 Watt attributed this media failure to a lack of 
‘willingness to draw in professionals’ and a preference to draw ‘analogies with the past – 
pamphlets which few people read, Press advertisements to counteract the bias of Press 
‘barons’, and a contempt for the new media.’160 Parallels drawn with S.W. Alexander’s Anti-
Dear Food League of the 1950s and the League of Nations Union’s Peace Pledge Ballot 
confirm this old-fashioned approach, but also confirm the anti-Market campaign’s position of 
attempting to apply political pressure in Parliament through mass mobilisation and protest. 
Countering the establishment-backed Britain in Europe 
The NRC was also compelled to appear respectable due to the esteemed position of 
those involved with Britain in Europe. With the group ‘led by such respected moderates as 
Jenkins and Heath’, the anti-Marketeers needed to emphasise its political nature.161 However, 
while anti-Market organisations sought the support of MPs, pro-Market organisations began 
to look outside of the political sphere. In preparation for a referendum, Director of the British 
Council of the European Movement, Ernest Wistrich, targeted ‘opinion-forming support 
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through the spectrum of British society’. Aware that voters would receive conflicting advice 
from politicians, he believed they would ‘look to opinion leaders of interest groups with 
which they are associated or whose views they respect’.162 After assessing recent opinion 
polls, Wistrich concluded that politicians were distrusted on the issue of EEC membership 
and that the pro-Market campaign should therefore recruit ‘national and local personalities 
outside the political sphere’.163 The re-launch of Britain in Europe was thus a way of shifting 
the task from the European Movement which was seen as ‘being much too clearly a politically 
motivated organisation’.164 This was followed up by the creation of the Council for Britain in 
Europe, which drew around 130 prominent persons from a number of targeted fields such as 
art, music, literature, sport and religion.
165
 The strategy of the British Council of the European 
Movement and Britain in Europe was therefore a ‘strategy of many voices’ and ‘organised 
diversity’, as a way of avoiding being too tied in with the political establishment.166 
Perhaps in response to this, anti-Marketeers wished to make it clear at the launch of 
the NRC that it had the support of ‘all sections of the community’, and proposed to appoint 
Vice-Presidents drawn from these sections.
167
 The Get Britain Out Campaign also sought 
support from outside of politics, with writer Kingsley Amis a signatory to their 1974 
manifesto, and theatre critic Kenneth Tynan and screenwriter Johnny Speight appearing 
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alongside political anti-Market figures at one of its press conferences.
168
 Amis had also 
previously been made a patron of the CMSC alongside fellow writers J.B. Priestley, John 
Osborne and Robert Conquest.
169
 However, the involvement of these personalities could not 
disguise the fact that the anti-Market campaign was led by controversial politicians, taken 
from the extremist wings of the Labour and Conservative parties. It was for this reason that 
Britain in Europe employed a strategy of engaging with anti-Marketeers who were ‘unpopular 
figures in the general public’, such as trade union leaders Jack Jones, Hugh Scanlon and Clive 
Jenkins.
170
 Throughout the referendum campaign, on the assumption that one of the best pro-
Market themes would be to tell the public to ‘Look who’s against us’, Britain in Europe thus 
sought to attempt to discredit the anti-Marketeers and demonstrate that they were disunited.
171
 
It was perhaps because of the conclusion amongst anti-Marketeers that ‘issues have tended to 
be eclipsed by personalities’ that the anti-Market campaign sought to include figures from 
outside the political sphere.
172
 
Inability to broaden the political support base 
Failure to broaden the anti-Market network and increase support by working with 
other pressure groups and non-governmental organisations was a major flaw in the 
referendum campaign. While anti-Market groups drew closer and liaised together in the early 
1970s under the CMSC umbrella, and during the referendum campaign under the NRC, it was 
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unable to form alliances with other groups which did not have withdrawal from the EEC as an 
objective. Christopher Frere-Smith highlighted the importance of drawing in other 
organisations to campaign on particular issues as early as 1973 when he stated that for single-
issue campaigns, 
...it really is essential that we are able to bring in the outside bodies who are 
concerned with that particular issue e.g. child poverty action, World Development 
Group [sic], Transport and General Workers Union, etc.
173
 
 
Attempts were made to bring in other organisations, particularly on the issue of food policy 
and rising prices. Renee Short, Labour MP and CMSC member, sought to organise a 
campaign on food prices directed at women’s organisations, initially contacting Women 
Against the Common Market to persuade them to launch a nationwide campaign. However, as 
Women Against the Common Market lacked the resources for such a campaign, a letter was 
sent to 118 women’s organisations, to which only four responded.174 Similarly, attempts to 
persuade the Consumers’ Association to work with anti-Marketeers failed, the organisation 
recommending a Yes vote in the referendum.
175
 The difficulty, according to Butler and 
Kitzinger, was that with groups such as the Consumers’ Association and National Farmers 
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Union in favour of entry, ‘the voice of large interest groups, apart from the trade unions, was 
heard almost entirely on the pro-Market side.’176 
This problem extended beyond interest groups, however. Despite all the hand-
wringing within anti-Market rhetoric about the Intervention Board and the destruction of food, 
the campaign was unable to gain the support of humanitarian organisations. These 
organisations were certainly aware of the details of EEC food policies, Marten quoting 
Oxfam’s estimate that the £197 million spent in 1973 on making food unsustainable ‘would 
feed 6.5 million starving children for a year’ at a press conference during the referendum.177 
The ACML also ordered ten thousand leaflets on Commonwealth sugar from the World 
Development Movement for distribution amongst supporters.
178
 However, during the 
referendum campaign the World Development Movement was careful not to fall on a 
particular side, its priorities being to ensure access to Commonwealth markets and to prevent 
the exploitation of third world producers.
179
 The complex and politicised issue of EEC 
membership, and the anti-Marketeers’ campaign for outright withdrawal, led to many NGOs 
who may have collaborated in Frere-Smith’s aforementioned ‘“one issue” campaigns’ on 
particular subjects wishing to avoid working too closely with the anti-Market campaign on the 
wider issue of withdrawal.
180
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Anti-political/anti-establishment character and rhetoric 
However, the risk was that the unity of extremist, anti-establishment politicians with 
figures from outside of politics could give the anti-Market campaign an “anti-political” edge 
that would alienate support from the wider population. In their analysis of the referendum, 
Butler and Kitzinger play down the prominence of anti-establishment rhetoric within the anti-
Market campaign. Although identifying Get Britain Out as ‘in some degree an anti-political 
movement’ and that its Chairman Christopher Frere-Smith wished the campaign to be ‘much 
more bitter with a strong anti-establishment and anti-party character’, they claim that this was 
nullified by the political influence of the likes of Marten and Jay.
181
 As a result, the anti-
establishment theme that had been prominent in the Norwegian referendum ‘drew less 
attention than expected’.182 However, as demonstrated above in relation to the populist issue 
of food prices, the “anti-establishment card” was often used to separate the anti-Market 
campaign from the elite-backed pro-Marketeers. This tension between respectability and anti-
establishment populism, and between politicians and campaigners, would be ongoing and 
troublesome for the anti-Market campaign. 
Get Britain Out’s referendum campaign, with its large number of regional and 
constituency groups seeking to mobilise local support, was further removed from traditional 
party politics than organisations that tended to mobilise on a national basis. Furthermore, the 
organisation was influenced by the temperament of Frere-Smith, who was ‘erratic’ in his 
attendance of NRC meetings and was behind Get Britain Out’s ‘tendency to go it alone’.183 
Frere-Smith confessed to a ‘distaste for... politicians’ way of life’, and Get Britain Out’s 
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rhetoric subsequently portrayed the organisation as an underdog and outsider against the well-
funded, politically-backed pro-Market campaign.
184
 Advertisements warned against the 
‘money and power-mad politicians’ on the other side, and press releases spoke of the 
‘enormous disparity of resources’ between the pro- and anti-Market campaigns, with the 
former being supported by ‘the leading moneybags in the country’ and the media.185 
Referendum campaign leaflets set the public against ‘the press bosses and the establishment 
politicians’, as well as the ‘politician seeking to strut on a bigger stage’, the ‘big City 
operator’ and the ‘big land-owner’ that would gain from British entry.186 Get Britain Out thus 
spoke of the ‘falling respect for Parliament and contempt for politicians’ in Britain, and 
sought to mobilise the public against ‘the politicians of this Country who have identified their 
own failures as the failures of the British people’.187 
Furthermore, Get Britain Out wished to protect the public from centralisation within 
politics and business, and the organisation accordingly set itself out as protecting the 
population from the power of the establishment. Frere-Smith, formerly a Secretary of the 
Cambridge University Liberal Club and ‘by conviction a free-trading Liberal’, was pivotal to 
continuing the liberalist ethos of Keep Britain Out founders Oliver Smedley and S.W. 
Alexander in the fight against centralisation of political power.
188
 Frere-Smith was influenced 
by the contemporary works of Ernst Schumacher, who called for smaller and decentralised 
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political and economic institutions under the ‘Small Is Beautiful’ motto, in the same way that 
antecedents such as the British Housewives’ League or the Society for Individual Freedom 
were influenced by the anti-statist, neo-liberalist works of Friedrich von Hayek.
189
 Get Britain 
Out, in claiming that ‘[t]he idea that bigger is better in politics is highly suspect’, argued that 
EEC membership, rather than bringing government closer to the people, would mean 
‘gigantic steps in the opposite direction, making the centres of power more remote, less 
representative and more inhuman.’190 Frere-Smith labelled this pro-Market philosophy as ‘the 
“big is best” school’. Using the example of the merger of car manufacturers to create ‘the 
appalling situation’ at British Leyland, he warned of the economic consequences of this 
philosophy, and likened political centralisation to a ‘1984 vision’.191 
While Get Britain Out fought ‘guerrilla warfare against the entrenched armies of the 
establishment’, other organisations in the anti-Market campaign had a similarly anti-political 
character.
192
 The ADFC had an anti-establishment tone to much of its rhetoric. Its 
aforementioned “Manifesto for Survival”, in which it set out liberalist, free-trade solutions to 
the British economic crisis, contained scathing criticism of ‘the conventional politicians of left 
and right’ who were leading the country deeper into disaster.193 The speeches of Chairman 
Oliver Smedley also distanced the ADFC from parliamentary politics. Smedley claimed that 
the country had become divided between ‘the real and the unreal’, and ‘the new and the out-
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of-date’. There had been ‘no differences’ between Labour and Conservative policies when in 
power, with each government ‘progressively worse than its predecessor’, while Liberal 
policies had led him to perceive ‘the whole of politics [as] out-of-date and irrelevant’. 
Smedley thus saw his organisation as part of ‘those who stand on the side-lines wanting to 
help whomsoever has the courage to emerge as leader of the political realists’.194 
The ADFC used the discourse of crisis and criticism of consensus politics to call for a 
new leader from outside of the political establishment. It was concerned at the prospect of a 
political revolution, urging the government introduced deflationary policies before the public 
‘start looking for a British ‘strong man’ to take over and save them from starvation.’195 As a 
result it listed Enoch Powell and Michael Foot as among the “constitutionalists” who could 
lead a democratic revolution, and called for a new party ‘united in its determination to restore 
Britain’s independence from rule by the Brussels bureaucracy and willing to smash the highly 
protected vested interests of agriculture, industry, commerce and finance...’196 This was 
another example of the anti-Market campaign positioning itself in direct opposition to the 
wealth and power of the pro-Market political and economic establishment. 
The National Council of Anti-Common Market Organisations was similar to Get 
Britain Out in its operation via local grassroots mobilisation, in its use of fly-posting, and also 
in that it distanced itself from the involvement of politicians in the campaign. The debate over 
whether MPs should serve on the successor organisation to the NRC illustrates the politician-
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campaigner divide. The Council believed that MPs, having to balance their work in the new 
umbrella organisation with their own position in their political parties, would ‘dampen down 
the activities of other members’.197 Audrey O’Reilly of the National Council stated that, while 
‘not insensitive to the most difficult position in which some Members of Parliament have 
found themselves’, 
…many people at the grass roots have made considerable sacrifices no less 
important to them. Naturally, those in the public eye are more conspicious [sic] 
in their efforts, and their actions are carefully watched by the public and the pro-
Marketeers alike. Because of this it is within their power to do much good and 
greatly enhance the cause, or by the same token do much harm, and perhaps cause 
us to loose [sic] battles.
198
 
 
While some in the National Council believed that MPs, although they ‘have not been much 
help in the past’, should be included in the successor organisation, the majority appeared to 
believe it ‘unwise and unfair to ask MPs to stand for this body’.199 It was between these anti-
political organisations and their more ‘respectable’ associates that a divide emerged within the 
referendum campaign, between those who believed the campaign had been ‘insufficiently 
militant’ and those who believed it had been ‘too militant’ and ‘had frightened Conservatives 
into a “yes” vote’.200 
The division between the more political and more protest-oriented groups within the 
anti-Market campaign is also reflected by their tactics in this period, particularly in their 
disagreements regarding mass meetings after British entry into the EEC. Those publicity-
seeking organisations which consisted of more agitational activists, such as Keep Britain Out, 
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were particularly committed to holding mass meetings and public demonstrations.
201
 Keep 
Britain Out held several demonstrations to coincide with official events such as the Fanfare 
for Europe and the Congress for Europe, aiming to embarrass the pro-Marketeers with its 
presence.
202
 Similarly, Air Vice-Marshal Don Bennett of the National Council for Anti-
Common Market Organisations organised mass meetings such as torch-lit processions, and a 
local ACML group associated with the Council affirmed that ‘[t]hese mass meetings do have 
an effect on the Government… in spite of what you privately may think.’203 
However, attitudes towards holding mass meetings changed after an unsuccessful 
united rally held at Central Hall in Westminster in November 1973.
204
 Despite the rally being 
open to supporters of all major anti-Market groups and all Resistance News subscribers, with 
a panel including Douglas Jay, John Biffen, Michael Foot and Sir John Winnifrith, the rally’s 
attendance had been ‘disappointing’ and the expenditure very high.205 The meeting also 
contributed to a rift between the CMSC and the ACML on one side and Keep Britain Out and 
the National Council on the other, the latter two organisations having failed to contribute to 
the costs of the rally.
206
 After the failure of the meeting, the CMSC agreed to hold no more 
                                                          
201
 The word ‘agitational’ was used to describe the character of Keep Britain Out in the Britain and Europe since 
1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources; Butler and Kitzinger also refer to KBO ‘attracting 
some publicity to itself in the late 1960s and early 1970s’, The 1975 Referendum, p.98 
202
 Letter from Frere-Smith to KBO supporters, inviting them to demonstration at Fanfare for Europe’s vintage 
car rally on 6 January 1973 [n.d.], CIB/10/2, BLPES; Letter from Frere-Smith to KBO supporters, inviting them 
to demonstration at Guildhall in London  coinciding with Congress for Europe meeting on 11 May 1973, 4 May 
1973, CIB/10/2, BLPES 
203
 Newsletter of Folkestone & District Anti-Common Market Group, 30 December 1973, CIB/7/16, BLPES 
204
 The meeting was held under the auspices of CMSC, but was jointly sponsored by the ACML, KBO, British 
Business for World Markets and the National Council for Anti-Common Market Organisations [NCACMO]: 
flyer for “Common Market: The Great Mistake” meeting on 10 November 1973 [n.d.], CIB/1/3, BLPES 
205
 Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 20 September 1973, CIB/1/3, BLPES ; Minutes of a 
meeting of ACML Executive Committee, 26 November 1973, CIB/7/4, BLPES 
206
 Minutes of a meeting of CMSC Executive Committee, 20 November 1973, CIB/1/3, BLPES. In Keep Britain 
Out’s case this may have been a reaction to another dispute over the failure of the ACML to provide a promised 
contribution to the rent of an anti-Market bookshop set up by Keep Britain Out and Enoch Powell during the 
Labour and Conservative party conferences in Blackpool.  This dispute led to the resignation of Frere-Smith 
from CMSC’s Executive Committee: Letter from Christopher Frere-Smith to Sir Robin Williams, 28 September 
 212 
 
large meetings in London but instead to provide speakers and literature for local meetings, 
which ‘were cheaper to run and had impact’.207 Its view that ‘this was not the time for 
demonstrations but to gather strength, build up finances and local organisations’ was at odds 
with more demonstrative groups like GBO.
208
 It was not until the launch of the referendum 
campaign in 1975 that large public meetings were held by anti-Market organisations again, 
although, in the case of the CMSC meeting held at Conway Hall in London in April 1975 
which was interrupted by National Front supporters, these still proved problematic.
209
 
Conclusions 
After the commencement of EEC membership, anti-Market groups continued to 
occupy a space in the confused middle ground between spheres of protest and politics. 
Political but lacking in political influence, and populist but unable to mobilise mass support 
against entry, this tension between seeking the respectable political route and trying to inspire 
a mass campaign of an anti-establishment character was causing the anti-Market campaign to 
falter. The changes in circumstances in this period, with the arena for mobilisation shifting 
from parliamentary politics to public debate with the announcement of the referendum, meant 
that anti-Market groups needed to adopt flexible strategies. However, divisions over the aims, 
rhetoric and identity of the campaign limited its appeal. As a result, the NRC would neither 
develop into a more “insider” organisation in which the public could instil trust, or a “popular 
front” style campaign encouraging a groundswell of opposition to EEC membership.  
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The dispute over whether to make food prices or sovereignty its central argument 
reflected a wider rift, of whether to present the anti-Market message to the wider public more 
directly or whether to acquire greater political influence through which to gain support. The 
issue of food prices was a key issue during the economic recession, and attributing rising 
prices to EEC membership was central to the anti-Market case. Furthermore, it was a populist 
issue capable of attracting cross-party support, targeting those most seriously affected by price 
rises and playing on more middle-class concerns regarding quality and provenance of 
foodstuffs. However, the anti-Market case was neutered by the rise in world food prices, and 
by the strategy of BiE to focus on long-term economic prospects and the economic impact of 
leaving the EEC during the recession.
210
 Furthermore, the NRC’s broad appeal to the 
consumer often spilled into anti-producer, anti-establishment rhetoric, with the potential to 
alienate political support.
211
 
The issue of sovereignty, by contrast, was a subject of political interest and scrutiny, 
but issues such as the size of lorries and the profligacy of the Intervention Board failed to 
conjure strong public opposition. According to the Hansard Society while pro-Marketeers had 
neglected the sovereignty issue, ‘neither the general public, nor constitutional and political 
experts, really have so much faith in traditional concepts like the sovereignty of Parliament as 
most opponents of membership have claimed’.212 Post-mortems of the referendum differed 
over which argument should have been made more prominent, but one observation that the 
‘central message [had] been far too diffuse’, and that the diversity of organisations and 
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literature was equivalent to ‘twenty kinds of bullet for the same gun’, summed up the disunity 
of the campaign.
213
 Jay’s recollection of the campaign was that anti-Marketeers being divided 
over the most significant and resonant issue, combined with the ‘spontaneous gathering of all 
sorts of clans’ that made up the NRC, meant that ‘the propaganda impact was probably 
dispersed and weakened.’214  
The National Referendum Campaign name itself was an extremely broad title in order 
to accommodate the ‘uneasy amalgam of groups’ and figures within it.215 Believed to have 
been proposed as a compromise by the trade unionist Jack Jones, Butler and Kitzinger 
claimed the title had a ‘neutral sound... for internal harmony – but it did not indicate where its 
members stood on the issue at stake.’216 As a co-ordinating body, it was to be a focal point for 
the media, and sought to present a persuasive and respectable anti-Market case. Furthermore, 
it was to be a ‘focal point for co-ordinating action’, to ‘help co-ordinate and liaise with all the 
various organisations which oppose membership of the Common Market’ and to assist local 
groups with speakers and propaganda, without superseding constituent organisations.
217
 It 
therefore delegated between the different strands of the campaign. Just as before the 
referendum CMSC and ACML allocated leaflets to be drafted by particular people depending 
on their politics and expertise, the NRC assigned different people to publish pamphlets on the 
key issues of food prices, trade, sovereignty and alternatives to membership.
218
 Its televised 
broadcasts were also allocated individual themes of food and prices, sovereignty and regional 
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issues, each drawing on the expertise of different personnel.
219
 Frere-Smith continued to 
assert the importance of organisations and personalities working at arm’s length from each 
other, and that the NRC should not take on ‘an executive role.’ In terms of administration, he 
stated ‘that organisation of events must be left to bodies which are represented on NRC’, and 
that the Campaign should ignore ‘territorial prerogatives’ but work to each constituent 
organisation’s strengths.220However, by allowing a loose unity under the NRC banner and 
allowing groups to ‘plough their own furrow’, an uneasy alliance was formed between 
politicians and figures with a more anti-establishment character.
221
 Having the NRC liaise and 
oversee the existing organisations who continued to work separately, although in 
collaboration with each other, was a means of preventing a full federation of anti-Marketeers 
which may have led to infighting regarding the issues, tactics, and politics of the referendum 
campaign. This was at the expense of a fully-organised strategy, with Butler and Kitzinger 
claiming NRC’s Executive got ‘bogged down in administrative matters’.222 Frere-Smith’s 
suggestion of establishing ‘an ad hoc body of not more than half a dozen people [to] meet 
frequently to discuss strategy and tactics’ seemed to be adopted with the formation of the ‘O’ 
Group, but in terms of the issues of campaigning, even this group could only seem to find the 
consensus to ‘expound the general theme’ on which the broadcasts should be based around 
and on which the campaign should proceed.
223
 This image of fragmented unity, and rather 
loose and expedient alliance of anti-Marketeers, limited its appeal throughout the referendum 
campaign. 
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This tension between the more political and populist strands in the anti-Market 
campaign gave it a schizophrenic image. On the one hand, anti-Market groups sought political 
support from MPs, particularly after the start of British EEC membership in the hope of 
reviving the campaign. The NRC also sought to eliminate extremist support and present a 
respectable case in the media, and political personalities such as Marten and Jay were at the 
forefront. However, up against the wide-reaching, establishment-backed support of BiE, the 
NRC, by incorporating organisations solely focused on opposing EEC entry, failed to make 
connections with social, economic or humanitarian NGOs. Faced with this elite-backed 
opposition, the anti-political and anti-establishment wing of the campaign was keen to portray 
anti-Marketeers as underdogs – which, given the financial disparity between pro- and anti-
Market campaigns, they were. However, playing the anti-establishment card sat uneasily with 
attempts to court the media, ensure fair coverage and to professionalise the campaign’s 
operations more generally. NRC’s government-funded two-thousand word leaflet, sent to 
every home in Britain, also sought to ‘appeal to the anti-establishment view by suggesting 
that a “No” vote provides the unique opportunity to vote against the leaders of all the main 
political parties’, despite the political names fronting the Campaign.224 
This demonstrates the inherent difficulty that anti-Market organisations of appearing 
non-political while campaigning on an inherently political subject. Formed due to the lack of 
political access on the EEC membership issue, anti-Market groups publicly appeared to 
largely eschew the institutional political route, yet still lobbied for political influence in the 
hope of achieving success within Parliament as, until the announcement of the referendum, 
leaving the EEC would be a political decision. This highlights the contradiction within the 
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aims of anti-Market groups who proclaimed themselves to be ‘non-political, the only aim 
being to get Britain out of the Common Market.’225 In another example, a local ACML group 
had mixed messages on EEC membership and the inflationary crisis. Its public message was 
to accuse political parties of a ‘failure to attack the real cause’ of inflation, which was 
portrayed as ‘a shocking admission of the conspiracy which surrounds any adverse points’, 
and the group proclaimed it ‘about time Politicians faced up and told people the truth.’226 This 
anti-political public message sat uneasily, however, with private tactics ‘to hold as many 
meetings as possible throughout the Country enlisting the support of prominent Anti Common 
Market MPs from both the main political parties’.227 
The anti-Market campaign therefore remained caught between the realms of 
parliamentary politics and mass protest, but unable to make a significant impact in either 
sphere. The campaign was, however, beginning to show signs of professionalisation and 
develop a more “insider” strategy in this period. Central to this was an increased awareness of 
the importance of the use of the media, and the attempt to draw in more political personnel 
and a respected campaign director. Despite these attempts, however, the campaign would 
continue to lack both the professional expertise and dynamism to enable its transformation 
into a high-profile movement. The search for a campaign director was unsuccessful and 
frustrating, reflected in Ronald Bell’s comment that ‘[t]his leadership business is the devil’.228 
No figure could be found from outside the campaign that could dynamically promote and 
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revitalise it whilst still commanding a degree of political respectability or prestige. Keith 
Joseph, co-founder of the Centre for Policy Studies, was one suggestion, but it was doubted 
whether he had the necessary ‘fighting spirit’ and was ‘a doubtful quantity on the Market’ – a 
sign that there was an inherent reluctance to relinquish control to an external figure.
229
 
After the referendum, the campaign’s development was further oriented towards a 
professionalised, political organisation seeking “insider” status, as the next chapter will 
demonstrate. The Safeguard Britain Campaign, launched in 1976 as an umbrella organisation 
for the remaining anti-Market organisations, showed a focused set of aims and a general unity 
that had been lacking between the start of EEC membership and the referendum. It targeted 
the support of sympathetic politicians, but also a more moderate support base who may have 
been deterred by the NRC’s extremist tendencies from voting against EEC membership. The 
aims and personnel of the new organisation both tended towards the political side of 
campaigning. Neil Marten identified after the referendum defeat that for future attempts to get 
Britain out of the EEC, ‘[the] possibilities centre on Parliament rather than non-Parliamentary 
organisations.’ Therefore, while maintaining pressure on MPs through non-party 
organisations, Marten advocated a combined organisation with a research team to monitor 
events. The aim was therefore now to block moves towards federalism in Parliament, and 
increase support inside and outside Parliament.
230
 Other anti-Marketeers shared the belief that 
Parliament should be targeted, with the organisation developing ‘particularly close liaison 
with those MPs who are interested in our cause as it is in Parliament rather than the country 
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where the next hurdles will be.’231 An article by The Economist reporting on the launch of the 
campaign, with aims ‘to combat European federalism and stop progress to direct elections to 
the European Parliament’, noted that it had ‘inherited some of the NRC’s staff and even some 
of its cash’, and was ‘made up of the stock list of known and militant antis’, including the 
likes of Jay, Powell and Marten.
232
 The chapter will show, however, that the conflict between 
the political and the popular manifestations of anti-Market campaigning would continue to 
hinder its development, and that it could not achieve either significant political influence or 
public prominence. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE ‘DILEMMA OF POLITICS’1: THE ANTI-EEC CAMPAIGN 
AND THE FAÇADE OF SCEPTICISM, 1975-1986 
 
The National Referendum Campaign dissolved weeks after the comprehensive defeat 
of the ‘No’ campaign which it spearheaded, with only a few thousand pounds remaining in its 
accounts.
2
 Its component organisations such as the CMSC and the ACML remained in 
existence, but a successor umbrella organisation was needed to unite the disparate strands of 
anti-EEC activism. Leading anti-Marketeers were thus left in a position where they wished to 
continue a vigilant campaign against the EEC’s encroachments upon British politics, industry, 
society and identity, while simultaneously accepting the verdict of the British public in the 
referendum and, at least for the time being, accepting EEC membership as a given. A 
conference was held at Central Hall in Westminster on 27 September 1975, to which 
representatives of all national and local anti-Market groups of all affiliations were invited to 
discuss proposals for the future and the creation of an organisation with the support of all 
major anti-Market organisations.
3
 The conference approved of a unified body to oversee the 
anti-EEC campaign, and delegates stressed the organisation should seek to defend British 
interests and guard against EEC developments and progress towards federalism.
4
 The 
Safeguard Britain Campaign [SBC], which would change its name to the British Anti-
Common Market Campaign [BACMC] in early 1982, was formed in February 1976 from the 
discussions that followed. The organisation was in some ways a successor to the CMSC that 
used the same headquarters in Fulham, and which fully merged itself within SBC within a few 
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months, yet the presence of representatives from the Anti-Common Market League, Anti Dear 
Food Campaign, Women Against the Common Market and other party-based organisations on 
SBC’s National Committee presented a broader cross-section of support than any pre-
referendum organisation.
5
 
The decade following SBC’s formation would certainly have justified its continuing 
role to its founders. Successive governments after the referendum took a cautious, 
instrumental approach to European integration, promoting a particularly British vision of how 
the EEC should develop, based around free movement of goods and services, 
intergovernmental co-operation over supranational decision-making, and an enlarged 
Community. In this respect, British politicians began to show a wary scepticism over the 
EEC’s political development while continuing to seek the maximum economic gain from 
British membership. Each Community development, such as the European Monetary System 
and the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, and the Single European Act 
signed early 1986, was met with little enthusiasm.
6
 British politicians, according to Anthony 
Forster, utilised ‘the language of scepticism’ while tacitly consenting to the EEC’s gradual 
supranational development.
7
 
Forster is correct to say that debate over the EEC was largely ‘confined to the 
parliamentary arena’ in this period but the actions of SBC and BACMC, and their component 
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organisations, are absent from his study of post-referendum Euroscepticism.
8
 In tandem with 
the parliamentary debate over EEC policies and development, and the high political wrangling 
at successive European summits in the early 1980s over Britain’s budgetary contribution, the 
Campaign
9
 once again fluctuated between a political role and mobilising for a mass 
campaign, and operated in a confused position between politics and protest. Opinion polls in 
this period showed that, despite the referendum result, a significant proportion of the British 
public consistently regarded EEC membership as detrimental, and in many cases a majority 
stated they would vote against membership.
10
 Eurobarometer data shows that opposition to 
membership began to increase within a year of the referendum, and by the turn of the decade 
around a half of those polled saw membership as a bad thing and around a quarter saw it as 
beneficial, the high point of opposition being 54 per cent seeing Britain’s membership as 
detrimental in October 1979. Opposition gradually fell during the first half of the 1980s, yet 
the figure who regarded membership negatively only once fell below 30 per cent by the end 
of 1985.
11
 Clearly a large potential support base existed for a mass campaign against 
membership and in defence of British interests, yet the extra-parliamentary anti-EEC 
campaign dwindled in terms of both membership and influence in this period. 
This chapter will assess the activity and the development of the Safeguard Britain 
Campaign and its successor the British Anti-Common Market Campaign, and will consider 
the reasons for its inability to either manifest into a popular movement against the 
encroachments of the EEC or to wield strong political influence with which to pressure 
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governments and political parties. The reasons for this were partly down to the conscious 
decision on the part of SBC’s founders to utilise its limited resources more effectively by 
seeking to become a more political, lobbying-oriented organisation. The public’s general 
antipathy towards the EEC issue also played a part, as the Campaign was aware that it was 
hard to convert apathetic dislike of the EEC into outright opposition. The Campaign’s long-
standing Secretary, Sir Robin Williams, declared that while the public ‘believes that the EEC 
has had something to do with the price of food and reply accordingly in an opinion poll’, it 
did not mean that ‘the general public is actively anti-Market nor does the general public 
believe that anything can be done about it.’12 The post-referendum period saw the birth of 
“scepticism” of EEC membership both inside and outside of Parliament, highlighting and 
attacking the flaws of EEC policy where they adversely affected British interests rather than 
calling for immediate withdrawal from the Community. These tensions between acting as a 
mass campaign and as political lobbyists, and fluctuations between scepticism and a more 
extremist position, hindered the effectiveness of the anti-EEC campaign. 
The political character, foundations and aims of SBC, which would lead to future 
problems, will be assessed first in this chapter. The umbrella organisation was set up as a 
political campaign, designed to keep out political extremists and less respectable campaigners 
who together had tarnished the reputation of the National Referendum Campaign. Anti-EEC 
politicians on the committee were thus central to the campaign, and facilitated and maintained 
links with the Houses of Parliament. After the referendum defeat, the Campaign’s founders 
were aware that the public’s vote for membership had to be respected and that any withdrawal 
from the EEC would be the result of political action. Emphasis on “safeguards”, and acting as 
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a “watchdog” – also the title of the Campaign’s journal – implied scepticism, and a continued 
vigilance against federalist development and protection of British interests. However, this 
scepticism was a façade, concealing the ultimate aim of withdrawal. The debate over the 
change of SBC’s name to both reflect its true aims and catch the tide of popular opinion 
reflected the tensions within the organisation, and the subsequent name change backfired in 
its alienation of political support. Backbench, party-based scepticism, within the Conservative 
Group for European Reform and the Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee, 
appeared more credible, building broader bases of political support through their more 
effective espousal of reformist policies. Furthermore, at a time when Thatcher and other 
senior political figures were adopting a more hard-line policy towards the EEC and negating 
the opportunities for campaigns outside of Westminster, the Campaign lacked credible and 
charismatic leadership with which to attract support. 
The chapter will then assess the conflict of strategy between this political direction, 
favoured by the majority of the committee, and the revival of a popular campaign favoured by 
grassroots supporters in affiliated local groups. As before, the Campaign put pressure on MPs 
during elections and party conferences, while MPs in the Committee were relied upon to 
lobby in Westminster and to give prestige to the Campaign, and make an authoritative case in 
both Parliament and the media. The Committee sought to professionalise the organisation in a 
political dimension, adopting a more “insider” model by targeting opinion-formers and 
increasingly using the press, and seeking the status of a “think-tank” in order to acquire 
greater funding and authority.
13
 In making its anti-EEC case, the Campaign increasingly used 
figures obtained from parliamentary reports or answers, or from the EEC’s own reports and 
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publications. This research was used most prominently in Common Market Watchdog, which 
was aimed more at opinion-formers than the general public and was a far cry from the anti-
Market newsletters of the 1960s. The Campaign also gave evidence on the EEC to a number 
of Parliamentary Select Committees and made legal challenges on EEC issues. However, this 
course of action caused local groups to feel distanced, and they called for detailed strategies, 
manifestoes and directions from the committee to feel involved. The Campaign thus had the 
combined problems of relying on supporters for income but struggling to keep them involved 
and active when engaging at the high political level, and balancing the political caution of the 
committee with the activism, dynamism and ambition of the grassroots. A revival of the 
popular campaign was called for, while the committee were wary of bad publicity and wasted 
resources. Accusations of an unimaginative campaign and attitude from the “mobilisers” 
within the organisation mirrored the criticisms of the likes of Christopher Frere-Smith during 
the referendum, and the movement was again pulled in two different directions. Its inability to 
engage with the continually-emerging social, environmental and humanitarian issues, and 
organisations campaigning for them who were similarly engaged in politics and popular 
campaigning, suggests the committee’s critics had a point. 
The political foundations of the campaign, and the problems they caused 
The National Referendum Campaign had failed in its attempts to mobilise the public 
into voting ‘No’ on 5 June 1975. As the previous chapter noted, figures within the component 
organisations gave the Campaign an “anti-political” character, attempting to mobilise and 
define the Campaign against its well-funded, establishment-backed “other”, Britain in 
Europe’s ‘Yes’ campaign. This image conflicted with its appointment of Neil Marten and 
Douglas Jay, as Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively, as respected and experienced 
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political figures to give the NRC credibility and authenticity. During the referendum 
campaign, Neil Marten spoke of the ‘many millions’ of ‘moderate, middle of the road people’ 
whom the anti-Marketeers should be targeting.
14
 It was these people, according to some 
within the anti-Market campaign, whose support had been alienated by the militant and 
extremist image of the anti-Marketeers.
15
 The organisation formed after the referendum was 
therefore designed to be a respectable political campaign, with more moderate aims, in order 
to exert more influence and attract a broad base of support. However, its political character, 
foundations and aims would become problematic in later years. The “sceptical” image of SBC 
proved to be only temporary, as it again struggled to keep its more uncompromising 
individuals and its local groups in line with its policy, and calls for EEC withdrawal returned. 
It was unable to find a respected senior political figure to promote its case in Westminster and 
in the media, while more dynamic but less credible individuals from outside politics were 
denied the leadership as the committee resolved to keep SBC politically respectable and 
cross-party. 
The initial impetus of SBC’s formation was taken up by CMSC, who discussed the 
possibility of a new campaign with the respectable and moderate aims of monitoring EEC 
developments and laws, and protecting British interests.
16
 Williams and Jay called for an 
organisation ‘embracing all the main anti-Market groups... to defend British interests and 
resist proposals for merging this country into a political federation’.17 A sub-committee 
formed to put forward recommendations on the organisation’s constitution was chaired by 
Hugh Simmonds, who co-founded Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome with anti-
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Market MP Ronald Bell.
18
 Simmonds, along with Williams, Enoch Powell and Labour 
Common Market Safeguards Committee Secretary John Mills, made up a small formal 
committee excluding the likes of the National Council of Anti-Common Market 
Organisations’ Chairman Don Bennett or Get Britain Out’s Christopher Frere-Smith.19 The 
larger steering committee, which had met a few months after the referendum, discussed their 
findings.
20
 Although Bennett was on the committee, Frere-Smith was not, and the committee 
was bolstered by more “political” figures such as Neil Marten, Shaun Stewart, a civil servant 
and previously a National Referendum Campaign researcher, and Ron Leighton, active in 
many anti-EEC organisations and Chairman of the Labour Common Market Safeguards 
Committee.
21
 
In spite of Frere-Smith’s absence, Bennett and his National Council of Anti-Common 
Market Organisations provided the opposition to the more moderate character of SBC. Letters 
sent to Simmonds by leading members of the National Council conveyed ‘apprehension... 
[that] we should accept verdict of the referendum, and take up an anti-federal position’, and 
‘welcomed the statement made by Air Vice-Marshal Don Bennett, that the National Council 
would continue its all out opposition’. It was also suggested that committee members of the 
new umbrella organisation sign a declaration of outright opposition to EEC membership.
22
 
This opposition may have been partly territorial, as it was stressed that ‘we have a perfectly 
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good organisation in the National Council, and I cannot see why the other organisations 
cannot join us.’23 The National Council was, however, strongly opposed to the plans to have 
MPs on the successor organisation’s committee, feeling it would give the organisation an 
undemocratic character and ‘dampen down the activities of other members’.24 Its view, 
therefore, was that a political campaign with MPs in prominent positions would be far more 
moderate in aims and character than a popular movement in outright opposition to 
membership. Audrey O’Reilly, also on the National Council of Anti-Common Market 
Organisations, accepted that anti-Market MPs had been forced to make sacrifices in their 
‘difficult position’, but believed that their public position meant that while they could promote 
the anti-Market cause, they could also harm it.
25
 
Other figures consulted before the Campaign’s formation, however, preferred a more 
political composition. They believed that, after the referendum defeat, anti-Marketeers should 
focus their efforts on Parliament, and as such a ‘steering and liaison committee’ with ‘a 
particularly close liaison with [anti-Market] MPs’ was recommended.26 Neil Marten, who was 
unable to attend the first steering committee meeting but was represented by Jay, passed on 
his wishes ‘to see all present bodies merge into one anti-federalist trust as a successor body.’27 
Enoch Powell, co-opted as both a sub-committee and steering committee member despite 
having held no major position in any of the component organisations, also favoured a more 
political course.
28
 Invited to report on the parliamentary scene, Powell felt that until the issue 
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of direct elections became more prominent there was ‘no point bashing ahead in public’ for 
the time being.
29
 Like Marten, he favoured the formation of a more formal-sounding “trust”, 
suggesting the title of ‘Safeguard Britain Trust’ despite reservations from other Steering 
Committee members that this had the connotations of ‘a rather shady merchant bank’.30 
There was a general feeling amongst many of those consulted, therefore, that it would 
be beneficial to have MPs on SBC’s committee, and to ‘have friends in the House of 
Commons (and desirably in the Lords also) to elicit information, raise issues and gain 
publicity for our cause.’31 This opinion prevailed as the National Council chose at SBC’s first 
meeting not to affiliate, with Don Bennett resigning as its Chairman so as to play a role in the 
new Campaign.
32
 A democratic structure had already been agreed upon with the committee to 
encompass representatives of the component national and party organisations, elected 
representatives from the affiliated local groups, and a few co-opted members.
33
 However, it 
was agreed that Labour MP Bryan Gould and Conservative MP and former Get Britain Out 
Executive Committee member Richard Body should be approached for the position of 
Chairman of the Campaign. Gould, a member of the House of Commons Scrutiny Committee, 
was appointed Chairman in 1976.
34
 Most organisations agreed to affiliate with it, including 
the Anti-Common Market League, CMSC, the Anti Dear Food Campaign, British Business 
for World Markets, the Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee and Conservatives 
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Against a Federal Europe.
35
 Only the National Council of Anti-Common Market 
Organisations declined to affiliate.
36
 
Furthermore, from the outset the aims of SBC were intended to be more moderate and 
anti-federalist. Shortly after the referendum defeat, Marten proposed that an organisation with 
a research team focused on working through Parliament should block moves towards 
federalism. This ‘change in philosophy from being strictly anti-Market to being anti-
federalist’ was designed to attract support from those with more pro-Market inclinations, 
through a theme of ‘co-operation but not integration’.37 This was a view shared by many anti-
Market campaigners. At a branches conference held in September 1975, Jay spoke of the anti-
EEC campaign’s future task to ‘expose the damaging absurdities of the EEC and resist all 
further invasion of British liberties and independence’, while stopping short of calls for 
withdrawal. Others at the conference agreed with Jay, Williams and Simmonds and felt that 
opposing both federalism and economic and monetary union could ‘split the ranks of the 
opposition’, and that becoming a ‘ratepayers [and] taxpayers organisation’ would ‘bring into 
our ranks a number of people who voted “Yes”.’ While some felt that a strong organisation 
committed to Britain’s withdrawal would receive more support, Williams summarised the 
meeting by saying that to ‘get converts from the public at large and in Parliament’, the 
organisation should ‘concentrate on the absurdities of CAP, Common Market regulations etc.’ 
A representative of a local Get Britain Out branch summed up the issue by stating, ‘We must 
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fight on. If you are an anti-Marketeer you must be anti-Federalist.’38 Throughout its early 
meetings, the committee consistently agreed that as an umbrella organisation it should 
‘oppose federalism or union and all matters leading thereto’ and ‘monitor the activities of the 
Common Market’ to ‘safeguard Britain’s interests’.39 A rather dismissive report in The 
Economist on SBC’s launch confirmed this anti-federalist approach, claiming it wished to 
stop progress to direct elections to the European Parliament.
40
 The Campaign’s main aims 
were defined at its launch, however, as acting as ‘an umbrella for all existing anti-Market and 
anti-federal bodies’ under which they could merge. It would ‘monitor the progress of events 
within the Common Market’, ‘provide a publicity and information service for interested 
persons’ and ‘campaign actively against all matters which lead towards a federated Europe 
including in particular direct elections and monetary union’.41 
SBC was therefore formed to be driven by a political nucleus, with more moderate 
political aims to attract more support and command more respect. Central to this 
respectability, however, was the way in which SBC continued to be strictly cross-party and 
excluded extremists. In early discussions on the formation of the post-referendum umbrella 
group, it was stressed that it must be founded ‘on an “all party” or “non party” basis’ and that 
‘some way must be found to maintain some sort of balance over the political spectrum, and 
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some way needs to be found to prevent infiltration by extremists.’42 SBC’s constitution was 
thus specifically drawn up so as to be comprised of representatives of those organisations 
which had agreed to affiliate with it and pursue SBC’s course of action, as well as anti-Market 
party political organisations with representation in Parliament, such as Conservatives Against 
a Federated Europe and the Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee.
43
 This remained 
something of a modus operandi for the Campaign, as years later Williams was still priding the 
organisation on its political balance across the committee and affiliated organisations, and its 
constitution with its ‘formulation designed to exclude extremist organisations.’ As part of this 
formulation, organisations ‘which, whilst opposed to British membership of the EEC also 
campaign for other objectives’ were also refused affiliation.44 This aspect of its constitution 
was essential to make the Campaign appear politically respectable and acquire influence at the 
high political level, but excluding campaigns and organisations which may have had 
scepticism or criticism of EEC membership amongst its secondary aims made SBC somewhat 
narrow. However, in the cautious post-referendum stages, a tight-knit umbrella organisation 
with a committee comprised of political figures was appropriate. 
Leading anti-Marketeers perpetuated this desire for SBC to have respectability and 
prestige, as shown by Oliver Smedley’s call for the appointment of esteemed presidents and 
vice-presidents in order to gain more support. Smedley felt that ‘distinguished men and 
women... would be only too pleased to lend their names to our endeavours’, and suggested 
that SBC’s constitution be amended so that twenty or thirty ‘good names’ could be added to 
                                                          
42
 Letter from unknown [possibly Neil Marten] to Douglas Jay, Margaret Coneybeare and Sir Robin Williams, 
22 September 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES 
43
 Rules and constitution of the Safeguard Britain Campaign [n.d., 1976?], MS Eng. Hist. c.1132/179-182, 
Bodleian Library 
44
 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Lord Chitnis of the Joseph Rowntree Social Service Trust, 24 February 
1982, CIB/3/1, BLPES 
 233 
 
the committee to improve SBC’s public appeal, as ‘People like to know in what sort of 
company they are likely to find themselves.’45 In addition, the Committee continued to 
attribute great importance to maintaining a political balance between the Labour and 
Conservative parties. Although it was not explicitly stated as a necessity in its constitution, 
SBC’s cross-party nature was always made known and used as a selling point, making clear 
that it was ‘not party-political’.46 In order to maintain this political balance, SBC needed to 
make links with Conservative anti-Marketeers in order to counter the large amount of 
committee members from the Labour Party, which followed an anti-Market line in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. In appointing chairmen, it was felt that ‘only a MP can hope to attract 
the attention of the media’, and they had to be drawn from the Labour Party ‘in view of the 
strength of anti-EEC opinion in the PLP and the relative weakness among Tory MPs’.47 
Consequently, Labour MPs and peers such as Bryan Gould, Nigel Spearing, Lord Bruce and 
Lord Stoddart occupied the chairmanship of SBC. With Scottish Unionist MP Michael Clark 
Hutchinson and Conservative MPs Sir Richard Body and Sir Ronald Bell as successive joint 
vice-chairmen, SBC used this arrangement of Labour chairman and Conservative vice-
chairman as evidence of its political balance.
48
 
This combination of political respectability, cross-party balance and eschewing 
extremism prevented Enoch Powell, one of the most vocal opponents of British membership 
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of the EEC, from assuming a more prominent role within SBC. Powell was a co-opted 
member of its committee, and while he had declined to be a patron of CMSC as its name was 
‘not unambiguously anti-Market’, he acknowledged the new post-referendum situation and 
supported the SBC name ‘as the best for our present purposes’.49 Powell spoke at a number of 
centrally- and locally-organised SBC meetings and was a popular speaker, with Williams 
declaring that ‘most of our members would like Mr Powell to be the speaker whether or not 
there is any other speaker’. However, in the same letter Williams spoke of the importance of 
getting a Labour MP to speak on the same platform as Powell, to maintain political balance 
and to protect SBC from accusations of a particular political bias. The risk of Powell 
attracting extremists to the meeting and ‘intruders interested in Mr Powell’s views on other 
subjects’ was also noted.50 Powell, according to Shaun Stewart, was co-opted onto the 
committee as his standing for election would cause SBC embarrassment. Furthermore, a 
regional organiser warned Powell against his proposed series of anti-Market meetings in 
seaside towns on the grounds that the National Front saw Powell as its ‘patron saint’, and 
‘will seize upon these meetings to the disadvantage of the anti-Market cause’, and that SBC 
did not wish to be associated with ‘rabble-rousing’.51 It was clear that the Campaign wished 
for respectability, and equal weight between moderate politicians drawn from both Labour 
and the Conservatives, to be fundamental to its image and composition. 
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From politicisation to professionalization 
In keeping with its moderate aims and political composition, SBC also sought to 
professionalise in the post-referendum period. A key aspect of this was to target opinion-
formers through research publications, reflecting the shift away from a public campaign and 
targeting parliamentary support for a campaign defending Britain from the negative 
consequences of EEC membership. SBC’s committee intended upon its creation to monitor 
and comment upon the impact of membership and events in the EEC and to provide both ‘a 
publicity and information service for interested persons’ and ‘a research unit which will 
investigate in depth the activities of the Common Market’.52 The committee continued to 
press along these lines, and by 1978 SBC’s manifesto was seeking to present research 
information to both the general public and ‘more significantly to the ‘opinion leaders’ in the 
community’.53 John Coleman, an SBC committee member, was an advocate of this focused 
approach.
54
 Whilst also seeking a more active campaign seeking more widespread support, he 
was aware that SBC’s role should be to research and to inform the public, and carry out ‘more 
of an educative than a band wagon type of campaign’.55 In his suggestions for the future of 
SBC, Coleman suggested that ‘our main thrust has to be at the inner political thinking of the 
major political and social groups and movements in our country’. He elaborated that the 
campaign needed 
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...a nucleus of people who dedicate themselves to understanding the principles on 
which the ever changing and confusing tactics of our opponents are based. None 
of us can ever afford to feel that we know it all.
56
 
 
SBC’s most regular research publication was its quarterly newsletter, Common Market 
Watchdog, the title of which clearly reflected its new aims in the post-referendum period. 
Watchdog was intended to both inform existing members of events, facts and statistics 
relating to Britain’s EEC membership, and to attract some new members without resorting to 
the more explicit forms of propaganda that previous campaigns had utilised. Having learnt the 
lessons of CMSC’s Resistance News which had operated at a loss, Watchdog was printed in a 
simple format to keep costs down.
57
 The committee had resisted calls from John Coleman to 
produce a more complicated newspaper combining the activities of all national and local 
groups on the grounds that it was ‘administratively complicated’ and that ‘printing as it is 
[and] not as a newspaper’ would keep Watchdog in production.58 Furthermore, Williams felt 
that such a publication would be too large and that Watchdog was ‘already sufficiently 
lengthy for ordinary people to read’.59 However, the Common Market Monitoring 
Association’s Market News, produced by Coleman, was intended to be more populist, 
described as ‘a public paper’ aimed at doubtful pro-Marketeers and focused on ‘how the 
Common Market really affects our lives and standards of living’. Coleman described 
Watchdog, somewhat derogatively, as ‘essentially a briefing publication and house magazine’. 
60
 A regional organiser of SBC suggested a new style for the publication which still 
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‘eschewed extra-bold headlines used in ‘popular’ advertising matter’ as Watchdog was ‘read 
by the committed seeking confirmation of his/her opinion’. In describing this as aiming 
Watchdog at the readership of The Times ahead of that of the Daily Mirror, the publication 
would continue to both target opinion-formers and to further educate existing SBC members 
with a well-researched and informative paper.
61
 
The content of Watchdog reflected SBC’s desire for a more professional, political 
approach. Its first issue a few months after the referendum set the tone, reprinting large 
sections of both the government’s referendum leaflet ‘Britain’s New Deal in Europe’ 
outlining the government’s commitments and promises, and of the White Paper on 
renegotiation. One of its articles speculated how the EEC would gradually assume more 
power over British policy, and that while the referendum had ‘for the time being killed any 
thoughts that the government’s decision to join the EEC might be reversed by the British 
people’, there was still ‘scope for watchdogs’.62 Watchdog went on to reprint details, figures 
and statistics from government Bills, White Papers and Select Committee recommendations 
and reports, such as the Overseas Trade Statistics from the Select Committee on Trade and 
Industry report that spelt out the increasing trade deficit since Britain joined the EEC.
63
 
Monitoring events in Parliament by reprinting debates, speeches, parliamentary questions and 
their replies, demonstrated SBC’s strategy to focus on events in Westminster. Furthermore, 
MPs sympathetic to SBC would obtain information through replies to parliamentary 
questions, such as the price of EEC import levies obtained in replies to SBC Chairman Nigel 
                                                          
61
 Letter from Harold Fieldman to Sir Robin Williams, 22 July 1977, CIB/2/1, BLPES 
62
 Common Market Watchdog, 1, Autumn 1975, CIB/1/4, BLPES 
63
 Common Market Watchdog, 38, New Year 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES 
 238 
 
Spearing and Labour MP Austen Mitchell.
64
 In doing this SBC was adopting the same 
approach as party political organisations such as the Conservative European Reform Group 
and pressure groups including the Child Poverty Action Group and Shelter, who also obtained 
figures from White Papers and parliamentary replies to use in leaflets to further their case.
65
 
Opinion poll results, trade figures, extracts and reports from the European Commission, and 
statistics and sympathetic articles in the Times, The Economist and the Financial Times were 
also reprinted in Watchdog.
66
 Having originally been promoted as a publication with 
‘interesting information about how the workings of the Common Market are affecting your 
pocket’, Watchdog increasingly gave a broader critique of the EEC and its policies, and 
provided less overt and populist propaganda than previous anti-Market campaigns.
67
 The 
reprinting of sympathetic articles in the press, and the speeches of concerned pro-Marketeers 
in parliamentary debates, showed how Watchdog pursued a course and adopted a tone that 
was more sceptical than hostile, as it sought to broaden its political base of support.
68
 
Aside from Watchdog, Williams recommended producing other ‘briefing documents 
[aimed at] opinion-formers such as MPs and Lobby Correspondents’.69 An example where 
SBC produced these documents while assuming a degree of authority and expertise was the 
work of Sir Richard Body on the Common Agricultural Policy [CAP]. In a shift away from 
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the predominant focus on food prices during the referendum, SBC reverted to broader 
critiques of agricultural policy by using the EEC Commission’s own reports and figures. Press 
statements criticised the CAP both as ‘a dear-food policy which penalises consumers’ and as 
‘divisive... [setting] consumer against farmers, and even farmer against farmer.’70 Body, with 
his agricultural background, was the ideal choice to produce the 1978 pamphlet The CAP 
Won’t Fit British Farmers, an extensive report based on detailed research. Criticising the 
over-production caused by the CAP and the dumping of foodstuffs in the developing world, 
Body argued for a return to a national agricultural policy combined with European free 
trade.
71
 Body continued to concentrate on agriculture and produced more publications on the 
subject in the early 1980s, which allowed the Campaign to target a specific group for support, 
and influence a particular sector.
72
 Body’s research publications on agriculture were seen as 
extremely important to the Campaign, although it was acknowledged that this work was 
preventing him from playing a more dynamic part in the wider campaign.
73
 At the expense of 
being seen as the ‘anti CAP expert’, where he believed ‘every door is now open to me for the 
[media] operation’, Body was unable to play a more active role within SBC and suggested 
relinquishing his vice-chairmanship in 1984 as a result.
74
 Yet Executive Committee member 
Hugh Gilmour recommended this kind of approach for the anti-Market campaign, where ‘the 
speaker or writer is obviously interested in the subject for itself’, in Body’s case, on 
agriculture and the environment. Gilmour went as far as saying there was ‘very little wrong 
with our Anti-Market strategy’, that ‘research has been first-class from the beginning’ and 
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that unpaid researchers with a passion for the subject ‘have done better than any professionals 
could have done for us.’75 In spite of this, SBC also sought to persuade research organisations 
to study and publicise the negative effects of membership. A key example was the attempt in 
1985 to approach both the Institute of Economic Affairs and the Department of Applied 
Economics at Cambridge to undertake a study into unemployment caused by EEC 
membership.
76
 SBC’s lack of finance, however, prevented this study from being carried out.77 
SBC therefore wished to form a ‘nucleus of people’ to counter the pro-Market case 
with expert knowledge through which they could influence opinion-formers.
78
 Part of its 
professionalization and shift towards expertise came with the evidence provided by senior 
SBC figures to Select Committees on European affairs. In this way it was able to occupy a 
position on the fringes of institutional politics and perform more of an “insider” role than in 
the past. The links between Select Committees and the SBC committee were manifold. Nigel 
Spearing, SBC Chairman from 1977 to 1983, had originally pressed for greater parliamentary 
control of European legislation, putting forward a motion in Parliament for further debate on 
legislation referred to the House by the Scrutiny Committee.
79
 Spearing would relinquish the 
chairmanship of BACMC upon being elected Chairman of the House of Commons Select 
Committee on European Legislation.
80
 Furthermore, in 1984 Shaun Stewart, a civil servant 
who had served on the Board of Trade who was active in SBC and BACMC and the Labour 
Common Market Safeguards Committee, was able to use his position as an advisor to the 
Sub-Committee of the Treasury and Civil Service Committee to assist SBC in providing 
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evidence. Stewart informed SBC in advance that the Sub-Committee would be writing to 
them, and according to Williams ‘doubtless had a hand in drafting the long questionnaire’ 
which the Committee had sent to them. Stewart, along with Jay, Body and economist Jim 
Bourlet, worked together to draft SBC’s evidence, with Stewart’s name omitted from the 
reply.
81
 
The Sub-Committee made a specific request to approach SBC for its expertise on the 
economic consequences of membership rather than on any ‘[w]ider issues of a political and 
strategic nature’, highlighting SBC’s shift towards being an organisation based around 
authoritative research.
82
 The lengthy response, on the economic benefits and disadvantages of 
membership, highlighted the disadvantages caused by ‘the undermining of Britain’s economic 
structure’, traditionally based on ‘low cost food’, with EEC membership causing inflation, a 
trade deficit and reduced competitiveness of British industry. Citing statistical evidence from 
a number of official sources, the report concluded that the economic consequences had been 
‘disastrous’ and recommended withdrawal from the CAP ‘and other economic contrivances of 
the EEC’.83 The following year SBC was again invited to give evidence to the same 
Committee, on the subject of the European Monetary System.
84
 Stewart again provided 
advice, recommending that SBC follow the strategy of the Labour European Parliamentary 
Group and submit evidence in the form of ‘an “essay” followed by crisp answers’ to the 
questionnaire, the latter provided in the ‘terse’ replies by Douglas Jay.85 The evidence stated 
that joining the European Monetary System would mean Britain would lose the power to 
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manage its own currency and would hinder the development of a single European currency 
amongst other member states, and therefore that Britain should reject membership of it.
86
  
Another aspect of the Campaign’s professionalised approach was to search for legal 
technicalities to fight the encroachments of the EEC. In the run-up to the first direct elections 
to the European Parliament, Leo Price QC, a barrister who had assisted the anti-Market 
campaign in the past, produced a memorandum challenging the legality of the elections with 
reference to the Treaty of Rome. SBC’s initial response was sceptical, believing that public 
opinion would not support a challenge which looked like ‘knockout by technical means’, and 
aware of the irony of the potential use of the European courts.
87
 Despite reservations, it sought 
to mount a legal challenge with Shaun Stewart, seeking Labour candidature for the elections, 
acting as a plaintiff, and Hugh Simmonds carrying out solicitor’s work for no fee.88 Stewart’s 
failure to be selected for the elections, however, meant SBC could not proceed with the 
case.
89
 
A more high-profile, and more successful, action was the challenge made by Oliver 
Smedley in 1984 to prevent the £120 million shortfall payment by the British government to 
the EEC budget. Smedley, fighting the case as a taxpayer with Leo Price offering his services 
for free, argued that payment without a parliamentary debate and bill would be 
unconstitutional. The government’s announcement in early 1985 that they would seek 
parliamentary authority for the payment was described by BACMC as ‘a clear moral victory 
                                                          
86
 “European Monetary System”, report produced by British Anti-Common Market Campaign for the Treasury 
and Civil Service Select Committee of the House of Commons, 22 May 1985, CIB/3/2, BLPES 
87
 “Response to memorandum on challenging direct elections by Leolin Price dated 20 May 1978, by Nigel 
Spearing” [n.d., 1978], CIB/2/2, BLPES; Letter from John Mills, Secretary of Labour Common Market 
Safeguards Committee, to Sir Robin Williams, 28 November 1978, CIB/2/2, BLPES 
88
 Instructions to Michael Mann QC sent by Hugh Simmonds, 30 January 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES; Letter from 
Sir Robin Williams to Leo Price QC, 11 May 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES 
89
 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Norris McWhirter, 11 May 1979, CIB/2/2, BLPES 
 243 
 
for Oliver Smedley and us’.90 This action combined assertive activity, ‘the biggest 
undertaking upon which anti-Marketeers have embarked on a long time’, with the opportunity 
of ‘putting a spoke in the EEC wheels’.91 Smedley described his motivation for challenging 
the payment, however, as the ‘defence of such delicate threads’ as ‘freedom of the individual’, 
parliamentary democracy and common law, which he perceived to be unmistakably British.
92
 
Despite the drawn-out appeal campaign to meet Smedley’s legal costs which hindered the 
BACMC’s finance and activities, there was initial optimism at the outcome, with Smedley 
claiming they had created an ‘atmosphere of doubt’ and were ‘winning at last’.93 Such tactics 
combined their aims of acting as a political nucleus lobbying the upper echelons of the 
political sphere, and adopting a sceptical stance fighting extension of EEC power. 
The Campaign also attempted to formalise links with the press during this period, 
attempting to use its committee’s political influence to publicise the anti-Market case. A 
suggestion was made shortly after the referendum for anti-Market MPs to ‘bombard the Press 
with correspondence’ given SBC’s limited funds.94 A number of press releases were 
subsequently produced, on one occasion under the name of ‘leading British parliamentarians 
associated with the Safeguard Britain Campaign’, opposing EEC policies and moves towards 
federalism.
95
 These press releases often commented on the performance of the government 
and other political parties regarding EEC policy, or dealt with other issues in the House 
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regarding the EEC, in an attempt to keep the issue prominent. This tactic of ‘comment by 
Press Release whenever anything important happens’, along with Common Market Watchdog 
and publications aimed at opinion-formers, maintained SBC’s active image, compensating for 
a lack of popular support to be a true mass movement and a lack of resources to be a fully-
developed research body.
96
 
It was clear, however, that SBC needed influential political figures and MPs within the 
Committee in order to ‘compel the attendance of pressmen at press conferences’.97 As a 
result, working through the Press maintained the political composition of SBC’s committee. 
This committee-led action also differed from the actions of groups such as the National 
Council of Anti-Common Market Organisations, which was re-launched after the referendum, 
whose “Operation Truth” instead involved members bombarding national newspapers over 
pro-EEC bias, with letters which were ‘identically worded’.98 SBC continued to target the 
press in its own way with its “Campaign for Truth” series of press releases.99 It would often 
be the task of the chairman, a politician as ‘only an MP can hope to attract the attention of the 
media’, to prepare and issue such press releases and letters to the media, but also to give an 
immediate response to developments in the EEC to the media.
100
 The mid-1980s also saw a 
revived attempt to make stronger links with the media, with the committee looking to revise 
its press list and make contact with more journalists, and to find a retired journalist 
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sympathetic to BACMC to become its part-time press officer.
101
 However, a lack of resources 
again prevented the Campaign from forming good relations with the media, Hugh Gilmour 
claiming that making contact with journalists and sub-editors from the national media was ‘a 
skilled and arduous job which can only be done successfully by a professional.’102 The 
assignment of John Coleman, whose Anti-Common Market Project advertisements in the 
national press had attempted to revive the media campaign, to the position of Press Officer in 
1986 appeared to be another step in the Campaign’s slow path to professionalization.103 A 
series of advertisements in the Guardian that year sought to present the anti-Market case to a 
wider audience.
104
 However, BACMC had difficulty putting the issue of EEC membership 
back on the political agenda, with information obtained through parliamentary questions 
attracting ‘little press publicity’, leading it to conclude that skilful use of the media ‘requires 
the kind of expertize [sic] which requires a great deal of money’.105 This inability to 
successfully use the media to get the issue of EEC membership back on the agenda, compared 
to the likes of Frank Field at the Child Poverty Action Group and Des Wilson at Shelter who 
were able to successfully propagandise their causes through a number of different media, 
hindered the anti-Market campaign.
106
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Professionalization, and changing its image from a mass movement to a research-
based think-tank, was one way in which the Campaign sought new sources of funding. The 
first move towards this was the suggestion made in 1976 to open a ‘research fund’ account 
financed by donations and spent on research expenditure, through which potential donors 
could be reassured.
107
 In 1979, SBC sought to solicit further donations towards research by 
registering as a charity, adopting the model of the Child Poverty Action Group by combining 
research with political campaigning. This again represented a desire to shift away from a mass 
campaign movement, and it was the political nature of SBC’s activities that prevented it from 
becoming a registered charity.
108
 An approach for donations made to S.E. Scammell’s 
McLaren Foundation in 1986 was unsuccessful for similar reasons, with the Charity 
Commission regarding BACMC as a political campaign.
109
 Enquiries were also made to the 
Inland Revenue in the 1980s regarding BACMC’s taxation status, in the hope of being 
classified as an organisation with charitable and research aims.
110
  
Attempts to attract wealthy backers continued to play up the Campaign’s intention of 
professionalising. A list of wealthy personalities who might have been sympathetic to the 
anti-Market cause was drawn up by Oliver Smedley, including Robert Maxwell and Rupert 
Murdoch.
111
 A draft letter to these personalities, to be sent on House of Commons paper and 
signed by the more eminent members of the Campaign’s Committee, emphasised the desire to 
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make EEC membership ‘the great national issue’ free from party loyalty, and laid out the 
plans to turn Common Market Watchdog ‘into a more professionally produced magazine 
which can be widely circulated, initially free, to a carefully selected list of opinion-formers’. 
A proposed ‘Foundation Fund’ would have the signatories as trustees to ensure the money 
was ‘not whittled away on unproductive administration costs.’112 
The Campaign’s most serious attempt to acquire the status of a think-tank was its 
application to the Joseph Rowntree Fund, seeking finance ‘to extend its research activities 
and, in particular, to undertake in-depth studies of the consequences of membership of the 
EEC and of the potential consequences of withdrawal.’113 SBC’s research, carried out by 
academics and part-time researchers, would thus make a ‘contribution to public understanding 
and debate’ with results which they would ‘publish and publicise widely’.114 After its 
application was rejected, Chairman Nigel Spearing appealed on the basis that SBC was the 
only organisation advocating the non-party case, which needed ‘hard, detailed monitoring and 
research’.115 
The aims to revive the anti-EEC movement were thus based on two different 
strategies, the first involving placing respected political personnel at the head of the 
Campaign, and the second introducing more professionalization and dynamism to its 
activities. The aforementioned strategy to improve the Campaign by having ‘good names’ on 
the committee was proposed by Smedley to elevate it from being run at ‘the petty cash-box 
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level’.116 The search for ‘notepaper patrons’ continued through scouring the letter-heads of 
think-tanks such as the Economic Research Council, the Institute of Economic Affairs and the 
Trade Policy Research Centre.
117
 John Coleman also sought to revive BACMC by getting 
‘supporting bodies, business people and politicians’ on its notepaper.118 Other suggestions to 
improve the Campaign’s image centred on its organisation, with John Coleman complaining 
that the Committee were ‘operating a national campaign with less organisation than that of a 
local insurance broker’s office’.119 Oliver Smedley was another active proponent of 
professionalising the operation and administration of the Campaign. Smedley believed that 
the Campaign must be run on ‘a more ambitious scale’, and criticised the small-scale 
operation of the Campaign, which should be 
...one of the most important Bodies in English history rating with the Anti-Corn 
Law League and certainly of far greater importance than Greenpeace, CND and 
many others of which the great British public are far more aware than they are of 
our activities.
120
 
 
Smedley’s experience at the Institute of Economic Affairs, the National Benevolent Fund for 
the Aged and the Farmers and Smallholders Association led him to believe that the Campaign 
needed ‘one individual... appointed who could make the success of the Organisation his or her 
own personal career’.121 A figure in the mould of Des Wilson at Shelter or Ralph Harris at the 
Institute of Economic Affairs, possessing ‘a background of economics, politics and PR’, was 
needed to re-develop the Campaign from scratch. With a detailed strategy, wealthy backers 
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could be found if they ‘knew that [their money] was not going to be dribbled away in an 
amateurish fashion, but used to good and fruitful effect.’122 What these two approaches reveal 
is the divergence between maintaining a professional political campaign headed by 
parliamentary figures, and the relinquishing of control to more dynamic personnel in order to 
raise the profile, support and activity of the campaign. This clash of views was endemic 
throughout the Campaign, particularly between local groups and the committee, and this 
chapter will now deal with those opposing strategies. 
The grassroots versus the Committee 
In order for the Campaign to prevent itself transforming into a purely professional 
lobbying body, it needed the support and input of local groups exemplifying widespread 
hostility to the EEC and its policies. While SBC co-ordinated or subsumed the national post-
referendum organisations, local groups were invited to affiliate, although often these groups 
remained sub-groups of the Anti-Common Market League or the National Council of Anti-
Common Market Organisations.
123
 As SBC was created, supporters and branches of the Anti-
Common Market League formed both the audience and organisation of its initial public 
meetings, and the League concurrently set about in strengthening its local and regional 
organisation.
124
 It soon became clear, however, that these members and groups were feeling 
increasingly distanced from the decision-making of SBC’s central committee. 
                                                          
122
 Suggestions made by Oliver Smedley to British Anti-Common Market Campaign Officers [n.d., 1986], 
CIB/3/3, BLPES 
123
 For example, a circular sent to SBC members calling for the resignation of Sir Robin Williams as Secretary 
was signed by several local anti-market groups, of which many were regional branches of the ACML or listed as 
an ‘Anti-Common Market Group’, whereas only two were local groups of the SBC campaign: [n.d., 1979], 
CIB/2/2, BLPES 
124
 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to ACML supporters, October 1976, CIB/2/1, BLPES 
 250 
 
The complaints from the grassroots centred on being treated as subscriber-members, 
with little financial or organisational support for their own local activism. This underlined one 
of the Campaign’s perpetual organisational problems – the contradiction of having paid 
subscribers with little campaigning to undertake, as efforts became focused on Westminster. 
SBC needed money for a revived post-referendum campaign, but local groups were only 
willing to provide considerable financial sums if a definitive action plan was devised, 
combining political persuasion, media work, and grassroots campaigning. 
Differences between the local groups and the committee in regards to the revival of a 
popular campaign also became apparent. As stated above, some figures within the anti-EEC 
movement opposed the involvement of MPs, favouring a public campaign bypassing political 
obstacles and red tape. In attracting the widest range of support, however, the Campaign had 
to align itself with more political groupings. For example, in an attempt to gain more 
Conservative support, it advocated a more “sceptical” and anti-federalist rhetoric. This 
approach was more in line with the policies of the Conservative European Reform Group, a 
parliamentary grouping with ‘severe reservations’ about EEC membership terms but calling 
for ‘substantial and fundamental changes’ rather than withdrawal.125 Local groups and certain 
prominent figures within SBC favoured a more hard-line approach, leading to the name 
change to the British Anti-Common Market Campaign in 1983, emphasising withdrawal 
rather than safeguards. This change appeared to backfire in terms of alienating the 
Campaign’s “sceptical” supporters and precluding it from forging links with the Conservative 
European Reform Group. Once again, divisions over strategy, aims, and the position of the 
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campaign in relation to political and public activism, stifled the progress of the anti-EEC 
movement. 
Criticism from the groups 
While SBC’s central committee reorganised for the post-referendum political 
situation, attempting to garner political support for a firm stance against EEC policy, local 
groups and less eminent figures, unsure of their role in the new campaign, raised their 
concerns. As early as 1977, John Coleman, elected to the committee as founder of the 
Common Market Monitoring Association, highlighted the disconnection between the 
grassroots and the central organisation. Coleman, who consistently favoured a more populist 
campaign educated and led by an informed political nucleus, reflected on his first SBC 
meeting with a ‘deep sense of concern’. Coleman felt that resolutions put forward by local 
groups were ‘dealt with in the letter but not in spirit’, and that the committee had failed to 
appreciate that ‘[a]ction was manifestly called for at the AGM.’126 He also felt that how SBC 
presented itself to groups, particularly those within a party organisation, was ‘tremendously 
important’ in maintaining support.127 He perceived SBC’s role to be that of a co-ordinating 
body to unite the ‘apparently disparate elements’, directing the efforts of party organisations 
and local groups and facilitating their campaigns. By guiding public anti-Market sentiment 
towards ‘setting up study groups locally and building up an understanding of the Common 
Market and its dangers in depth’, SBC could build up ‘highly informed potential leaders and 
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informed public opinion’, and facilitate ‘a two-way loyalty between anti-Market MPs and 
groups in the country.’128 
Whether as a way of attempting to exert more influence within the committee or to 
direct SBC along more populist lines, Coleman continued to converse with key members of 
local groups and expressed their criticisms and concerns, claiming they felt ‘dangerously 
neglected’.129 Coleman wrote to Gould inspired by the ‘spirit of anger’ from local groups and 
the ‘many forceful complaints about the inadequacy of the activities of the Safeguard Britain 
Campaign’. From these, the accusation arose that ‘there is no direction from the HQ of a 
national organisation and an almost total absence of co-ordination’. Coleman cited examples 
where provincial organisers had received little or no assistance from the central organisation, 
and that local groups were therefore ‘a little too anxious to have a bandwagon type of 
campaign’. Better guidance and implementation of AGM decisions was recommended to stop 
groups feeling ‘like ships adrift simply being told to do their own thing’.130 
By 1979, as will be assessed below, patience was wearing thin with SBC’s stagnation 
and its lobbyist nature, particularly with its Secretary Sir Robin Williams. In that year, 
Coleman would again complain of the way in which the wishes and the activities of the local 
groups were overlooked. In criticism of the way that Williams had responded to a local 
branch in Dorset, Coleman reminded Williams that the committee should ‘treat the groups, 
who are often starved for information, or are misinformed by our national press, with the 
utmost understanding’. Its London headquarters were thus accused of doing ‘much to deaden 
the effect of the Campaign’, alienating both its core support and some of the more prominent 
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political personalities.
131
 Coleman’s complaints came as a result of the ‘malaise’ within the 
Campaign and the ‘extreme concern of those who see the campaign as failing to achieve what 
they hope for.’ The Campaign was condemned as being too political and possessing an 
‘unimaginative attitude’, with Coleman stating 
The very fact that it is called a ‘campaign’ is misleading to people in the 
country. Had it been simply called the Safeguard Britain Co-ordinating 
Committee and only been intended to improve liaison between MPs and leaders 
and representatives of campaigning bodies the situation might have been better, 
and more campaigning groups might have developed spontaneously. […] …it is 
impossible not to draw the inference that it does not seriously wish to grow and 
expand, that it wishes to strangle any real campaign in the country.
132
 
 
These criticisms were also voiced by local group leaders. Christopher Joyce, of SBC’s 
Eastbourne branch and Coleman’s assistant in the Common Market Monitoring Association, 
also sought to reorganise and stimulate the campaign through greater dialogue between the 
centre and the grassroots. Like Coleman, he raised his concerns after the first AGM, in a letter 
to Sir Robin Williams stating the 
…general feeling among regional groups (especially the more active)… that SBC 
is still not sufficiently accountable to its membership and that there is an 
exasperating remoteness of the latter from the executive.
133
 
 
Resolutions were put forward by local groups at AGMs calling for more recognition, such as 
the Torbay Anti-Common Market League branch’s claim that SBC’s structure ‘does not give 
full weight to the importance of the members and groups’ and calling for more local 
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representatives on the committee.
134
 It also accused the committee of inertness and excessive 
caution, leading to ‘the continuance of a half cooked organisation which uses the groups in 
the country as a tedious necessity’.135 The Eastbourne branch had also called for ‘a more 
detailed strategy’ at AGMs.136 
In response, Shaun Stewart, while accepting the need to expand membership, pointed 
to improvements in regional organisation and blamed ‘the constant criticism from certain 
groups and individuals’ for Bryan Gould’s resignation as chairman. Defending the more 
political approach, he predicted that those who opposed the presence of politicians on the 
committee would become ‘bigger fish… swimming in a very small pond’ if they succeeded, 
and cited his lengthy experience in the Civil Service when claiming that ‘without the political 
connection the organisation would have carried no weight at all.’137 Starting the post-
referendum period with ‘a handful of guerrillas’, Stewart declared it vital to keep links with 
anti-Marketeers in Parliament ‘where the battle must eventually be won’.138 This approach 
was incorporated within SBC’s national strategy, which stressed that members’ efforts should 
be directed towards Westminster. After drawing up a list of objectives to campaign for, SBC 
would ‘advance these objectives in the current political scene’. As these objectives centred on 
parliamentary sovereignty, the statement declared that the ‘immediate priority’ was ‘our 
national Parliament, its members and those who seek election to it must receive our main 
attention’, with ‘opinion leaders’ also targeted. Aside from some general advice on the 
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forthcoming direct elections, the statement did not provide local groups with any guidance for 
activism.
139
 
The grassroots anti-Market activists were thus left detached, and sought both greater 
direction and input within a two-way anti-Market campaign. Coleman therefore continued to 
push for ‘a new kind of campaign with a very capable and imaginative organiser’ to provide 
greater organisational cohesion and to revive the grassroots campaign.
140
 Yet these criticisms 
were never really addressed by the SBC hierarchy. By the mid-1980s, Oliver Smedley, 
perceiving Sir Robin Williams to be ‘unnecessarily defeatist’ about the campaign, cited a 
letter he had received from a supporter about how the recent AGM had been a successful 
meeting that was ‘good for morale’, and should be replicated more frequently. Smedley 
elaborated on the supporters’ complaints about the lack of communications and activity by 
stating that ‘members are not being given enough to do by their Executive Committee.’141 
The political orientation of SBC, combined with the diminished level of activity and 
involvement of local groups, led to questions being raised as to the overall purpose and role of 
SBC. Accusations from the likes of Air Vice-Marshal Don Bennett of a nucleus of figures 
controlling the direction of the anti-Market campaign appeared to hold some truth.
142
 
Williams’s assertion that a revival of the EEC issue would mean people would ‘re-emerge, 
full of energy and criticisms as to what we… have omitted to do in the interim’, demonstrated 
how SBC’s senior figures saw themselves as the post-referendum vanguard, eager to keep the 
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subject alive within political echelons.
143
 The resignation of Lord Bruce as Chairman of the 
successor British Anti-Common Market Campaign in the mid-1980s led to further soul-
searching as to the Campaign’s role. Its then vice-chairman Richard Body believed the time 
had come ‘to decide what it is trying to do, and how to achieve it’, and that it should either 
become a co-ordinating committee or draw up a plan of action for campaigning.
144
 
Williams’s response underlined one of the Campaign’s major problems. While 
needing to retain active officers, Williams also felt that fulfilling a purely co-ordinating role 
would be insufficient, and furthermore that without a level of public activism supporters 
would ‘lose interest in subscribing if we merely co-ordinated the activities of other bodies, i.e. 
we would run out of money and so finish.’145 The Campaign had thus found itself in a vicious 
circle, hoping to revive a campaign with increased funding and renewed vigour, but alienating 
its primary source of funding. Once again, the anti-Market movement was found to exist 
within the grey area between political pressure and public activism, attempting to straddle 
both but failing to succeed in either. In the early years of SBC, both Christopher Joyce and 
John Coleman called on the committee to issue a definitive strategy, as part of what the 
former called ‘a clear indication to supporters [as to] how the Campaign intends to channel its 
financial resources.’ Joyce argued that donations would subsequently increase, and a ‘greater 
sense of accountability of the Executive to supporters’ would be fostered.146 Coleman called 
for the production of a manifesto and ‘a much greater sense of direction’, with a national 
campaign organiser. In anticipation of the committee saying they could not afford to employ 
an organiser, Coleman asserted that local groups had stated they would finance specific 
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proposals but were wary of money going to a general fund.
147
 Williams responded with a 
claim that the committee were seeking £100 a year from local groups to fund a national 
organiser, but as explained above, they struggled to devise a detailed strategy which would 
fully engage and integrate grassroots anti-Marketeers.
148
 
The case of Oliver Smedley, a vocal proponent of the Campaign’s professionalization, 
demonstrates the conflicting strategies of the anti-Market movement. His ambitions in the 
mid-1980s echoed the calls from the likes of Coleman for a well co-ordinated, nationally-
organised, active campaign. Smedley stated that he was willing to donate towards the 
employment of an ambitious full-time Executive, provided he ‘knew that [the money] was not 
going to be dribbled away in an amateurish fashion, but used to good and fruitful effect.’149 
Smedley wished to improve the image of the Campaign by combining a prestigious 
committee of well-known names with a network of active local groups. In an attempt to move 
away from the ‘petty cash-box level’, Smedley believed that ‘the money will come if we go 
out to deserve it.’150 Yet paradoxically, it was Smedley’s action which did the most to 
financially cripple the Campaign and take funding away from activism, whilst also 
demonstrating the distance between committee and membership. After Smedley incurred 
substantial legal costs from the attempt to prevent a shortfall payment by the Treasury 
towards the EEC budget, Williams stated that raising funds for Smedley would use ‘All 
energies for the time being’.151 Williams relayed this priority to local organisers, stating that 
the ‘hard grind of collecting funds for the legal appeal’ must be undertaken, after which ‘we 
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can turn our attention to new positive action’.152 Almost a year later, Williams claimed that as 
most of his time had been spent on this matter, ‘our efforts have not met with the success we 
would like.’153 While Smedley had defended the action by saying it had brought the 
Campaign out of the ‘Petty Cash Book mentality which was in danger of stultifying all 
progress’, it became clear that the legal case had revealed the distance between the tiers of its 
organisation.
154
 The chairman Lord Stoddart clarified the difficulty of repeatedly appealing to 
members for funds, including the ‘problems of explaining such a complicated problem in 
terms likely to get a response’.155 Indeed, some local branch members were angered by the 
sudden decision to proceed with the costly action without consultation of groups or 
members.
156
 The difficulty of combining high-level political action with local grassroots 
activism therefore continued to be a prohibitive burden on the Campaign. 
The clash over the nature of campaigning and moving away from ‘orthodox anti-
marketism’ 
 
In its position between lobbying body and public campaign, differences arose within 
the Campaign over the potential revival of a mass movement opposing European integration. 
In the initial post-referendum origins of SBC, a relative consensus as to the scaled-back 
operations of the anti-Market campaign was accepted, with leading anti-Marketeers not 
wishing to be seen as extremists rejecting the referendum result. By the late 1970s, however, 
the same figures within SBC who called for greater grassroots involvement attempted to 
pressure the committee into a mass campaign. Once again, the future direction of the 
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Campaign was in a tug-of-war between the more ambitious newcomers– along with older die-
hards such as Oliver Smedley – against the more cautious old hands in the committee who 
perceived the battle to be in the political arena, and sought Westminster personnel 
accordingly. 
John Coleman was once more highly active in calling for a new direction for the 
Campaign. Although aware of the limitations both financially and in terms of the low 
prominence of the EEC issue, Coleman was also aware that while ‘the main battle at the 
moment is in Westminster’, and that a large-scale public campaign shortly after the 
referendum ‘would fall flat’ and be counter-productive. However, he felt that in the future ‘a 
campaign will be widely demanded’, and that the organisation should not proceed with a 
wholly political orientation. Coleman even predicted the need for a united anti-EEC party to 
counter any potential pro-EEC social democratic coalition government, with all the party 
organisation and national support which that would entail.
157
 In Coleman’s view, the rift 
between ambitious anti-Marketeers seeking a more populist mass campaign and cautious 
committee figures – evident in the ‘fundamental conflict’ between the Common Market 
Safeguards Campaign and Get Britain Out in the referendum campaign – was stifling the anti-
EEC movement.
158
 
Other SBC figures also pushed for a more widespread public campaign. As local 
group leaders, they were perhaps keen to see control wrested away from the politicians in the 
central committee through a more decentralised operational structure. Christopher Joyce had 
pressed for Williams to make SBC and the Anti-Common Market League ‘more 
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demonstrative’, and that local groups were eager for a ‘much more positive campaign’.159 
Regional organiser Bill Pearce was even more insistent on the need for mass mobilisation. In 
a frank exchange of letters with Shaun Stewart, he criticised the circumspect management of 
SBC’s activities by stating that ‘[t]actics are alright. But an organisation which consists of 
generals and no troops as a result has not really achieved much.’160 The likes of Coleman and 
Smedley, in fact, acted as a buffer between those figures who opposed the presence of MPs 
within SBC, and the politicians themselves in the committee. Coleman warned of the 
activities of Patrick Holden, a demagogue within the anti-Market campaign who preferred (or 
was perhaps forced) to operate under the National Council of Anti-Common Market 
Organisations banner, and his appeal to local groups who had felt ignored or ostracised. 
Coleman repeated one group’s accusation that the committee in London were ‘totally failing 
to take the lead’ and were ‘forced to share the view of Pat Holdern [sic] that the movement 
should kick out the MPs and get ahead with a mass movement of the people of this country.’ 
Believing this to be ‘a dangerously unconstitutional standpoint’, Coleman sought 
reorganisation and revival of SBC in order to prevent the development of a ‘bandwagon type 
campaign’ that could be attacked and dismantled by the media.161 
Coleman was thus attempting to heal the rift and decrease the distance between 
committee and grassroots and tackle what he called ‘the dilemma of politics’. While 
expressing sympathy with those Campaign members who were ‘absolutely anti-politicians 
and want the campaign to be run by non-political people’, he recognised the paradoxical tactic 
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of trying to restore parliamentary sovereignty while distancing the Campaign entirely from 
Westminster. In Coleman’s words, ‘Our aim must be not to get rid of our elected 
representatives but to make them do our will.’162 Anti-political rhetoric, which had remained a 
part of anti-EEC discourse since the days of the Anti-Common Market League attacking the 
Macmillan Government in the early 1960s, had come back to haunt the Campaign. Inability to 
combine mass pressure with political support curbed the development of the Campaign in 
both public and political spheres, as it had done for the past two decades. Coleman’s hopes to 
unite the different strata within ‘a new kind of campaign’, along with Smedley’s plans to 
combine high-profile donors and committee members with ‘decentralisation’ including 
women’s and youth sections in an expanded mass campaign, represented attempts to bridge 
the ‘grey-area’ divide.163 
Countering the pragmatism and caution of the committee, however, was difficult. 
Attempts to expand activities on anything other than a small scale were met with reactions 
ranging from rebuttal to scorn. In SBC’s early years, proposals put forward to record the 
activities of all other anti-Market organisations in a quarterly paper were dismissed as ‘[m]uch 
too complicated’.164 Previously, having seen the losses that CMSC’s Resistance News had 
incurred, the committee warned Coleman of the potential costs of his own organisation’s 
Market News along the lines he wished to follow.
165
 Coleman and Joyce continued to press 
for a news-sheet that would at least collate all the activities of local groups and list the 
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publications of anti-Market organisations.
166
 Attempts to send summaries of committee 
decisions were pressed for by Joyce, Coleman and Stewart, and were eventually accepted 
despite some reluctance from the committee, such as Williams who felt it would be better to 
provide vague information about ‘the main direction in which we are trying to go’.167 
Attempts of figures within SBC to revive popular mobilisation and demonstrations 
proved even more difficult. While local group leaders sought to re-launch a public campaign 
based around a petition against direct elections to the European Assembly and a national day 
of demonstration, the committee were wary that low turnout could potentially backfire, both 
financially and in terms of media coverage. Without ‘[l]iterally vast numbers of signatures’ 
and ‘thousands of people’ in ‘hundreds of places’ respectively, both activities were seen as 
counter-productive.
168
 Once again, the question of how best to mount a public campaign on an 
emotive issue with diminished resources was the subject of controversy within the anti-
Market movement. Figures such as Joyce sought ‘energetic groups in [the most] vulnerable 
constituencies’ where MPs were undecided or with low majorities, so as to direct mass 
pressure against political targets.
169
 The committee, however, remained pessimistic at the 
prospect of reviving a large-scale campaign of activism. Williams reiterated the need for those 
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public meetings without the draw of Enoch Powell to be held in small halls, so as to avoid 
negative coverage in the media.
170
 Stewart defended this strategy, claiming that 
…if some of us have been cautious – and caution is actually foreign to my own 
nature – it has been because I know from long experience as a civil servant that 
demonstrations consisting of two men and a boy are not going to convince 
anyone.
171
 
 
This was an attitude that continued into the 1980s, with BACMC unsure as to whether public 
meetings should be ‘designed to attract new members, or to provide a rallying point for the 
faithful’.172 The committee’s pessimism as to the extent of potential support shaped both their 
political approach and their reluctance to attempt reviving a public campaign. 
Refusal to entertain suggestions on the organisation and strategy of the Campaign was 
unremitting. As mentioned above, many of John Coleman’s suggestions for the campaign 
were met with reluctance or derision, such as his ambitious idea to launch a youth campaign 
by getting anti-Market literature into school staff rooms and local education authorities, which 
the committee dismissed as ‘dreaming’.173 The ideas of David Axton, a local group founder 
recommended by Smedley for employment within SBC, also clearly represented the 
difference of opinion between the committee and other personnel. In an attempt to bring the 
grassroots and the national organisation closer together, Axton proposed that activism of the 
former, which lay outside of party politics and ‘cannot seen to be condoned by the MPs’, 
should be overseen by the Anti-Common Market League while SBC fulfilled the role of a 
national co-ordinating body. It was hoped that grassroots membership would grow as a result 
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of local groups being ‘freer to undertake activities’.174 In a dismissive reply, Williams 
explained that an employed organiser’s role was to increase membership and income, rather 
than the ‘pure waste of time’ of making suggestions on reorganisation to ‘the existing 
dedicated anti-Marketeers’.175 Once again, ambition and pragmatism were in stark conflict. 
Partly as a result of such stubborn dismissals from Williams, a campaign was briefly 
launched in the late 1970s to remove him as Secretary of SBC, in order to adopt a more 
imaginative approach. Coleman laid the blame for SBC’s stagnation on the activities of 
Williams and the tone of his letters, while Joyce also complained of the ‘atmosphere of 
acrimony’ at committee meetings.176 An ‘urgent circular’ signed by a number of local anti-
Market groups and associations was sent out in early 1979. It protested at the ‘obstructiveness 
and discourtesy’ of Williams, with one group describing his actions as ‘overbearing and rude’ 
and calling for his resignation. Members were asked to vote against him at the next committee 
elections, on the grounds that SBC needed ‘energy, imagination and absolute commitment’.177 
Coleman perceived this attitude to exist in the majority of the committee, which had ‘done 
much to deaden the effect of the Campaign’ and to alienate some useful members.178 
Williams would survive as Secretary of the Campaign for several decades, yet the 
calls for a new approach continued to be made. Coleman launched attempts in the late 1970s 
and 1980s to broaden the scope of the anti-Market movement and to raise the profile of the 
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anti-Market case in the media. The latter, a venture dubbed the Anti-Common Market Project, 
drew inspiration from campaigns that combined public activism with social, economic and 
political concerns. Working in collaboration with Richard Wiggs and Professor Horace Rose, 
the Anti-Concorde Project was the predominant influence upon this scheme, the former being 
its founder. Both campaigns operated through soliciting donations from concerned members 
of the public to fund half-page and full-page advertisements promoting their cause in the 
national press, becoming self-perpetuating and self-financing media projects. Coleman and 
Wiggs drew parallels between the Anglo-French collaboration over Concorde and becoming a 
member of the EEC; both were anticipated to be forays into modern European enterprise but 
were perceived, in the groups’ opinions, as failures.179 
The Anti-Common Market Project aimed to both keep what was becoming a lapsed 
issue alive in the mainstream press, and to gain the support and involvement of people 
opposed to EEC membership who were reluctant to join movements or organisations. The 
advertisements were both a ‘public education programme’ and timed for maximum political 
influence, such as during party conferences.
180
 The project’s founders saw it as a way of 
preventing the anti-Market campaign from falling into ‘the trap of ‘preaching to the 
converted’ and providing a way to ‘present forcefully the common ground of the anti-Market 
case and to avoid all party political and other associations.’181 Within a few years, Coleman 
was aiming for the project to have a membership of thousands making it ‘a force that the 
major parties can only ignore at their peril’.182 Although BACMC collaborated with the 
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project, Coleman now perceived it as ‘enormously successful’ as ‘a parliamentary liaison and 
co-ordinating committee’, but believed the project had potential as a ‘national campaigning 
body’.183 A series of advertisements in the Guardian, The Times, the Spectator and Tribune, 
was therefore the new anti-Market strategy to attempt to combine public and political 
pressure.
184
 Reactions to the first advertisement in the Guardian – including a strong rebuttal 
in a leader column in The Times, and published responses from the Conservative Group for 
Europe, British Chambers of Commerce and the European Commission, the latter reporting 
the advertisement to the Advertising Standards Authority over alleged inaccuracies – 
demonstrated the political weight of the project.
185
 
The Anti-Common Market Project’s advertisements attempted to both increase 
support for the mass campaign against EEC membership and also broaden the campaign by 
incorporating other social and political issues. However, the first advertisement, in an attempt 
to cover the aforementioned ‘common ground’, was similar to the majority of previous anti-
Market literature, dealing with a number of issues such as unemployment, trade, food policy 
and sovereignty.
186
 The Project’s propaganda came to be more focused in later 
advertisements, particularly regarding the increasingly prominent issue of unemployment. As 
the British-EEC dialogue focused increasingly on Britain’s budgetary contribution and the 
CAP, Coleman sought to publicise the ‘soft-pedalled’ issue of unemployment ‘loud and clear’ 
through advertisements, with information and examples of firms that had suffered or closed 
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during EEC membership and ‘the movement of plant by the very big firms and multinationals 
to the Continent’.187 A full-page advertisement, titled ‘Brussels and the dole queues’, was 
subsequently drafted.
188
 
Coleman, along with other figures on the fringes of the committee, had sought to tailor 
their propaganda and campaigns to specific groups, issues and campaigns for some time. The 
Common Market Monitoring Association’s newsletter, Market News, was intended to appeal 
to the wider network of anti-Market sentiment beyond the realm of the existing activists, with 
Coleman attempting to ‘create overlaps with the interests of others [sic] significant 
organisations’. As well as targeting political parties and trade unions, links were forged with 
environmental and peace movements, in part due to the first issue’s article by the academic 
Mary Kaldor which, according to Coleman, led the newsletter to be ‘distributed nationally 
through CND and various peace organisations’.189 His attempt to gain support through 
ecological and anti-nuclear groups, as well as more conventional organisations such as the 
National Federation of Self-Employed, was part of a wider strategy to transcend what 
Coleman dubbed the ‘orthodox anti-marketism’ which had stifled the anti-EEC campaign. At 
the turn of the decade, Coleman was scathing in his criticism of SBC’s lack of imagination, 
complaining that ‘[n]othing effective is being done to draw together all the various groups of 
people threatened by the EEC’. Just as pro-Marketeers targeted specific interest groups, it was 
suggested that the anti-Market campaign tailored its message toward producers, consumers 
and the third sector. Thus, anti-nuclear groups would be warned of the ‘extreme threat’ of 
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EEC energy policy, propaganda would target the ‘alternativist movement’ and ‘anti-big 
technology view’, and organisations from political parties to animal welfare movements 
would be seen as potential bases of support.
190
 As Coleman stated to Williams, 
I would like to see Safeguard Britain Campaign supplying its supporters with 
appropriate literature for every kind of political meeting from right-wing 
environmentalists to the mass of Trade Union meetings which recently took place 
in London.
191
 
 
Other fringe members of the Campaign shared this view. The committee invited the 
activist Reverend John Papworth to play a greater role within BACMC based on his ideas for 
increasing fundraising and public support. Whereas Williams had previously dubbed him the 
‘collarless cleric’ who ‘talked excitable rubbish’, Papworth’s ideas began to be seen as 
useful.
192
 In a lengthy memorandum advocating ‘a massive campaign’ for withdrawal, 
Papworth advocated tailoring BACMC’s messages to appeal to different support bases, 
stating the need to ‘define more exactly at whom our literature is directed’, from academics to 
activists, ‘and to sharpen the contents accordingly’. Unemployment was again a key theme to 
be utilised, in order for BACMC to ‘think forward’ and show how it is ‘related to the 
problems of people, especially young people, today.’193 
As well as suggesting BACMC organise around specific interest groups and 
occupations, Papworth recognised the burgeoning social movement sector and the ‘New Left’, 
in part due to his experience in pacifist and civil rights movements. Acknowledging ‘the 
profound transformation in consciousness’ where young radicals would join counter-cultural 
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movements rather than socialist or communist parties, he encouraged BACMC to reach out to 
these causes and movements.
194
 Furthermore, inspired by the works of E.F. Schumacher and 
Leopold Kohr, Papworth felt it should cater to the former’s ‘small is beautiful’ mantra.195 As 
with the liberal anti-Marketeers who saw EEC membership as an expansion of ‘big 
government’, Papworth felt BACMC could secure the support of the radical, educated youth 
in Britain’s post-materialist society whose ethos was for ‘a human scale approach’ and in 
favour of ‘non-centralised forms of power’.196 Coleman shared this liberalist critique of the 
EEC, calling in the late 1980s for ‘a Europe based on co-operation, not on coercion’, with 
individual liberty made paramount rather than ‘superimposed common policies and artificially 
contrived harmonisation’. The ‘distinction between European co-operation and European 
institutions’, and a favouring of intergovernmental agreement over supranationalism, echoed 
the traditional anti-EEC rhetoric from the early 1960s onwards, as did Coleman’s vision of a 
‘new Europe [protecting] the interests of 250 million consumers’ – a case of old wine in new 
bottles following the free-trade liberalist arguments of the 1960s and 1970s.
197
  
BACMC took some of these suggestions on board, and began in the mid-1980s to 
target particular groups by evoking certain contemporaneous issues. Central to its propaganda 
in this period were the issues of the EEC budget and Britain’s trade deficit, and the effects of 
EEC membership on unemployment. While BACMC campaigned against increased EEC 
taxation during the 1980s via its “More Down The Drain” leaflet, Sir Robin Williams and 
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Richard Body began to plan a campaigning theme based on unemployment to supplant it.
198
 
When the committee met at the end of 1984 to discuss future strategy, emphasis was once 
more on a public and parliamentary campaign based around the subject of unemployment, 
with Douglas Jay again advocating emphasis on issues which were ‘easily understood’ and 
resonated with the public, sidestepping the problem of limited resources with ‘a steady drip-
drip of propaganda over a longer period’. Hugh Gilmour echoed these sentiments, developing 
his aforementioned endorsement of detailed research with calls for expertise on certain related 
subjects ‘where the speaker or writer is obviously interested in the subject for itself – Peace, 
Unemployment, the Third World’. Richard Body’s aforementioned works on agriculture were 
presented as examples of a domestic problem presented with an anti-EEC solution.
199
 
Williams subsequently approached Body – who had ‘given up hope of persuading BACMC’ 
to press the issue of unemployment – to devise a study on this issue undertaken by a research 
organisation such as the Institute for Economic Affairs.
200
 Williams’s approach was motivated 
by the suggestion of veteran anti-Marketeer Leo Russell, who had seen a Common Market 
Watchdog article on the effect of membership on the motor industry, and suggested an 
industry-by-industry study.
201
 Predictably, however, BACMC lacked the funds to commission 
a willing research organisation to undertake the study.
202
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The Campaign’s interaction with emerging issues espoused by new social movements 
was also extremely limited. Whereas some interest in these issues had been expressed by the 
committee, this awareness was not developed into formal or informal connections with groups 
and movements potentially sympathetic to the anti-EEC cause, preventing the opportunity to 
expand its own support base. Lack of any working relationship with the global poverty and 
third world movement is one telling example. After its initial application for a research grant 
to the Joseph Rowntree Social Service Trust, a disagreement arose between Williams and the 
Campaign’s chairman, Nigel Spearing MP, on how to resubmit the application. At a 
committee meeting, Richard Body had suggested launching a specific project related to third 
world development for which they could receive a research grant. Spearing had understood 
that the project had been given approval, but Williams and the committee had deemed it 
‘periferal [sic] to our main purpose’ for which the Campaign ‘need money now’. An 
application was subsequently resubmitted for a grant to put the wider anti-Market argument 
across, with the third world project left as ‘a fall-back position if rejected’.203 Some effort to 
connect the anti-EEC campaign with the ongoing third world famine was made via the press, 
including comments on the ‘appalling reality of thousands of people dying of starvation in 
Ethiopia and elsewhere while there is food in grotesque abundance mouldering in expensive 
European storehouses’.204 An approach was also made to the editor of the Panorama 
television programme to return to the issue of the CAP and linking it with the issue of 
proposed further integration.
205
 However, despite keeping track of arguments and figures 
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utilised by groups such as the World Development Movement, no formal links were made 
with organisations connected to international development and global poverty.
206
 
Inability to engage with the network of social movements on a variety of different 
issues is further demonstrated by the failure to work with the Greenham Peace Camp 
protestors. BACMC had utilised figures from a Guardian article in a Common Market 
Watchdog piece on the EEC’s destruction of food.207 The Guardian article, however, was 
predominantly about the demonstrations outside the Intervention Board headquarters at 
Reading by the women of the nearby Greenham Peace Camp. The ‘broad conscience’ of the 
protestors led them to use the ‘network of consumer, peace, political and women’s groups’ to 
campaign against the hoarding and destruction of food. Inability to form a working 
relationship with the ‘Mountain Movers’ of the article, or the wider activist network, 
represented a fundamental inability to engage with the emerging issues which Coleman and 
Papworth had highlighted the importance of.
208
 Refusal to relate anti-EEC propaganda to the 
nuclear issue on the grounds that ‘anyone who takes an anti-nuclear line is liable to be 
considered a crank or a communist’ also limited the Campaign’s outlook.209 
This desire to exclude political extremists or mavericks, as set out in the SBC’s 
foundations, may have contributed to its inability to branch out to other movements and 
issues. It was felt by most of the committee that by focusing on the issue of EEC membership 
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alone, the Campaign was less likely to repel leaders or supporters on political grounds. Some 
anti-Marketeers, including Oliver Smedley, lamented the ‘political balancing act’ inherent in 
this approach.
210
 However, this desire to bridge the party political or ideological divide led to 
the Campaign basing propaganda on ‘the general case against the EEC’ and ‘arguments… 
which are suitable for all audiences’.211 Along with the Anti-Common Market Project’s 
aforementioned presentation of the ‘common ground of the anti-Market case’, the Campaign 
and its publication stuck to the ‘orthodox anti-marketism’ which Coleman had criticised, 
ensuring propaganda was confined to the issue of the EEC.
212
 
Coleman’s strategy to ensure the Campaign’s cross-party character was to develop 
working relationships with party political anti-EEC groups. He suggested that the 
Conservative and Liberal parties should have a ‘Common Market Safeguards Campaign’ like 
Labour’s, in order to ‘foster an inter-party consciousness among anti-Marketeers’ and make 
the Campaign a co-ordinating body heading the wider anti-Market movement.
213
. Along with 
targeting ecological, anti-nuclear, peace and alternativist movements, it was proposed that the 
Campaign appeal to members of political parties for support, by emphasising the EEC’s 
‘threat to true Conservatives, […] true Liberals, […] true Socialists, [and] Communists’.214 
However, with the majority of its key political figures belonging to the predominantly anti-
Market Labour Party, the Campaign needed to target the increasingly sceptical Conservative 
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rank-and-file, and find ‘means of identifying Conservatism with the anti-Market case’.215 The 
final section of this chapter will analyse the attempt to gain Conservative support through the 
prism of the Campaign’s own changing position between scepticism or “safeguards”, and 
outright calls for British withdrawal from the EEC. 
The fluctuation between scepticism and outright hostility 
While there was some opposition to the more moderate foundations of SBC, based 
around anti-federalism and scepticism of further European integration, the majority of anti-
Market leaders formed a consensus on the ‘safeguarding’ tactics. The activities and rhetoric of 
SBC in its first few years mirrored its initial aims of seeking to ‘reduce the damage to Britain 
from the more unacceptable and unfair consequences of membership’ and embracing those ‘in 
favour of co-operation with our European partners within the present framework, but who 
have little sympathy with the sillier excesses of that tiny but vocal minority of Euro-
fanatics’.216 Press statements therefore presented critiques of harmful or unacceptable 
policies, including those ‘imposing a federal superstructure which no one wants, and… 
harmonising everything in sight’.217 As a result, much of SBC’s early focus was on the first 
direct elections to the European Assembly, seen as ‘a major step’ towards a federal Europe 
opposed by the British government and public.
218
 This position reflected the attitudes of much 
of the wider anti-Market campaign, such as the Labour Common Market Safeguards 
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Committee whom the Campaign commended for ‘holding the fundamentalists at bay’ in the 
production of a draft pamphlet.
219
 
However, dissent regarding the Campaign’s title and objectives continued to manifest 
in the late 1970s. Air Vice-Marshal Don Bennett was a particular critic who, in addition to 
believing SBC had been subject of a ‘take-over’ by personnel of the Common Market 
Safeguards Campaign, favoured a more militant name. Williams defended the Safeguard 
Britain Campaign title, which was chosen with ‘the fewest objections to it for our purposes’ 
and to attract the more moderate support it had failed to win over during the referendum. The 
‘different situation’, according to Williams, meant that ‘other names more attractive to 
straightforward anti-Common Market fighters’ were to be temporarily shelved.220 These 
included Bennett’s suggestion of British Independence Campaign, and David Axton’s 
proposed revival of the ‘Get Britain Out’ slogan as there were many who felt it ‘would be a 
much more effective name for the movement as a whole.’221 Figures within SBC were 
therefore forced to defend its name and position, including Coleman who believed Safeguard 
Britain Campaign was ‘a good and appropriate title’ and felt ‘the campaign against the title 
has been set in motion to weaken and split our campaign’, and Williams whose letters to 
supporters stated that while withdrawal was still favoured, ‘the best tactics at this stage would 
be to adhere to the [Campaign’s] statement of aims’.222 
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This uneasy compromise between strands of the Campaign unravelled with the row in 
1979 over the membership of Hugh Simmonds on SBC’s committee. Simmonds, instrumental 
in SBC’s formation, had come under criticism for speaking at a pro-Market Conservative 
Party meeting. He explained that while wholeheartedly against membership, he felt that anti-
Marketeers should ‘accept that for the present we are members of the Market, an institution 
which needs radical change, and an institution within which we should fight most vigorously 
against federalism.’223 As a result, he was willing to adopt an anti-federalist position within 
the Conservative Party, but his support of Conservative candidates in the direct elections was 
in conflict with the SBC’s policy of boycotting the elections. Several committee members 
defended Simmonds on the grounds that SBC should cover ‘the widest possible range of 
opposition’ and ‘a fairly wide spectrum of views’.224 Williams felt that Simmonds ‘was doing 
more good for our cause by opposing federalism at that particular meeting than by raising the 
straight Common Market issue of “in” or “out”.’225 Other members, on the other hand, 
expected Simmonds to resign, and Williams’s defence of Simmonds was the catalyst for the 
circular calling for the removal of Williams as Secretary of SBC, signed by twenty-one 
different anti-Market groups, including Coleman’s Common Market Monitoring 
Association.
226
 This conflict over SBC’s principal objective and tactics led to Simmonds 
absenting himself from committee meetings in this period, and would continue to divide 
members of the committee in the following decade. 
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A number of resolutions at the 1980 AGM calling for a more hard-line programme 
focused on withdrawal set the tone for a shift in the Campaign’s policy.227 Shortly after, 
Shaun Stewart suggested a change of the Campaign’s name may be beneficial, yet the 
majority of the committee, led by Sir Ronald Bell and Enoch Powell, felt such a change was 
premature and the subject was deferred.
228
 The subject arose again the following year, as 
more uncompromising names for the organisation were discussed.
229
 Readers of Common 
Market Watchdog were invited to submit suggestions for an alternative, or to state their 
support for the existing name.
230
 A slender majority voted for a name change, the most 
popular suggestions being a title incorporating ‘Anti-Common Market’ or ‘Against the 
Common Market’, followed by suggestions incorporating ‘independence’/‘independent’ or 
‘freedom’/‘free’, demonstrating the desire for a campaign toward withdrawal.231 While the 
committee voted to retain the name later that year by eight votes to three, Bennett moved a 
resolution at the 1982 AGM for a name ‘to mention the Common Market and to express 
clearly… opposition to it.’232 Despite some opposition from committee members on the 
grounds that the present name ‘had more appeal for the unconverted’, the resolution to change 
to the British Anti-Common Market Campaign was carried by forty-seven votes to seven, 
demonstrating the more hard-line sentiment amongst the Campaign’s rank-and-file.233 
Combined with the name change, the Campaign’s objectives changed to include ‘restoration 
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of full national sovereignty’, repeal of the European Communities Act and free association 
with other nations including Commonwealth members.
234
 
Figures within the Campaign perceived it to be an opportune time to move towards 
such an uncompromising stance. The change was explained to supporters as ‘both a reflection 
of our true convictions and of the growing strength of opposition to British membership of the 
EEC.’235 It was also described as ‘the signal to redouble our efforts’ and increase membership 
in support of British withdrawal from the EEC.
236
 With opinion on the EEC hardening in both 
the Labour and Conservative parties, anti-Marketeers had as early as 1980 been advocating 
that the Campaign should become more hard-line, ‘when all factors seem to be working in 
favour of withdrawal or major changes in the EEC and voting public [of] all parties is with 
us.’237 The 1980 Labour Party Conference passed a resolution calling for a commitment to 
withdrawal to be included in the next manifesto, and a statement outlining a twelve-month 
withdrawal timetable was passed even more overwhelmingly the following year.
238
 The 
party’s 1983 manifesto, as part of a radical socialist programme, was committed to EEC 
withdrawal. The Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher had also toughened its 
stance towards the EEC during the ongoing impasse regarding Britain’s budgetary 
contribution.
239
 In this political climate, along with the opportunity to ‘square up to the 
Common Market’ over the Falklands Crisis and the loss of Britain’s veto, a move to a 
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stronger anti-Market position appeared the most logical way to revive the campaign.
240
 In 
addition to his suggestions to target specific groups for support, Reverend John Papworth 
believed clarification of purpose was central to revival, as 
…the state of public opinion in relation to Britain’s membership of the EEC is 
sufficient to warrant, with considerable chances of success, a massive campaign to 
secure Britain’s withdrawal... […] All public utterances and all propaganda needs 
to be based on that clear-cut objective. We must not indulge in fudging of this 
basic principle by entering into any discussion about improving the terms of 
‘membership’ or similar exercises which can only result in creating confusion of 
purpose.
241
 
 
Around the same time as the Campaign’s stance hardened towards withdrawal, a 
group of MPs within the Conservative Party was taking an increasingly sceptical stance 
towards the terms of EEC membership. The Conservative European Reform Group, founded 
in November 1980, brought together thirty-six Conservative backbenchers with ‘severe 
reservations about the effect of the terms of membership of the EEC and certain trends and 
developments within the Community.’242 Support outside of Parliament came from 
Conservatives for European Reform [COFER], which was later allied with the parliamentary 
group.
243
 The Conservative European Reform Group sought ‘fundamental reform of the 
Common Market’, particularly the CAP and Britain’s budgetary contribution, and the 
restoration of limited powers to national parliaments.
244
 The group caused controversy within 
                                                          
240
 Letter from Sir Robin Williams to Mrs G Dennis, Secretary of Eastbourne and District Branch of BACMC, 9 
June 1982, CIB/3/1, BLPES  
241
 Memorandum by John Papworth, addressed to members of the British Anti-Common Market Campaign, 
December 1982, CIB/3/1, BLPES 
242
 Conservative European Reform Group leaflet [n.d., December 1980], THCR 2/11/7, Churchill Archives 
Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge 
243
 COFER campaigned ‘for a fairer deal in Britain in the EEC’ on the same points as the Conservative European 
Reform Group – “How To Win the Next General Election”, Conservatives for European Reform leaflet [n.d., 
1985?], CIB/3/2, BLPES 
244
 Conservative European Reform Group leaflet [n.d., December 1980], THCR 2/11/7, Churchill Archives 
Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge 
 280 
 
the party, with its objectives described as ‘irreconcilable with the settled policies of this party 
and this Government’ and ‘a dud prospectus’.245 Policies such as ‘the complete wind-up of the 
Common Agricultural Policy’ were seen as ‘clearly beyond the possibility of being 
negotiable’.246  
The party hierarchy thus sought to temper the group’s position. Discussions at 
Conservative Central Office led to agreement that individual members of the group would be 
warned, and that despite its ‘innocuous name’ the group should be ‘actively discouraged from 
the top’.247 A subsequent meeting with Thatcher served to both clarify and moderate the 
group’s policies. Various members of the group presented themselves as sceptics challenging 
the wisdom of EEC policies, with Teddy Taylor proclaiming them ‘reformers, not apologists’ 
for the EEC. Others asserted the need to defend British interests, with one MP describing the 
group as ‘fighting for a Gaullist Europe’. The only two members to voice opposition to 
continuing British membership of the EEC were Sir Ronald Bell and Richard Body – both 
involved with SBC – and it was suggested that their stance was incompatible with 
membership of the group. The fact that half of the group had been elected for the first time at 
the 1979 election arguably made these MPs more persuasive to direction from the leadership, 
and Thatcher’s claim that she had only been upset by ‘the way the press had reported the 
purposes of the Group’ demonstrated a lack of concern regarding the group’s outlook.248 The 
wording of the group’s aims was modified so that previous references to fundamental changes 
                                                          
245
 Hansard Oral Answers, 3 December 1980, in THCR 2/11/7, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, 
Cambridge 
246
 Memorandum from  Lord Thorneycroft to Ian Gow, Private Parliamentary Secretary to Margaret Thatcher, 5 
December 1980, THCR 2/11/7, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge 
247
 Memorandum from  Lord Thorneycroft to Ian Gow, Private Parliamentary Secretary to Margaret Thatcher, 5 
December 1980, THCR 2/11/7, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge 
248
 Minutes of a meeting between Margaret Thatcher, Sir Nicholas Bonsor, Chairman of the Conservative 
European Reform Group, and thirty-six members of the Conservative European Reform Group at 10 Downing 
Street, 15 December 1980, THCR 2/11/7, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge 
 281 
 
made ‘either in the basic structure of the Common Market or else in the relationship that 
Britain has with the Community’, to the ‘ending of the CAP’, and the ‘reassertion of power of 
national Parliaments over the institutions of the Community’ were omitted.249 
Therefore, the Campaign’s aim of withdrawal conflicted with the more moderate, 
sceptical aims of the Conservative European Reform Group. While the latter was able to 
present itself as a group for Conservative sceptics in favour of fundamental EEC reform, the 
Campaign retained a more extreme image that prevented it from gaining political influence. 
Sir Robin Williams had in correspondence quoted a speech by Enoch Powell in 1977 claiming 
there was no difference between repeal and modification of the European Communities Act, 
as ‘[t]he modifications which Britain requires would, if accepted by the Community, render 
repeal superfluous’ and ‘[t]he minimum of these modifications is to regain for Britain the 
status of an independent nation state’.250 Powell’s aforementioned acquiescence regarding the 
Safeguard Britain Campaign title, however, demonstrated the support for a sceptical image 
and objectives, whilst simultaneously working towards the hidden objective of withdrawal or 
entirely different terms of membership. John Coleman shared this view, believing that 
attracting anti-federalist pro-Marketeers necessitated ‘playing down our ultimate objective – 
to get our [sic] or destroy the Common Market.’ Coleman cited the example of the 
Scandinavian anti-Market campaigns which had succeeded in harnessing ‘the wider pressure 
of anti-federalism’ instead of ‘purely negative-seeming anti-Market appeal.’251 While the 
Conservative European Reform Group were accused of ‘masquerad[ing] as reformers’, its 
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members, even in private correspondence, asserted their belief that the group’s objectives 
were not incompatible with membership, highlighting the pressure for reform from other 
member states as evidence.
252
 In the case of the Campaign, however, the mask was beginning 
to slip before its name change, as seen in a Common Market Watchdog article criticising 
‘those that believe that the EEC can be reformed from within’, who were unable to ‘counter 
the pure doctrine of the EEC’.253 
As a result, the new approach and title of BACMC alienated political support from 
Conservatives, who may previously have been attracted by the sceptical, anti-federalist, 
patriotic approach of the Safeguard Britain Campaign. Once again, the anti-Market movement 
had failed to find the correct balance between political recognition and the basis for a popular 
movement. The need to correct the mistake of the referendum campaign by attracting more 
Conservative support was identified in the earliest moments of the Safeguard Britain 
Campaign, as it looked towards the forthcoming direct elections legislation. The charge of 
‘identifying Conservatism with the anti-Market cause’ was seen as one of its most pressing 
tasks.
254
 Coleman’s suggestions included an aforementioned ‘Conservative Common Market 
Safeguards Committee’, to act as 
…a focal point for the whole gamut of doubts about the Common Market from the 
total doubt of the anti-Marketeers, through the partial doubts of anti-federalists 
down to those with specific hostilities to particular Brussels directives.
255
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This ‘arena of partial dissatisfactions’ was where Coleman felt the Campaign should be 
drawing its support.
256
 The Campaign’s new title immediately saw some of that support begin 
to desert it. Hugh Simmonds, one of the more pragmatic committee members, swiftly 
declared his opposition to the ‘simple and strident call for withdrawal’ reflected in the British 
Anti-Common Market Campaign name, and resigned his membership of both the committee 
and the Campaign.
257
 
Seeking support of Conservative politicians both inside and outside of the European 
Reform Group would also prove difficult. A reply from Peter Lilley to BACMC, which had 
pressured candidates on their views regarding the EEC in the run-up to the 1983 election, 
summed up the position of many within the party. While Lilley shared the attitudes of 
BACMC on issues such as the budget, the CAP and parliamentary sovereignty, he declared 
that he was not in favour of withdrawal and instead sought to ‘modify the EEC and make it 
work in our interest if we are prepared to be sufficiently robust about it.’258 Approaches to the 
Conservative European Reform Group were similarly unsuccessful. Most of these were 
concerned with finding Richard Body’s successor as vice-chairman of BACMC between 1984 
and 1985. Williams, however, discovered that MPs within the Conservative European Reform 
Group had declared that ‘it would be counter-productive for them to become a Vice-President 
within the context of the work they are doing within the Conservative Party’.259 When Body 
was asked for suggestions on his successor, he was similarly pessimistic on the chances of 
persuading a European Reform Group member and suggested approaching a Conservative 
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peer.
260
 A similar approach to COFER was also unsuccessful. Smedley had suggested inviting 
its secretary, John Rattray, to run a youth section of BACMC, but Rattray refused due to the 
‘possible conflict with the reformist approach of COFER’, and was unable to recommend 
anyone from the Young Conservatives for the position.
261
 The tactics of the reform groups, 
which Williams described as ‘avoiding outright opposition to the EEC but undermining it by 
reform’, were therefore in stark conflict with BACMC.262 
The change in name and objectives of the Campaign were therefore increasingly 
perceived to have been an ill-timed mistake. After the clear rejection of the Labour Party 
manifesto in the 1983 election, of which EEC withdrawal was a major part, the inability to 
attract support to a hard-line position stifled the Campaign. Furthermore, the issue of the 
Falklands War served to divide anti-Marketeers, with the Anti-Common Market League’s 
longstanding president Victor Montagu resigning in the belief that campaigning against the 
EEC would be ‘inopportune and counterproductive’ after its support of British military 
action.
263
 As BACMC’s committee convened to discuss strategy in the mid-1980s, Williams 
stated his belief that the change in name may have backfired as it had now had ‘tactical 
disadvantages’ and ‘precludes us from pursuing the undermining approach of the 
Conservatives for European Reform.’ The priorities, therefore, were to ‘[m]obilise the 
widespread dislike of ordinary people that is at present inert and resigned’, and encourage the 
government to push for reforms so that the Campaign would be ‘pushing at a door already 
beginning to open.’264 A policy document drafted by Chris Jones, formerly a journalist for 
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Tribune and contributor to the Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee, also reached 
the same conclusions.
265
 Previously a hardliner and advocate of Labour’s withdrawal policy, 
Jones now believed that the Campaign must change its title as ‘[a] name that limits our 
options is a luxury we cannot afford.’ In light of the new political situation and the limitations 
of the Campaign’s resources, Jones suggested changing to ‘European Reform Campaign’ in 
order to broaden the base of support, following in the footsteps of Conservative MPs whose 
own organisation was ‘now the strongest and healthiest component of the anti-Market 
movement.’ A broad campaign comprising many different opinions and political persuasions, 
he argued, would be more likely to attract political and press interest, but would falter if based 
on ‘uneasy compromise’ and ‘rigid orthodoxy’.266 
By 1986, however, little had changed. John Coleman, now BACMC’s press officer, 
felt the Campaign’s name was leading to its output being immediately disregarded. By 
contrast, the Conservative European Reform Group was ‘listened to both by politicians and 
the public’, the latter being more receptive to the solution of reform rather than withdrawal. 
More constructive titles were suggested to put them ‘more in line with both the Labour and 
Conservative anti-Market groups’ and to resolve the current ‘absurd situation’ where ‘[w]e 
are the umbrella project and yet the Conservatives cannot support our Media Project.’267 
Coleman would raise the issue again a year later, advocating policies based around a ‘new 
Europe’ of co-operation and democracy. A positive approach and title was proposed to 
reinvigorate the organisation and bring in Eurosceptics, such as Teddy Taylor of the 
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Conservative European Reform Group who ‘made it quite plain… that he cannot operate 
under an anti-Common Market Banner.’268 
In the minds of some leading figures in the Campaign, the difference between 
withdrawal and fundamental reform of the EEC may have been minor. The inability to bring 
together advocates of withdrawal and reform, however, prevented the Campaign from forging 
links with anti-Marketeers operating within political parties. Oliver Smedley’s belief that the 
1983 general election result had freed the issue of EEC membership from party loyalty and 
ideology had been misguided; MPs and party workers were reluctant to work within a non-
party organisation unwilling to stop short of calls for immediate withdrawal from the EEC.
269
 
In attempting to cater to grassroots extremism, the Campaign alienated political support and 
once again found itself unable to incorporate public campaigning with application of pressure 
at the top tiers of British politics. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
By 1987, the anti-EEC movement as led by the British Anti-Common Market 
Campaign was in disarray. John Coleman, by now the Press Officer for the Campaign, 
reported that it was ‘declining’ in terms of both funds and membership, and an entire 
restructuring of the campaign was needed.
1
 Perhaps most importantly, it lacked a sense of 
purpose, identity and direction. On the one hand, some committee members felt that to change 
the Campaign’s uncompromising title would be ‘a mistake’ and ‘completely 
counterproductive’, inviting criticism from pro-Marketeers and diluting the Campaign’s 
‘message to the nation’.2 This strand of the Campaign, favouring consistently high levels of 
activism campaigning toward the ultimate aim of British withdrawal from the EEC, sat 
uneasily with those on the committee who saw the Campaign’s future in professionalization 
and political connections, seeking to exert influence from a narrower base of support than the 
mass membership organisations envisaged in the 1960s. Indeed, one account of the founding 
of the Anti-Federalist League (later UKIP) states that the impetus came from discontents 
within the audience at a meeting of Campaign for an Independent Britain (previously 
BACMC), where the political speakers addressing the meeting downplayed the aim of EEC 
withdrawal.
3
 The decision of the Campaign in the early 1990s to not put forward a by-election 
candidate on the grounds that it ‘would break up the organisation’ as Labour and 
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Conservative MPs in the Campaign ‘would not go along with it’ further emphasises this 
division between being a political or public campaigning organisation.
4
 
Oliver Smedley’s suggestion to professionalise the organisation along the lines of the 
Institute of Economic Affairs, under the leadership of an ambitious and highly active 
individual, implied that the Campaign’s future lay as that of an insider think-tank, making the 
case for British independence from the EEC based on research publications and expertise to 
influence opinion-formers and politicians.
5
 Yet in his comments that the Campaign should be 
‘of greater importance than Greenpeace, CND and many others of which the great British 
public are far more aware’, Smedley still envisaged a groundswell of popular support whose 
interests were to be defended as part of a wider mass movement.
6
 Compared to certain other 
non-governmental organisations and social movements, who bridged the insider-outsider 
dichotomy through representation of a particular sectional interest or specific base of support 
with an engagement with Westminster politics, anti-EEC organisations envisaged themselves 
as the last line of defence in preserving British independence, meaning the confusion between 
exerting influence on the wider public or higher echelons of power would always remain 
prevalent. 
The decline in influence of the Campaign, like the UEM and FU before it, means that 
this study into popular movements for or against British involvement in European integration, 
from the late 1940s to the mid-1980s, is ultimately a story of a study of failure. These 
campaigns and organisations were unable to locate their position within the broad spheres of 
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politics and activism, and unable to translate a highly emotive issue into an effective political 
or mass movement. These campaigns failed for a number of different reasons. A continual 
lack of financial backing, particularly in comparison to the wealthy technocratic pro-Market 
campaigns such as the Britain in Europe or the United Kingdom Council of the European 
Movement, hindered the campaigns’ effectiveness and often accentuated their amateurish 
image, a particular problem on the anti-Market side where individuals and aims were often 
regarded as politically disreputable. The problem of leadership and personality was another 
ongoing problem, with the campaign unable to find a figurehead with both charisma and 
political credibility, who could exemplify the campaign’s cross-party character and also reach 
out to a wider support base.
7
  
The prevalence of party political fringe groups on European integration also stifled the 
growth of non-party campaigns and organisations, with both politicians and supporters 
reluctant to step outside of party politics on the EEC issue in the same way that was evident 
for campaigns on environmentalism, human rights, or peace and disarmament led by non-
governmental organisations. Pro- and anti-integration movements were thus unable to 
depoliticise the issue of British membership of the EEC, a subject that continued to hold roots 
in the policies, legislation, and debates of governments and political parties. Decision-making 
on a governmental and Community level also contributed to the rise and fall in salience of the 
EEC issue within Britain. Popular campaigns for and against European integration ebbed and 
flowed in synchronicity with external events, and by lacking the resources to force the issue to 
prominence, organisations were compelled to be opportunist and try and catch the tide of 
popular opinion as much as mobilise it. For example, the aforementioned difficulty after the 
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referendum of turning a general public dislike or antipathy towards the EEC into anti-Market 
sentiment was reflected by opinion polls which showed the majority of respondents were not 
much interested in matters relating to the EEC.
8
 The fact that ‘opponents of entry included 
many who thought the issue unimportant’ further demonstrates the inert nature of anti-Market 
opposition, and the fact that a majority of poll respondents believed that, as an EEC member 
Britain, would have less say in here affairs and the Six would benefit most had little influence 
on the referendum result.
9
 
However, the primary factor contributing to these issues of finance, leadership and 
support was that in operating across the spheres of institutional politics and popular 
mobilisation, these organisations were continually struggling to define themselves and their 
position within politics and public activism. Anti-EEC organisations, particularly after 
Britain’s entry into the EEC in 1973, struggled to effectively unite the moderate wing of the 
campaign, aiming for more political influence and support, with the more anti-establishment 
section whose paradoxical stance was to eschew Westminster politics while seeking to 
preserve British political sovereignty. This led to disunited campaigns and internal power 
struggles, as highly active individuals within the anti-EEC movement saw its future in 
different sites of activism. FU had similar strategic disagreement in the 1950s over whether to 
continue public campaigning or to become a smaller intellectual pressure group targeting 
opinion-formers.  
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In failing to fully define their position, aims and tactics, these organisations oscillated 
between two differing identities. On the one hand anti-Market organisations sought to define 
themselves by their populism and demagoguery, based on more emotional responses to the 
issue of British EEC membership concerning national identity and heritage, patriotism, and 
the more ‘popular’ notions of sovereignty. Portraying themselves as the true guardians of 
British sovereignty and the protectors of individual democratic rights against the increasingly 
distanced machinery of political parties and the globalisation of politics, their image as 
political outsiders within a grassroots insurrection was reinforced. On the other hand, 
politicians and pragmatists within the campaign sought to define it around political 
respectability and distance the campaign from the more troublesome image of political 
extremism. This was particularly prevalent after the referendum, where the committee of the 
Safeguard Britain Campaign and its successor organisation sought to influence opinion-
formers through expertise and research publications of a high standard, emulating the models 
of Thatcherite think-tanks such as the Centre for Policy Studies which were rising to 
prominence at that time.
10
 Attempts to find wealthy financial backers in order to carry out 
economic studies into the impact of EEC membership signalled a desire to move away from 
the self-funding model of grassroots activism and demonstrations. FU and UEM similarly 
sought to target the public directly, basing their messages around the lofty ideals of pacifism 
and common European values, and hoped for groundswells of support from the bottom up. 
Both, however, were too removed from the political sphere, and the British government’s 
decision to stay out of the European integration process led to both organisations going into 
decline and division over strategy.   
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The distance of these campaigns from the political sphere contributed to another cause 
of their failure, that of the lack of charismatic and professional leadership or directorship. In 
the late 1980s, Oliver Smedley had called for the anti-Market movement to be reconstructed 
around an ambitious professional organiser, highly active and well-connected in the realms of 
policy-making and fundraising. A large part of the anti-Market movement’s problems from 
the 1960s to the 1980s was precisely the lack of this sort of figure. While groups such as the 
Common Market Safeguards Campaign and the Safeguard Britain Campaign had the support 
and leadership of some fairly competent backbenchers, the ability to find one or more 
individuals to bridge the divide between the spheres of Westminster and public protest 
prevented campaigns from captivating both MPs and the electorate. Charismatic figures 
existed within the wider movement, but whether due to internal rivalries, organisational 
incompetence, a predisposition to be involved in a number of different organisations and 
causes (in the case of Oliver Smedley), or a disreputable connection with an unsavoury 
support base (in the case of Enoch Powell), no natural leader emerged to take the campaign 
forward. 
This thesis has sought to broaden the historiography on Britain and Europe by moving 
the focus away from analyses of the formulation of governmental and party policy. 
Furthermore, however, it has analysed the campaigns and organisations on European 
integration outside of the framework of party management. Institutional studies by the likes of 
Mark Aspinwall, Paul Taggart and Simon Usherwood, perceive anti-EU movements from the 
1990s onwards as a ‘touchstone of dissent’ externalised from intra- and cross-party consensus 
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on European integration.
11
 This, however, pays little heed to the preceding decades where 
non-party movements were actively seeking to influence the major political parties. 
Usherwood’s brief overview of the pre-Maastricht anti-EEC movement references its internal 
divisions and ‘continual change and mutation of organizational forms [that] reflects the 
diversity of the backgrounds of those opposing European integration and the problems of 
finding common ground’.12 This study has investigated this fundamental division within the 
anti-EEC movement in detail, in a period in which Usherwood claims anti-EEC organisations 
were ‘rare’ and had ‘no appreciable impact’. 13 It has shown how the different strands of the 
campaign sought to find a common ground in the populist case against EEC membership, and 
demonstrated how internal disagreement between its individuals and factions over the running 
of the campaign contributed to its failure. 
Furthermore, analysis of the externalisation of Eurosceptic opinion from the 
perspective of party management presents it as a process of political rebels ‘using non-party 
groups’ to voice their opinions.14 This has been in lieu of an analysis from the perspective of 
the organisations themselves which attributes them with more agency than a mere release 
valve for intra-party dissent, and assesses how they sought to approach MPs and gain political 
influence whilst directing their message to the general public. A more detailed focus on the 
internal machinations and perceptions of these organisations sheds more light on their 
                                                          
11
 Taggart, P., “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems”; 
Usherwood, “Opposition to the European Union in the UK: The dilemma of public opinion and party 
management”; Aspinwall, “Structuring Europe: Powersharing institutions and British preferences on European 
integration” 
12
 Usherwood, “Opposition to the European Union in the UK: The dilemma of public opinion and party 
management”, pp.226-227 
13
 Usherwood, S., “Beyond Party Politics: Opposition to the European Union in France and the UK, 1985-1999”, 
unpublished PhD, London School of Economics, 2004, p.35, p.36 
14
 Usherwood, “Opposition to the European Union in the UK: The dilemma of public opinion and party 
management”, p.212 
 294 
 
position and aims, and their concerns and arguments become more defined. Additionally, 
there has previously been little analysis of the individuals within these organisations whom 
Usherwood states ‘crop up again and again’.15 On the pro-Market side, the continued presence 
of the likes of Victor Gollancz, Lady Juliet Rhys Williams, Edward Beddington Behrens and 
Stephen King-Hall within non-party organisations was emblematic of the combination of 
humanitarianism and pacifism with liberal, planning-minded “middle opinion”. Their anti-
Market counterparts, such as Sir Robin Williams, Oliver Smedley, Christopher Frere-Smith 
and Sir Ian Mactaggart, represented an amalgam of liberalism and conservatism on the fringes 
of politics, drawn from middle-class professions of business and law. 
The longitudinal approach employed has broadened the analysis of Eurosceptic 
mobilisation and opinion beyond specific periods, such as Dewey’s focus on the first 
application and the number of works on the referendum.
16
 In doing so it has analysed beyond 
the parliamentary battles that Forster calls the ‘key events’ in the development of the anti-
Market campaign.
17
 Of equal importance has been the anti-Market organisations’ reaction to 
these key events, either when the EEC issue is off the agenda or after a defeat. For example, 
after both the commencement of British EEC membership in 1973 and the referendum defeat 
in 1975, anti-Marketeers sought to focus on the issues of sovereignty and EEC legislation, 
acting as a political watchdog, in contrast to focusing more on populist issues and employing 
more anti-establishment rhetoric during the referendum in an attempt to win public support. 
This is mirrored by the soul-searching that FU and UEM undertook after Britain’s decision to 
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Schuman Plan led to a rapid decline in interest in European integration. The long-term 
analysis has also furthered the initial, contemporary analyses of the anti-Market organisations 
by the likes of Lieber and Kitzinger.
18
 Studies such as Kitzinger’s and Goodhart’s are useful 
snapshots of the actions of these organisations, but place too much emphasis on the imbalance 
between their resources and those of their pro-Market counterparts.
19
 This thesis has assessed 
the internal activities and debates within these organisations more closely, to assess how they 
sought to address this imbalance – with divisions over whether to try and match the 
respectability of the pro-Market organisations, or to emphasise their difference in anti-
political, anti-establishment rhetoric. 
The long-term analysis of anti-Market organisations has also demonstrated how their 
opposition evolved. Dewey’s focus on the first application rightly places national identity at 
the heart of the anti-Market case, and he claims that a process of othering the EEC into a 
‘traditional “us” versus “them”’ dichotomy was accompanied by xenophobic arguments that 
‘further marginalised the anti-Market case’.20 However, the anti-Market case would become 
more sophisticated as organisations sought to professionalise and to attract political influence. 
The “insider” strategies employed by the SBC were far removed from the mobilisation of 
anti-Market groups in the 1960s, and a longer analysis than Dewey’s shows how anti-Market 
activity developed beyond solely ‘“low political” protest and populism’ as it gravitated 
toward the political fringes.
21
 In the 1970s, the “us versus them” argument deployed by the 
anti-Marketeers was to present themselves as fighting an elite-backed campaign that would 
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increase the democratic deficit and harm the British consumer. It was this anti-establishment 
rhetoric, rather than xenophobia, than would risk alienating widespread support. 
Furthermore, in the 1960s, as chapter two demonstrated, organisations such as the 
ACML were in the process of moving away from their party political origins and seeking 
support on a cross-party basis. The issues that anti-Marketeers focused on – sovereignty, 
national identity, prices, the Commonwealth – were all populist, non-party issues that formed 
the basis for an umbrella organisation at the end of the decade. As chapters three and four 
show, it was disagreements over strategy and leadership of the campaign rather than party 
political ideology that prevented a truly united anti-EEC organisation from emerging in the 
1970s. The clash between the more “respectable” political side of the National Referendum 
Campaign, represented by Neil Marten and Douglas Jay, and the activist strand led by Vice-
Chairman Christopher Frere-Smith and veteran anti-Marketeer Air Vice-Marshal Don 
Bennett, created a very fragmented sense of unity within the Campaign. While Butler and 
Kitzinger’s study of the referendum points out that many of the local activist organisations, 
particularly those within the Get Britain Out organisation, were dominated by the hard left, 
the sheer number of examples of cross-party collaboration cited suggests that political 
affiliations were not as much of an obstacle as expected.
22
 At the head of the Campaign, 
particularly, the efforts of Marten and Jay – first in the creation of the Common Market 
Safeguards Campaign with Sir Robin Williams and Ron Leighton, then with Jack Jones and 
other leading anti-Marketeers in the creation of the National Referendum Campaign – led to 
the creation of a respectable core within the anti-EEC movement.
23
 This continued, as shown 
in chapter four, with the creation of the Safeguard Britain Campaign as a successor to the 
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Common Market Safeguards Campaign, designed to be a respectable and positive campaign 
free of extremist and anti-establishment individuals. As the chapter argues, the problems of 
the Safeguard Britain Campaign were not problems of party ideology, but of balancing the 
demands of ambitious activists within the grassroots and local groups with those of a more 
conservative and politically-oriented committee. 
This strategic dispute, furthermore, adds a further layer of complexity to the 
development of Euroscepticism than has rarely been analysed before in the historical context. 
Forster broadened the term “Euroscepticism” to include scepticism of all moves ‘towards 
supranational European integration’, comprising everything from expressing doubts to calling 
for outright withdrawal.
24
 However, while he claims that this ‘multi-faceted nature’ was a 
source of division, he states that this was down to party political ideology and allegiances.
25
 
This thesis has shown that, outside of the Westminster framework, there was a politician-
activist divide, which was often evident in conflicting aims and strategies. During and after 
the referendum campaign, anti-federalist arguments were put forward in the hope of attracting 
moderate public and political support. This shift from an anti-Market to a Eurosceptic position 
camouflaged the SBC’s long-term goal of British disengagement from the EEC. Yet local 
groups, dissatisfied with the Campaign’s lack of activity and favouring a more hard-line 
strategy, helped push through the name change that advocated immediate withdrawal. This 
division between moderates and hardliners mirrors those in other contemporary British NGOs 
and non-party campaigns, and was unrelated to issues of party ideology.
26
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Whilst Crowson and Forster, in stretching their analysis back to 1945, have 
demonstrated that Euroscepticism is not just a modern-day Conservative phenomenon, this 
thesis has argued that was not the preserve of any ideology.
27
 Despite accusations of political 
bias, anti-Market organisations consistently sought to appeal to the public on a non-party or 
cross-party basis. If there was any particular ideological strand that ran through the anti-
Market campaign in this period, it was liberalism. Anti-Market organisations were often 
predominantly a base for Liberal Party defectors, and it was liberal themes which were 
utilised as potential mobilising factors for cross-party support. While the foundations of the 
ACML in 1961 were definitively Conservative, the free-trade origins of KBO defined many 
of the qualities of the anti-Market movement throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Its founder 
S.W. Alexander, who had been close to liberal Conservatives in the Tory Reform Group and 
been instrumental in founding the Society of Individualists in the 1940s, was a champion of 
free trade and core Liberal values.
28
 Together with Oliver Smedley, according to Richard 
Cockett, ‘they sought to keep the flames of Gladstonian Liberalism burning’, with the former 
chairman of the London Liberal Party and the latter leaving the Liberal Party in 1962 over the 
issue of the EEC application.
29
 Smedley, as an active opponent of governmental intervention 
through his organisations the Cheap Food League, the Farmers and Smallholders Association 
and Council for the Reduction of Taxation, railed against the ‘controls of the centrally 
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planned economy’ and the increasing centralisation of governmental power.30 It was these 
liberalist themes – the desire to protect national sovereignty, small government, direct 
democracy, individual rights, and free trade – from the post-war trends of centralisation, 
nationalisation and increasing state powers, which lay at the heart of the anti-EEC campaign. 
Anti-EEC organisations ultimately attempted to combine campaigning on these issues 
in the form of a citizens’ movement, distanced from substantial political support or 
endorsement, with a more professionalised approach as a pressure group impacting upon 
Westminster politics. In the post-war period until the 1990s, however, these organisations 
failed where other social movements and pressure groups with a political dimension 
succeeded. Their position between that of a mass movement and of an organisation with more 
political aims necessitated them to constantly balance widespread support of a public they 
claimed to represent with political respectability and legitimacy, and to seek a figurehead who 
could unite these two strands with charismatic leadership and political credibility. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the reasons why the anti-EEC movement was 
unable to expand its support and have more impact was its inability to make connections and 
alliances within the wider networks of NGOs, movements and pressure groups. This is 
particularly relevant with regards to those organisations which sought to speak for, and 
mobilise, the general public on issues where they were perceived to be politically 
disenfranchised. The aforementioned liberalist themes that underlined the anti-EEC campaign 
– individual liberty and democratic rights, small government, and decentralisation of political 
powers – lay at the heart of numerous NGOs across the political spectrum. For prominent 
personnel within right-leaning civil liberties groups, opposition to the EEC was an extension 
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of the anti-statism upon which their groups were founded. Yet despite some of these figures 
working within anti-EEC organisations, collaboration between campaigns, be it formal or 
informal, was absent. 
In addition to the aforementioned activities of Smedley and Alexander, Sir Ian 
Mactaggart combined Chairmanship of the Society for Individual Freedom with Vice-
Chairmanship of Keep/Get Britain Out, as well as positions within the National Referendum 
Campaign, Anti Dear Food Campaign and Open Seas Forum.
31
 The Society for Individual 
Freedom’s support base, comprised of right-wing Conservatives and classical liberals, would 
doubtless have had the potential to overlap with that of anti-EEC organisations. The National 
Association for Freedom – renamed the Freedom Association in 1980 – was similar in its 
objectives and support base. Yet despite the rise of neoliberalism in the late 1970s associated 
with rightist think-tanks such as the Centre for Policy Studies and the Institute of Economic 
Affairs, with which these libertarian organisations were associated, the anti-EEC movement 
never capitalised on these themes or support bases. The same can be said of environmental 
and organicist causes, which bridged left-liberal concerns with classical liberal anti-statism. 
For example, in her study of the British anti-flouridation movement in the 1950s and 1960s, 
Amy C. Whipple showed how the British Housewives’ League, with parliamentary support, 
mobilised against the ‘erosion of personal freedom’.32 A BHL pamphlet produced in 1959, 
before the first EEC application, echoed the sentiments of the anti-EEC movement in that it 
perceived the fluoridation issue to ‘cut across party politics’ as ‘an invasion of fundamental 
human rights against which people of all parties must stand together as they would against a 
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foreign invader.’33 Once again, the issues of food quality and consumer choice, alongside 
defence of individual liberties, formed part of this liberalist movement’s agenda. Membership 
of the EEC, and the resulting policy directives that would affect the British public, was an 
extension of this increasing loss of individual liberty. 
However, despite the anti-EEC movement’s connections with the British Housewives’ 
League, it made no formal connections with the environmental or organic movements, despite 
the rise of the former in the late 1970s and 1980s. One exceptional individual within the 
campaign was Sir Richard Body, owner of a farmhouse near Newbury in Berkshire.
34
 A 
strong parliamentary advocate of environmental and organic causes, Body wrote several anti-
EEC books and pamphlets from an agricultural point of view and, as noted in chapter four, he 
became the campaign’s authority on all matters relating to the EEC’s Common Agricultural 
Policy. Another figure, John Papworth, sought to associate the anti-EEC campaign with the 
emerging network of social movements focusing on peace, the environment and feminism, all 
united by their ‘human scale approach’ and grassroots character.35 Despite this, however, the 
anti-EEC movement failed to make strong links with such organisations and causes that 
opposed the increasing centralisation of power and loss of sovereignty caused by EEC 
membership. 
This thesis has also added to the increasingly broad and complex historiography on 
NGOs, pressure groups and social movements by focusing on curious examples that do not 
easily fit categorisation in existing frameworks. Arguments which emphasise the development 
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of professionalism, expertise and insider strategies seem reinforced by the tendencies of pro- 
and anti-Market organisations to attempt more political pressure group strategies.
36
 Initial 
populist and idealistic campaigns for European integration were less successful than 
resourceful and elitist political and economic pressure groups, and FU’s social movement 
characteristics were challenged by alternative strategies to mass membership being put 
forward. Anti-Market groups increasingly sought to professionalise to attain greater political 
legitimacy through insider strategies. Yet the emotive arguments upon which the anti-Market 
case rested ensured a dedicated activist base would continue to push for bolder public 
campaigning. In some ways, they therefore share some characteristics with the conservative 
campaigns and NGOs that have recently attracted scholarly attention, utilising what Whipple 
describes as ‘the public demonstration strategies of “the left” and by its “rightist” claims of 
victimization by a governing elite’.37 They also shared similarities with “in-between” non-
party organisations, such as the National Council for Civil Liberties, in being comprised of 
middle-class ‘public-minded professionals’, attempting to shift from the politics of ‘popular 
front movements’ to ‘NGO model’ activism, and combining the old and new forms of 
politics.
38
 However, while the National Council for Civil Liberties was led by ‘progressive 
professionals’ working on a radical issue with new social movements, anti-Market 
organisations had a conservative agenda.
39
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The anti-Market organisations’ duality of public and political campaigning, combined 
with their conservative agenda, make them hard to place on the political map. In being 
concerned with ‘cultural, ethnic, national, and linguistic heritage and identity’, and sharing 
values of ‘opposition to manipulation, control, dependence, bureaucratisation [and] 
regulation’, anti-Marker organisations fall into Claus Offe’s definition of new social 
movements and ‘new politics’.40 Their protest tactics and their unwillingness to negotiate (or 
moderate their aims down from EEC withdrawal) reinforce this image.
41
 Yet this thesis has 
shown that their protests and structures were old-fashioned, and they were guided by the 
models of nineteenth-century organisations such as the Anti-Corn Law League.
42
 
Furthermore, according to Dewey, many of those involved in the anti-Market movement were 
born in the late Victorian age.
43
 Their protests were not as innovative, militant or visible as 
the radical, left-liberal social movements of this period, and old-fashioned tactics and an 
inability to utilise the media contributed to the lack of impression they made on public 
opinion. Furthermore, they shared some similarities with Kitschelt’s definition of social 
movements as being ‘oppose[d to] the bureaucratisation of society’ and invoking populist 
‘direct democracy’ against unresponsive ‘elite’ political institutions. 44 Yet the presence of 
politicians within the anti-Market campaign, and the aim of preserving parliamentary 
sovereignty meant that with the possible exception of groups like the PFM, no radical 
overhaul of institutional politics was sought. These organisations therefore fell between old 
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and new political paradigms, insider and outsider strategies, and definition as pressure groups 
and social movements. 
The development of pressure groups for or against European integration in post-war 
Britain shows a developing aspiration to gain support through sophisticated arguments and 
increased political connections and recognition. This, however, was combined with an 
ongoing desire to remain outside of traditional political avenues and apparatus, aiming to 
develop a broad mass movement to demonstrate the weight of public opinion. Just as pro-
Market groups had in the late 1950s, anti-Market groups sought to establish political 
connections and gain more influence, prestige, and access to the political sector that had often 
been denied to them. Similarly, they attempted to concentrate more on research publications 
than mass-distributed propaganda as they planned to adopt a more think-tank based model in 
the 1980s. As a result, anti-Market groups constantly sought more financial, political and 
research resources in order to expand their campaign. 
However, these moves were often met with hostility by a proportion of anti-Market 
support who wanted a more populist, anti-political and anti-party campaign driven by 
grassroots activity. In targeting the general public directly, the campaign would often use old-
fashioned methods of pamphleteering, disseminating propaganda, newspaper advertisements 
and mass meetings, in the belief that the campaign would escalate and expand by merely 
stating the facts and spreading the message. A mass membership base making frequent 
donations, rather than outside financial influence, was to be the source of the campaign’s 
funding. Compared to wealthy pro-Market organisations, groups like ACML, according to 
Dewey, ‘wore its financial difficulties as badge of integrity’ and prided itself on being driven 
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by ‘ordinary private individuals’.45 However, the problem, as stated by Uwe Kitzinger, was 
that EEC entry meant that ‘the rich stood to gain, the poor to lose; and the poor cannot give 
large donations.’46 The campaigns needed numbers in the hundreds of thousands or millions 
in order to both wield powerful influence and be financially viable, and in the absence of 
large-scale support groups were torn between public campaigning and political lobbying. 
The pro-Market groups of chapter one demonstrate the difficulties of attempting an 
idealistic campaign built on mass support, and based along the lines of the associational 
movements of the nineteenth century and the inter-war period, in a post-war era and during 
the rise of professional society when professional and technical NGOs were gaining the 
public’s trust. Other “inbetweener” groups operating across the spheres of political lobbying 
and public activism and support, such as the Child Poverty Action Group, Shelter and a 
number of environmental groups such as Friends of the Earth, have shown how utilisation of 
effective marketing and public relations strategies combined with high-profile and dynamic 
leadership allowed them to make an impact in Westminster and on public opinion. On the 
issue of EEC membership, which remained rooted in Westminster politics, groups with 
confused positions, on the fringes of Westminster but oscillating between insider and outsider 
strategies, struggled to make an impact at the political level. 
                                                          
45
 Dewey, British National Identity and Opposition to Membership of Europe, 1961-63, p.121 
46
 Kitzinger, U., Diplomacy and Persuasion, p.236 
 306 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Manuscript Sources 
 
British Library of Political and Economic Science [BLPES] 
 
Frances Josephy Papers 
 
Lady Juliet Rhys Williams Papers 
 
Campaign for an Independent Britain collection 
 
 
 
The National Archives 
 
PREM 11-4415 
 
 
 
Parliamentary Archives, House of Lords Records Office 
 
National Referendum Campaign Collection 
 
Britain and Europe Collection 
 
 
 
Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge 
 
Margaret Thatcher Papers 
 
 
 
Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick 
 
Victor Gollancz Papers 
 
MSS.233-5-MIS-2 
 
 
 
Special Collections, University College London 
 
Hugh Gaitskell Papers 
 307 
 
 
 
 
Bodleian Library, Oxford 
 
Neil Marten Papers 
 
 
 
Hull History Centre 
 
Anne Kerr Papers 
 
 
 
Labour History and Archive Centre 
 
Labour Party Archive 
 
 
 
Dorset Record Office 
 
Lord Hinchingbrooke Papers 
 
 
 
Other archival material 
 
Britain and Europe since 1945 microfiche collection, Harvester Primary Social Sources 
 
Thatcher MSS (digital collection), Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org 
 
Mass-Observation Archive, Adam Matthew Digital, 
http://www.massobservation.amdigital.co.uk 
 
Eurobarometer surveys, European Union, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm 
 
Who’s Who database, Oxford University Press, 
http://www.ukwhoswho.com 
 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com 
 
 308 
 
 
 
Newspapers and Newsletters 
 
Anti-Common Market Activities 
 
Anti-Common Market League Newsletter 
 
Anti Dear Food Campaigner 
 
Birmingham Gazette 
 
Birmingham Post 
 
Britain 
 
Common Market Broadsheet 
 
Common Market Safeguards Campaign Bulletin 
 
Common Market Watchdog 
 
Current Topics 
 
Daily Mail 
 
Daily Telegraph 
 
The Economist 
 
Evening Standard 
 
Europe Left 
 
Federal News 
 
Financial Times 
 
Forward Britain Movement Newsletter 
 
Get Britain Out Newsletter 
 
Get Britain Out Referendum Campaign: Talking Points 
 
Guardian 
 
 309 
 
Globe and Mail 
 
Gloucestershire Echo 
 
Housewives Today 
 
The Independent 
 
Independent News 
 
Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee Bulletin 
 
Manchester Guardian 
 
Market News 
 
On Target 
 
Political Intelligence Weekly 
 
Resistance News 
 
New Statesman 
 
News Chronicle 
 
Newsbrief of the Labour Common Market Committee 
 
Referendum News 
 
The Observer 
 
The Spectator 
 
Sunday Telegraph 
 
Sunday Times 
 
The Times 
 
Tribune 
 
United Europe: News-letter of the United Europe Movement 
 
United Nations News 
 
 310 
 
 
 
Primary Books, Memoirs and Autobiographies 
 
Anti-Common Market League, Joining the Common Market: Or what the Treaty of Rome 
really means (London: Anti-Common Market League, 1967) 
 
Boothby, R., Boothby: Recollections of a Rebel (London: Hutchinson, 1978) 
 
Body, R., Agriculture: The triumph and the shame (London: Temple Smith, 1982) 
 
Body, R., Farming in the Clouds (London: Temple Smith, 1984) 
 
Bryant, A., A Choice for Destiny: Commonwealth and Common Market (London: Collins, 
1962) 
 
Corbet, R.H. (ed), Britain, not Europe: Commonwealth Before Common Market (London: 
The Anti-Common Market League, 1962) 
 
Denman, R., The Mandarin’s Tale (London: Politico’s, 2002) 
 
Field, F., 60 Years of UNA-UK (London: UNA, 2006) 
 
Goodhart, P., Full-Hearted Consent: The story of the National Referendum Campaign and the 
campaign for the Referendum (London: Davis-Poynter, 1976) 
 
Gould, B., Goodbye to All That (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995) 
 
Hansard Society, The British People: their voice in Europe: report of an independent working 
party sponsored by the Hansard Society on the effects of membership of the European 
Community on British representative institutions (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1977) 
 
Heathcote-Amory, D., Confessions of a Eurosceptic (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2012) 
 
Jay, D., The Truth About the Common Market (London: Forward Britain Movement, 1962) 
 
Jay, D., After the Common Market: A better alternative for Britain (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1968) 
 
Jay, D., Common Market: The Way Out: One year into the EEC (London: Common Market 
Safeguards Campaign, 1974) 
 
Jay, D., Change and Fortune: A political record (London: Hutchinson, 1980) 
 
Jenkins, R., A Life at the Centre (London: Politico’s, 2006) 
 
 311 
 
Jowell, R. and Hoinville, G., Britain into Europe: Public Opinion and the EEC, 1961-75 
(London: SCPR, 1976) 
 
Macmillan, H., Tides of Fortune: 1945-1955 (London: Macmillan, 1969) 
 
Macmillan, H., Pointing the Way: 1959-61 (London: Macmillan, 1972) 
 
Macmillan, H., At the End of the Day: 1961-63 (London: Macmillan, 1973) 
 
Marten, N., The Common Market: No Middle Way (London: Common Market Safeguards 
Campaign, 1974) 
 
Pickles, W., Not with Europe: The political case for staying out (London: Fabian International 
Bureau, 1962) 
 
Shelter, The Shelter Story: A brief history of the first three years of Shelter’s national 
campaign for the homeless, and a handbook on its current activities (London, 1970) 
 
Thatcher, M., The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993) 
 
Walker, P. and Walker-Smith, D., A Call to the Commonwealth: The constructive case 
(London: Anti-Common Market League, 1962) 
 
Walker, P., Staying Power: An autobiography (London: Bloomsbury, 1991) 
 
Wilson, D., Memoirs of a Minor Public Figure (London: Quartet Books, 2011) 
 
 
 
Secondary Books 
 
Aldous, R. and Lee, S. (eds), Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1996) 
 
Aldous, R. and Lee, S. (eds), Harold Macmillan: Aspects of a political life (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1999) 
 
Aldrich, R.J., The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: 
John Murray, 2002) 
 
Anderson, B., Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1983) 
 
Baggott, R., Pressure Groups Today (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995) 
 312 
 
 
Baker, D. and Seawright, D., Britain For and Against Europe: British Politics and the 
Question of European Integration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) 
 
Baimbridge, M. (ed.), The 1975 Referendum on Europe: Volume 1: reflections of the 
participants (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2006) 
 
Barberis, P., McHugh, J., Tyldesley, M., (eds), Encyclopedia of British and Irish Political 
Organizations: parties, groups and movements of the twentieth century (London: Pinter, 
2000) 
 
Beer, S., Modern British Politics: a study of parties and pressure groups (London: Faber, 
1969) 
 
Bell, L., The Throw That Failed: Britain’s 1961 Application to Join the Common Market 
(London: New European, 1995) 
 
Beloff, N., The General Says No: Britain’s exclusion from Europe (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1963) 
 
Birn, D.S., The League of Nations Union (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) 
 
Black, L., Redefining British Politics: Culture, consumerism and participation, 1954-1970 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010) 
 
Brivati, B., Hugh Gaitskell (London: Politico’s, 2006) 
 
Brivati, B. and Jones, H. (eds), From Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and Europe since 
1945 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993) 
 
Broad, R., Labour’s European Dilemma (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) 
 
Butler, D.E. and King, A., The British General Election of 1964 (London: Macmillan, 1965) 
 
Butler, D. and Kitzinger, U., The 1975 Referendum (London: Macmillan, 1976) 
 
Butler, D. and Kavanagh, D., The British General Election of October 1974 (London: 
Macmillan, 1975) 
 
Butler, D. and Kavanagh, D., The British General Election of 1992 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1999) 
 
Byrne, P., Social Movements in Britain (London: Routledge, 1997) 
 
Byrne, P., The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (London: Croom Helm, 1988) 
 
 313 
 
Camps, M., Britain and the European Community, 1955-63 (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1964) 
 
Charlton, M., The Price of Victory (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1983) 
 
Clark, A., Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and changing human rights 
norms (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 
 
Cockett, R., Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-tanks and the economic counter-revolution, 
1931-83 (London: HarperCollins, 1994) 
 
Coupland, P.M., Britannia, Europa and Christendom: British Christians and European 
Integration (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2006) 
 
Crowson, N.J., The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945: At the Heart of 
Europe? (New York: Routledge, 2006) 
 
Crowson, N.J., Britain and Europe: A political history since 1918 (New York: Routledge, 
2011) 
 
Crowson, N., Hilton, M. and McKay, J. (eds), NGOs in Contemporary Britain: Non-state 
actors in society and politics since 1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009) 
 
Daddow, O. (ed), Harold Wilson and European Integration: Britain’s Second Application to 
Join the EEC (London: Frank Cass, 2003) 
 
Daddow, O., Britain and Europe since 1945: Historiographical Perspectives on Integration 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004) 
 
Daniel, M., Cranks and Gadflies: The Story of UKIP (London: Timewell, 2005) 
 
Deighton, A. (ed), Building Postwar Europe: National decision makers and European 
institutions, 1948-63 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995) 
 
Deighton, A. and Milward, A. (eds), Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European 
Economic Community, 1958-1963 (Brussels: Bruylant, 1999) 
 
Dell, E., The Schuman Plan and the British Abdication of Leadership in Europe (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995) 
 
Denman, R., Missed Chances: Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century (London: Cassell, 
1996) 
 
Dewey, R.F.J., British National Identity and Opposition to Membership of Europe, 1961-63: 
The Anti-Marketeers (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009) 
 
 314 
 
Eley, G., Forging Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
 
Ellison, J., Threatening Europe: Britain and the Creation of the European Community 1955-
58 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) 
 
Evans, D., While Britain Slept: The selling of the Common Market (London: Gollancz, 1995) 
 
European Movement, An A-Z of Anti-EU and Anti-EMU Organisations in Britain (London: 
The European Movement, 2000) 
 
Field, F., Poverty and Politics: The inside story of the Child Poverty Action Group’s 
campaigns in the 1970s (London: Heinemann, 1982) 
 
Forster, A., Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics: Opposition to Europe in the 
British Conservative and Labour Parties since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2002) 
 
Forster, A. and Blair, A., The Making of Britain’s European Foreign Policy (London: 
Pearson, 2002) 
 
Francis, M. and Zweiniger-Bargielowska, I. (eds), The Conservatives and British Society, 
1880-1990 (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1996) 
 
George, S., An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994) 
 
Gifford, C., The Making of Eurosceptic Britain: Identity and economy in a post-imperial state 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008) 
 
Gowland, D. and Turner, A., Reluctant Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 1945-
1998 (London: Pearson, 2000) 
 
Grant, W., Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1995) 
 
Grant, W., Pressure Groups and British Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) 
 
Greenwood, S., Britain and European Cooperation since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) 
 
Greenwood, S. (ed), Britain and European Integration since the Second World War 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996) 
 
Hennessy, P., Never Again: Britain 1945-1951 (London: Vintage, 1993) 
 
Hennessy, P. and Seldon, A. (eds), Ruling Performance: British Governments from Attlee to 
Thatcher (Oxford: Blackwells, 1987) 
 
 315 
 
Hilton, M., Consumerism in Twentieth-Century Britain: The search for a historical movement 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
 
Hilton, M., Crowson, N., Mouhot, J-F., and McKay, J., A Historical Guide to NGOs in 
Britain: Charities, civil society and the voluntary sector since 1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2012) 
 
Hilton, M., McKay, J., Crowson, N. and Mouhot, J-F., The Politics of Expertise: How NGOs 
shaped modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 
 
Hinton, J., Women, Social Leadership and the Second World War: Continuities of class 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
 
Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. (eds), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983) 
 
Holmes, M. (ed), The Eurosceptical Reader (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996) 
 
Hopgood, S., Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty International (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2006) 
 
Howe, A., Free Trade and Liberal England, 1845-1946 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997) 
 
Jordan, A.G. and Richardson, J.J., Government and Pressure Groups in Britain (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1987) 
 
Jordan, G. and Maloney, W., The Protest Business: Mobilizing campaign groups 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) 
 
Kaiser, W., Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration 1945-
63 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996) 
 
Kaiser, W. and Staerck, G. (eds), British Foreign Policy 1955-64: Contracting Options 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) 
 
Kavanagh, D., Crisis, Charisma and British Political Leadership: Winston Churchill as the 
outsider (London: Sage, 1974) 
 
Kennedy, P., The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External 
Policy 1865-1980 (London: Fontana, 1981) 
 
Kennedy, P., The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict 
from 1500-2000 (London: Unwin, 1989) 
 316 
 
 
King, A., Britain Says Yes: 1975 Referendum on the Common Market (Washington: AEI 
Press, 1977) 
 
King, R. and Nugent, N. (eds.), Respectable Rebels: Middle class campaigns in Britain in the 
1970s (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1979) 
 
Kitzinger, U., The Second Try: Labour and the EEC (Oxford: Permagon, 1968) 
 
Kitzinger, U., Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common Market (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1973) 
 
Kohr, L., The Breakdown of Nations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957) 
 
Lawrence, J., Speaking for the People: Party, language, and popular politics in England, 
1867-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
 
Lawrence, J., Electing Our Masters: The hustings in British politics from Hogarth to Blair 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 
 
Lee, S., Victory in Europe? Britain and Germany since 1945 (Harlow: Pearson Education, 
2001) 
 
Lent, A., British Social Movements since 1945: Sex, Colour, Peace and Power (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001) 
 
Lieber, R.J., British Politics and European Unity: Parties, Elites and Pressure Groups 
(London: University of California Press, 1970) 
 
Lord, C., British Entry to the European Community Under the Heath Government of 1970-4 
(Aldershot: Gower, 1994) 
 
Ludlow, N. P., Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 
 
Marquand, D. and Seldon, A. (eds), The Ideas that Shaped Post-War Britain (London: 
Fontana, 1996) 
 
May, A. (ed), Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe: The Commonwealth and Britain’s 
Applications to join the European Communities (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001) 
 
Mayne, R. and Pinder, J., Federal Union: The Pioneers: A History of Federal Union 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990) 
 
McCarthy, H., The British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, citizenship and 
internationalism, c.1918-45 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011) 
 317 
 
 
McCord, N., The Anti-Corn Law League, 1838-1846 (London: Unwin, 1968) 
 
McKibbin, R., The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain, 1880-1950 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990) 
 
Milward, A., The United Kingdom and the European Community Volume I: The rise and fall 
of a national strategy 1945-1963 (London: Routledge, 2012) 
 
Moon, J., European Integration in British Politics 1950-63: A Study of Issue Change 
(Aldershot: Gower, 1985) 
 
Norton, P., Conservative Dissidents: Dissent within the Parliamentary Conservative Party, 
1970-74 (London: Temple Smith, 1978) 
 
Parkin, F., Middle-Class Radicalism: The social basis of CND (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1968) 
 
Parr, H., Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain’s 
World Role, 1964-1967 (London: Routledge, 2006) 
 
Perkin, H., The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880 (London: Routledge, 2002) 
 
Pinder, J. (ed.), Fifty Years of Political and Economic Planning: Looking forward, 1931-1981 
(London: Heinemann, 1981) 
 
Pine, M., Harold Wilson and Europe: Pursuing Britain’s membership of the European 
Community (London: Tauris, 2007) 
 
Prochaska, F., Christianity and Social Service in Modern Britain: the disinherited spirit 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 
 
Pugh, M., Women and the Women’s Movement in Britain, 1914-1959 (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1992) 
 
Ramsden, J., The Winds of Change: Macmillan to Heath, 1957-1965 (London: Longman, 
1996) 
 
Reynolds, D., Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century 
(London: Longman, 1991) 
 
Robins, L.J., The Reluctant Party: Labour and the EEC, 1961-1975 (Ormskirk: G.W. and A. 
Hesketh, 1979) 
 
Ryan, M., The Acceptable Pressure Group (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1978) 
 318 
 
 
Schumacher, E.F., Small is Beautiful: A study of economics as if people mattered (London: 
Abacus, 1974) 
 
Shepherd, R., Enoch Powell (London: Hutchinson, 1996) 
 
Spiering, M., “British Euroscepticism” in Harmsen, R. and Spiering, M., Euroscepticism: 
Party politics, national identity and European integration (New York: Rodolpi, 2004) 
 
Tarrow, S., Power in Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
 
Toomey, J., Harold Wilson’s EEC Application: Inside the Foreign Office 1964-67 (Dublin: 
University College Dublin Press, 2007) 
 
Turner, J., The Tories and Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000) 
 
Tratt, J., The Macmillan Government and Europe: A Study in the Process of Policy 
Development (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996) 
 
Trentmann, F., Free Trade Nation: Commerce, consumption and civil society in modern 
Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
 
Wall, S., The Official History of Britain and the European Community Volume II: From 
rejection to referendum, 1963-1975 (London: Routledge, 2013) 
 
Weight, R., Patriots: National Identity in Britain 1940-2000 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2002) 
 
Weston, J. The FoE Experience: the development of an environmental pressure group 
(Oxford: Oxford Polytechnic School of Planning, 1989) 
 
Whiteley, P. and Winyard, S., Pressure for the Poor: The poverty lobby and policy making 
(London: Meuthen, 1987) 
 
Wilkes, G. (ed), Britain’s Failure to Enter the European Community 1961-63: The 
Enlargement Negotiations and Crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations 
(London: Frank Cass, 1997) 
 
Windlesham, Lord, Communication and Political Power (London: Cape, 1966) 
 
Young, H., This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1998) 
 
Young, J.W., “The Heath government and British entry into the European Community” in 
Ball, S. and Seldon, A. (eds),  The Heath Government 1970-1974: A reappraisal (New York: 
Longman, 1996) 
 
 319 
 
Young, J.W., Britain and European Unity (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) 
 
Zald, M. N. and McCarthy, J. D. (eds), Social Movements in an Organisational Society: 
Collected essays (New Jersey, USA: New Brunswick, 1987) 
 
 
 
Secondary Articles 
 
Aspinwall, M., “Structuring Europe: Powersharing institutions and British preferences on 
European integration”, Political Studies, 48:3 (2000), pp.415-442 
 
Baker, D., Gamble, A. and Ludlam, S., “The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht 1993: 
Conservative divisions and British ratification”, Parliamentary Affairs, 47:1 (1994), pp.37-60 
 
Bromund, T., “Whitehall, the National Farmers’ Union, and Plan G, 1956-57”, Contemporary 
British History, 15:2 (2001), pp.76-97 
 
Buchanan, T., “‘The Truth Will Set You Free’: The Making of Amnesty International”, 
Journal of Contemporary History, 37:4 (2002), pp.575-597 
 
Buchanan, T., “Amnesty International in crisis, 1966-67”, Twentieth Century British History, 
15:3 (2004), pp.267-289 
 
Burkett, J., “Re-defining British morality: ‘Britishness’ and the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament 1958-68”, Twentieth Century British History, 21:2 (2010), pp.184-205 
 
Carey, S. and Burton, J., “Research Note: The Influence of the Press in Shaping Public 
Opinion towards the European Union in Britain”, Political Studies, 52 (2004), pp.623-640 
 
Crowson, N.J., “Lord Hinchingbrooke, Europe and the November 1962 South Dorset By-
election”, Contemporary British History, 17:4 (2003), pp.43-64 
 
Forster, A., “No Entry: Britain and the EEC in the 1960s”, Contemporary British History, 
12:2 (1998), pp.139-146 
 
Frank, M., “The New Morality: Victor Gollancz, ‘Save Europe Now’ and the German 
Refugee Crisis, 1945-46”, Twentieth Century British History, 17:2 (2006), pp.230-256 
 
Geddes, A., “Labour and the European Community 1973-93: Pro-Europeanism, 
‘Europeanisation’ and their implications”, Contemporary Record, 8:2 (1994), pp.370-380 
 
George, S., “Britain and European Unity: 1945-1992 by John W. Young” review, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 33:2 (1995), pp.306-307 
 
 320 
 
Gifford, C., “The rise of post-imperial populism in the UK: The case of right-wing 
Euroscepticism in Britain”, European Journal of Political Research, 45 (2006), pp.851-869 
 
Gifford, C., “The UK and the European Union: Dimensions of Sovereignty and the Problem 
of Eurosceptic Britishness”, Parliamentary Affairs, 63:2 (2010), pp.321-338 
 
Gliddon, P., “The British Foreign Office and Domestic Propaganda on the European 
Community, 1960-72”, Contemporary British History, 23:2 (2009), pp.155-180 
 
Grant, W., “Insider Groups, Outsider Groups and Interest Group Strategies in Britain”, 
University of Warwick Department of Politics Working Paper No. 19 (1978) 
 
Grant, W., “Pressure Politics: A politics of collective consumption?”, Parliamentary Affairs, 
58:2 (2005), pp.366-379 
 
Grantham, J.T., “British Labour and the Hague ‘Congress of Europe’: National Sovereignty 
Defended”, Historical Journal, 24:2 (1981), pp.443-452 
 
Haeussler, M., “The Popular Press and Ideas of Europe: The Daily Mirror, the Daily Express, 
and Britain’s First Application to Join the EEC, 1961-63”, Twentieth Century British History 
[forthcoming] 
 
Hearl, D., “Britain and Europe since 1945”, Parliamentary Affairs, 47:4 (1994), pp.516-31 
 
Hilton, M., “The Female Consumer and the Politics of Consumption in Twentieth-Century 
Britain”, The Historical Journal, 45:1 (2002), pp.103-128 
 
Hilton, M., “Politics is Ordinary: Non-governmental organisations and political participation 
in contemporary Britain”, Twentieth Century British History, 22:2 (2011), pp.230-268 
 
Hinton, J., “Militant Housewives: the British Housewives’ League and the Attlee 
Government”, History Workshop Journal, 38 (1994), pp.129-156 
 
Jacobs, E., “‘An Organising Female with a Briefcase’: Barbara Wootton, Political Economy 
and Social Justice, 1920-1950”, Women’s History Review, 16:3 (2007), pp.431-446 
 
Jenkins, C., “Resource Mobilisation Theory and the Study of Social Movements”, Annual 
Review of Sociology, 9 (1983), pp.527-553 
 
Kaiser, W., “Using Europe and Abusing the Europeans: The Conservatives and the European 
Community 1957-94”, Contemporary Record, 8:2 (1994), pp.381-399 
 
Kitschelt, H.P., “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear 
Movements in Four Democracies”, British Journal of Political Science, 16:1 (1986), pp.57-85 
 
 321 
 
Kitschelt, H., “Social Movements, Political Parties, and Democratic Theory”, Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 528 (1993), 
 
Lieber, R.J., “Interest Groups and Political Integration: British Entry into Europe”, The 
American Political Science Review, 66:1 (1972), pp.53-67 
 
Maloney, W.A., Jordan, G. and McLaughlin, A.M., “Interest Groups and Public Policy: The 
insider/outsider model revisited”, Journal of Public Policy, 14:1 (1994), pp.17-38 
 
Marwick, A., “Middle Opinion in the Thirties: Planning, Progress and Political ‘Agreement’”, 
English Historical Review, 79:311 (1964), pp.285-298 
 
McCarthy, H., “Parties, Voluntary Associations, and Democratic Politics in Interwar Britain”, 
Historical Journal, 50:4, 2007, pp.891-912 
 
McCarthy, H., “Leading from the Centre: The League of Nations Union, Foreign Policy and 
‘Political Agreement’ in the 1930s”, Contemporary British History, 23: 4 (2009), pp.527-542 
 
McCarthy, H., “Democratising British foreign policy: rethinking the Peace Ballot, 1934-5”, 
Journal of British Studies, 49 (2010), pp.358-387 
 
Melissen, J. and Zeeman, B., “Britain and Western Europe, 1945-51: Opportunities Lost?”, 
International Affairs, 63:1 (1987), pp.81-95 
 
Moores, C., “The Progressive Professionals: The National Council for Civil Liberties and the 
politics of activism in the 1960s”, Twentieth Century British History, 20:4 (2009), pp.538-560 
 
Moores, C., “From Civil Liberties to Human Rights? British civil liberties activism and 
universal human rights”, Contemporary European History, 21:2 (2012), pp.169-192 
 
Offe, C., “New Social Movements: Challenging the boundaries of institutional politics”, 
Social Research, 52:4 (1987), pp.817-868 
 
Page, E.C., “The Insider/Outsider Distinction: An empirical investigation”, British Journal of 
Political Science and International Relations, 1:2 (1999), pp.205-14 
 
Parr, H., “A Question of Leadership: July 1966 and Harold Wilson's European Decision”, 
Contemporary British History, 19:4 (2005), pp.437-458 
 
Rollings, N., “British Industry and European Integration 1961-73: From first application to 
final membership”, Business and Economic History, 27:2 (1998), pp.444-454 
 
Seyd, P., “Shelter: The National Campaign for the Homeless”, Political Quarterly, 46:4 
(1975), pp.418-431 
 
 322 
 
Smith, J., “The 1975 Referendum”, Journal of European Integration History, 5:1 (1999), 
pp.41-56 
 
Spiering, M., “The Imperial System of Weights and Measures: Traditional, superior and 
banned by Europe?”, Contemporary British History, 15:4 (2001), pp.111-128 
 
Taggart, P., “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European 
party systems”, European Journal of Political Research, 33 (1998), pp.363-388 
 
Tarrow, S., “National Politics and Collective Action: Recent theory and research in Western 
Europe and the United States”, Annual Review of Sociology, 14 (1988), 
 
Usherwood, S., “Opposition to the European Union in the UK: The dilemma of public 
opinion and party management”, Government and Opposition, 37:2 (2002), pp.211-230 
 
Usherwood, S., “Proximate Factors in the Mobilization of Anti-EU Groups in France and the 
UK: The European Union as first-order politics”, European Integration, 29:1 (2007), pp.3-21 
 
Usherwood, S., “The Shifting Focus of Opposition to the European Union”, Journal of 
Contemporary European Research, 9:2 (2013), pp.279-296 
 
Vernon, J., “What is a cultural history of politics?”, History Workshop Journal, 52 (2001), 
pp.261-265 
 
Whipple, A.C., “‘Into Every Home, Into Every Body’: Organicism and anti-statism in the 
British anti-flouridation movement, 1952-1960”, Twentieth Century British History, 21:3 
(2010), pp.330-349 
 
Whipple, A.C., “Speaking for Whom? The 1971 Festival of Light and the search for the 
‘silent majority’”, Contemporary British History, 24:3 (2010), pp.319-339 
 
Young, J.W., “Churchill’s ‘No’ to Europe: The Rejection of European Union by Churchill’s 
Post-War Government, 1951-1952”, Historical Journal, 28:4 (1985), pp.923-937 
 
Zweiniger-Bargielowska, I., “Rationing, Austerity and the Conservative Party Recovery after 
1945”, Historical Journal, 37:1 (1994), pp.173-197 
 
 
 
Unpublished Works 
 
Ashford, N., “The Conservative Party and European Integration, 1945-1975”, unpublished 
PhD, 1983 
 
Calhoun, C., “Social Movements and Social Change”, paper delivered at London School of 
Economics, 27 November 2012 
 323 
 
 
Grant, W., “Is the study of pressure groups a fading paradigm?” Paper prepared for 60th 
Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association, 2010 
 
Moores, C.M., “From Civil Liberties to Human Rights?: British Civil Liberties Activism, 
1934-1989”, unpublished PhD, University of Birmingham, 2010 
 
Usherwood, S., “Left-wing opposition to the European Union in the UK: Explaining its 
under-development”, paper given at Political Studies Association conference, University of 
Lincoln, 7 April 2004 [cited with author’s permission] 
 
Usherwood, S., “Beyond Party Politics: Opposition to the European Union in France and the 
UK, 1985-1999”, unpublished PhD, London School of Economics, 2004 
